Hans wrote:
However,
outcome-based ethicists don’t like this focus on a few simple behavioral
rules because that allows for unequal results for similar efforts in a
broad range of domains of human endeavor, and doesn’t handle tragedy or
unfortunate events well.
That is true, and needs to be dealt with
at some point, but that can be taken care of in other ways. I don’t
see how that problem can be solved by any simple set of behavioral rules.
But the nonsimple ones have to come later, after we have an adequate and
sufficient system for recursion of the simple embodiment.
The bottom line is
that we will always struggle with the right yin/yang balancing act between
regulations/laws that assure broadly desired outcomes and rules/laws that focus
on equal treatment of people and institutions (no matter the outcome resulting
from such equal treatment by the law/force). This is further complicated be
law/force).
Absolutely true. But that is the
purpose of the judiciary, to perform that balancing act against the legal
structure of the moment. Even though there will always be a balancing
act, lets plan ways to control the balance, like the two wheel scooter turned
into control system the rider (I forget its name).
With a constitutional amendment, the
judiciary would have some teeth to close around infringements of our liberties
in those areas. Whether it’s the individual political players we
identified in the ontology so far, or individuals acting on their own, or
corporate or NGO actions, the amendment should name remedies that can be used,
and causes under which the players can be sued for costs plus damages when the
amendment is violated.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Hans Polzer
Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2012
6:50 PM
To: '[ontolog-forum]
'; doug@xxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Self Interest Ontology
Rich,
The main counter to
this tactic of enlisting the power of government is to reduce and focus
government power to a few “essential” domains, such as common
defense, external affairs (i.e., State Dept.), a judicial system, and a
monetary system (or at least some regulation of the monetary system to reduce
fraud and speculation). The more government gets involved in other domains, the
easier it is for the dominant/ascendant parties you refer to tilt the playing field
in their favor by influencing government behavior in those other domains.
However, outcome-based ethicists don’t like this focus on a few simple
behavioral rules because that allows for unequal results for similar
efforts in a broad range of domains of human endeavor, and doesn’t handle
tragedy or unfortunate events well. I’m reminded of Davy Crockett
objecting to Congress voting federal funds to provide disaster relief in the
early 1800’s for those impacted by a flood, if I recall correctly.
The bottom line is
that we will always struggle with the right yin/yang balancing act between
regulations/laws that assure broadly desired outcomes and rules/laws that focus
on equal treatment of people and institutions (no matter the outcome resulting
from such equal treatment by the law/force). This is further complicated be
law/force). This is further complicated by the problem of the commons and
externalities resulting from individual/institutional behavior but not readily
dealt with via agreements (i.e., contracts) among individual interacting
parties, such as pollution, infrastructure, etc.).
The key problem is
that there is usually a mismatch in incentives between those who benefit from
some regulation vice those who are adversely impacted by the same regulation.
The negative impact is usually diffuse and relatively small as seen by the
broad population, while the beneficiaries are usually relatively few and stand
to gain significantly from the regulation. That makes it hard to argue against
the regulation. This happens inside institutions of all sorts as well. SOPs and
employee guidebooks rarely get smaller over time. Every rule and process put in
place is there for a reason, but the cost to the institution of each such
rule/process is rarely documented/analyzed or periodically reviewed. So older
institutions tend towards being less competitive/effective in their chosen
domain over time (after some initial learning curve), and lose out to new
competitors – unless protected by the established government, or have
some “near death” experience that shakes up them up enough to
re-examine how they are doing business (and what business/domain it is really
in).
One mechanism that I
have seen work is to create some kind of “ombudsman” and
“outsider self assessment” institution that encourages
internal negative feedback signals and periodic or event/criteria-driven candid
self-examination of accreted rules/regulations/processes. If this is
accompanied by greater focus on regulation/rule costs to society (facilitated by
an “ombudsman” social networking function), in addition to the
traditional focus on the benefits of the same (for which focused advocacy
groups already exist), I believe you will see fewer laws/regulations passed
that tilt the playing field to favor any particular group or institution. But
if there is significant government involvement in some domain of human
endeavor, there will always be strong motivation for participants in that
domain to influence government/force in their favor (and attack/neutralize such
counteracting mechanisms). And from the government/force perspective, the
rules/laws will be viewed with a focus on their benefits and their negative
impacts minimized/discounted.
Hans
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Rich Cooper
Sent: Wednesday, June 06, 2012
4:03 PM
To: '[ontolog-forum]
'; doug@xxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Self Interest Ontology
John and Doug,
John wrote:
Just note that article I sent about the South Sea
Bubble. Shortly after they got their stamp of approval from the King,
they lobbied to cripple the competition by forbidding any stock to be traded
unless the corporation had a charter from the King.
That tactic – enlisting an
established power of force to limit competition – seems to be repeated
throughout history when any faction (corporate, NGO, political crusade,
populist movement …) becomes strong enough to enlist the contemporary
form of force (government, king, dictator, politician, …). By
eliminating competition, the ascendant group makes their position more
secure.
If this one tactic could be nullified,
i.e. if ascendant groups could be prevented from complete dominance, then the
remaining individuals could opt out of any proposed plan to deny them their
equal justice.
Does anyone have suggestions on how to
nullify the ability of the top to compel the remainder into their plan?
That is what Friedman’s “Power to Choose” is actually
about. Forget the politics he espouses and just consider the opt-out
tactic. If that could be put into an amendment to the constitution, and
enforced in nearly every case, it would put a stop to lots of this hijacking of
public interest and public funds in the service of private interests.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
Doug,
> John
emphasizes that lobbyists enhance the perceived self-interest of
> their corporations by writing (laws and) regulations to harm their
> competition.
Just note
that article I sent about the South Sea Bubble. Shortly after they got
their stamp of approval from the King, they lobbied to cripple the competition
by forbidding any stock to be traded unless the corporation had a charter from
the King.
Corporations
have been doing that even before Adam Smith was born. Those are the kinds
of shenanigans that destroy the efficacy of the "invisible
hand". When the South Sea Bubble burst, the difficulty of forming
new businesses prolonged the disastrous effects.
Big
business is the natural enemy of small business. Government has a
tendency to take the side of big business because they give bigger
"campaign contributions". But when you weaken the elected
government, there are no barriers of any kind to stop big businesses from
becoming the worst imaginable kind of de facto government.
Have you
ever heard of the company towns run by mining corporations in the 19th
century? Just listen to the song "16 Tons". That is
called laissez faire. That is why the Republicans passed the anti-trust
laws.
John