>Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> writes:
>
>> I think you are reading more into that word [objective] than
>> I do. Objective does not mean final, absolute, or
>> permanent. It means concerned with facts rather
>> than opinions.
>
>Please give an example of a statement of a fact that cannot be
>regarded as a statement of an opinion. (01)
There are so many its hard to know where to
start. Arithmetic affords an infinity of them,
including for example (02)
3.(4-1)=9 (03)
and other branches of mathematics afford a much
richer and more exotic set of examples, such as
the Jordan Curve theorem (one of my favorites). (04)
If you find mathematical truths a bit wonky, I
would suggest any reasonably thoroughly verified
scientific truth, such as the theory of
continental drift, say. Of course, any strictly
scientific truth is ultimately subject to
disconformation - in which case we discover that
it wasn't true after all - but that doesn't make
it into a mere *opinion*. Opinions are cheap;
truths are harder to find, and require a certain
mental discipline, attention to detail, and a
willingness to be careful about what one says. (05)
> > What this thread began with was
>> the question of whether it was possible for there
>> to be objective facts about logic, or whether in
>> contrast any logic was culturally embedded and
>> hence merely a collection of opinions or habits
>> or perhaps cultural prejudices. And my point was
>> simply that this second idea about logic is plain
>> flat wrong, and (I suspect) arises from ignorance
>> about the actual subject itself. What technical
>> logic (aka 'mathematical logic' or 'formal logic'
>> or simply these days 'modern logic') has
>> developed is a collection of ideas and methods of
>> analysis that amount to an *objective* theory of
>> truth, and hence of the superstructure of ideas
>> which rest on this notion of truth: entailment,
>> validity, consistency, etc.
>
>Pat, we've been talking right past each other. I used logic as an
>example of something that's a sacred cow for many (including both you
>and me), in order to illustrate the problem that one person's *truth*,
>no matter how well-reasoned or admirable or proven or descended from
>Sinai or consistent or WHATEVER it is, may be regarded by another
>person as *opinion*. (06)
Im afraid I thoroughly disagree. There really are
objective truths, and someone who asserts that
such a truth is merely a matter of opinion is
just wrong. Most of logic consists of truths
which are necessary: which could not *possibly*
be false. (07)
> The fact that the general applicability of logic
>is not a matter of opinion, at least in in *our* minds, does not
>change the fact that, for others, this may be just our opinion. (08)
There is of course no accounting for the vagaries
of human belief. But I see no particular
compulsion to be consistent with nonsense. (09)
> Such
>people do not share our values, or they do not share our experience,
>or whatever. (010)
No, they are simply wrong. It has nothing to do
with values, and its not a matter of culture.
Truth is not culturally relative. (011)
>My concern is to be able to allow *their* opinions to share the
>mainstream with whatever our "opinions" are. I do not want to exclude
>things just because they are illogical, or naive, or wrong-headed, or
>WHATEVER. (012)
Then we disagree fundamentally. I do want to
exclude them; or at least, I want their authors
to acquire enough of an education to be able to
understand what we are talking about. (013)
> As far as I can see, what's needed is a mainstream that's
>value-neutral, opinion-neutral, culture-neutral, logic-neutral, (014)
Value, opinion and culture, I agree. But you have
to tell me what that last term 'logic-neutral'
means. If someone is using a different LOGIC, I
don't think it is even possible to determine if
they are rational enough to communicate with. (015)
>etc.
>Neutral. I deeply agree with John's reminder of Pierce's injunction
>to avoid blocking inquiry. I would only add Hamlet's remark:
>
> There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
> (016)
More THINGS, yes. I also agree with this: in
fact, I coined the term 'Horatio principle' to
motivate the design of the Common Logic 'module'
construction. But to admit this idea, that there
are things about which we know nothing and have
nothing to say, is not to allow a plenitude of
*logics*. (017)
>If we want to be able to allow the things of which we have not yet
>dreamt (but of which others may have) in the mainstream of information
>processing, then we'll have to make room for them. (018)
How? We don't know what they are. (019)
> We cannot exclude
>them for *any* reason, (020)
On the contrary, we cannot do anything other than
ignore them, as Wittgenstein pointed out. (Wovon
man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man
schweigen. ) If that ignoring will cause trouble
later when they appear and their value is
recognized, we will have to reconsider our work
at that point. Such is life: in any case, nothing
we do is likely to last more than about 5 to 10
years. But we cannot plan to include things about
which we cannot, by definition, have any
information whatever. (021)
>other than perhaps that they are destructively
>viral, or something like that. (And even then, who gets to decide
>what's "destructive"? Better to find an approach that shrugs off
>attacks.)
>
>If we assume that the information that a given ontology will govern
>will never appear in any mainstream other than the mainstream defined
>by itself (and/or the ontologies from which it is co-derived), (022)
Im not sure what you mean by a mainstream. The
Semantic Web vision is one of many, many
ontologies, all part of a world-wide web of
information, referring to one another and in some
cases saying more about concepts used in other
ontologies; with new ontologies appearing every
minute, just like web pages do at present. Could
this be what you call a 'mainstream'? It is not
value-free, of course; but it can be what one
might call multi-valued, in that the various
ontologies will presumably be written by people
from a large variety of cultures and backgrounds,
and having different purposes in mind. But this
is possible only if they all agree to use the
same basic logic to communicate with one another. (023)
> then we
>assume that there can be no value-neutral mainstream that delegates to
>to the marketplace of ideas all decisions regarding what's valuable,
>what the nature of "value" is, what's relevant to what, and what
>bridges between perspectives are possible or useful.
>
>> To call this
>> 'objective' is not to claim that it is a final,
>> absolute truth which cannot be challenged.
>> (Amusingly, most of my professional life has been
>> spent challenging one part of it or another.) It
>> is to say that the challenge must be more
>> articulate and analytical than merely disparaging
>> the entire subject as a cultural opinion, just
>> one more subjective view among a multitude of
>> equally mythical cultural positions vying validly
>> for attention, and deserving of no special claim
> > on our allegiance.
>
>I meant no disparagement. And I certainly did *not* mean to abandon
>*my* values, or for anyone else to abandon theirs.
>
>(And as for your "articulate and analytical" requirement, touché. I
>have not found a good way to talk about this. A good way would be
>compelling *without* being off-putting. If you think of one, please
>call me collect!)
>
>> That is a fundamental
>> intellectual mistake, and ultimately an
>> anti-intellectual and anti-scientific stance to
>> adopt.
>
>Do you really believe the mainstream should exclude:
>
> * mistakes?
>
> * anti-intellectualism? (Is the mainstream of human communications
> and knowledge the exclusive province of intellectuals?)
>
> * anti-scientism?
>
> * religion? (Or even its ugly stepchild, religious fundamentalism?)
>
>My own feeling is that suppressing these things makes them more
>destructive, not less. (024)
What are we talking about here? Are we writing a
Bill of Rights for a human society, or are we
trying to do ontology engineering? I have
absolutely no interest in politics, myself, so Im
definitely not trying to do the former. So, yes,
of course I don't advocate suppressing religion.
But I also doubt that we need to have a
theologist as part of an ontology design team
(unless we are doing an ontology of theology,
maybe.) (025)
>To suppress them mechanically, by exclusion of
>one or more parts of their own foundations, or by requiring them to
>stand on a foundation that does not suit them, is to challenge them to
>survive *apart* from the public square. This may make the public
>square cleaner, more attractive, and easier to navigate, but the
>ultimate cost can be very high. It's better to let them appear in the
>mainstream. Let them stand in the full light of day. Let them remain
>in their withering/evergreen state permanently, as public monuments to
>their wrongheadedness and as meeting-places for people who are still
>learning their lessons. (026)
I have no idea what you are talking about here. (027)
>
>> It seems to go along with a view that
>> Truth (note the use of the mystical Capital
>> Letter) is something unattainable, beyond the
>> lowly human realm, something transcendent, almost
>> religious; so to claim to have a science of
>> mathematics of Truth is ridiculous, and a sign of
>> a limited cultural imagination. But this is just
>> the other side of the same misunderstanding. We
>> can, and do, have an objective theory of truth
>> precisely because truth is not transcendent or
>> unknowable or absolute. It is limited, mundane,
>> and tied to human forms of expression, and we are
>> often mistaken about it; but not about what it
>> *is*.
>
>I think we're arguing about the definitions of our terms, here. My
>use of the term "Truth" causes cognitive dissonance for you. (028)
Well, you havn't actually defined it: but I think
I get your drift. It doesn't cause me cognitive
dissonance (if it did, I might be more inclined
to agree with it): I just think its mistaken. (029)
>It is
>not helping us communicate. I've been talking about the kind of truth
>that is revealed only when we can see something from multiple
>perspectives. (030)
Hmm. Can you give me an example? Most of the
cross-cultural cases I know in detail are cases
where one culture got something wrong and the
other culture got it right, or at any rate more
right. (031)
> You've been talking about an objective theory of truth.
>Not the same thing.
>
>Reality doesn't exist in the absence of perspective. Reality is
>subjective, not objective. (032)
Absolute nonsense. Reality existed for billions
of years before there was anything that could
form a subjective view of it. If, as seems quite
possible, this planet contains the only life
capable of having a subjective view, and our sun
goes nova and wipes us all out, the universe will
carry on being objectively real without noticing
our passing. (033)
> When people speak, they speak the truth if
>they say what is real for them. (034)
No. They speak the truth when what they say is in
fact the case, in the actual world. (035)
>The *real* worlds are the worlds that
>are real *for persons*. (036)
No, the real world is the one that persons
inhabit and are part of. There is only one of it.
It is the one where if someone throws a brick at
you in it, you really do get objectively hurt.
(Alternative definition, from Peter Viereck:
Reality is that which, when you don't believe in
it, doesn't go away.) (037)
> Science, our Truth-seeking process, has long
>recognized this. For example, the differences between different
>persons' realities are the the reasons why experiments that yield
>significant results need to be independently replicated. (038)
You couldn't be more wrong about this point, but
this isn't the forum to go into a debate about
philosophy of science. (039)
>If we can participate in *multiple* realities, even including
>"realities" that we deprecate for one reason or another, sometimes we
>understand things better. (040)
Again, I'd like to see an example. I think this
is (leaving aside the nonsense about multiple
*realities*) usually false. Divergent points of
view are usually mostly wrong: insight comes from
locating the one that might be closest to the
truth. (041)
>It is not True, and not Scientific, to
>believe that Science moves forward entirely on the basis of what
>is already thought to be known about Truth. (042)
Well, actually science does kind of do this.
Theories are replaced, for sure: but part of what
the new theory must be able to do is to account
for the things that the old theory also
explained. Science requires that explanations
always increase, and older 'truths', now
exploded, can often be used as useful
approximations. Newtonian physics is wrong, but
it is a good enough approximation to enable
navigation to Saturn. (043)
> > So is your point that we should ignore all of
>> science and philosophy because it will eventually
>> be replaced by something else? That seems like a
>> recipe for always doing nothing.
>
>No. My point is merely that we should make room for the something
>else, lest it be suffocated at birth, and we be deprived of its
>value. (044)
This something else is an *alternative* to all of
science? I'm not going to hold my breath in case
that turns out to be of any real value. (045)
> > ...most useful debate is not merely the
>> pitting of contrary viewpoints against one
>> another, but arises when people try to understand
>> the other position: which often requires a lot of
>> mutual education.
>
>Yes. And how can the mainstream best provide for such mutual
>education?
>
>(a) By demanding that whatever is expressed be expressed in
> terms of some particular ontology? (046)
It might often be useful for each side to express
its ideas in an ontology-ish form. We have found
for example than many disagreements can be
exposed and then resolved by having the people
involved cooperate on the construction of a
concept map, which can often be seen as a kind of
informal sketch of an ontology. (047)
>(b) By supporting an ontology-neutral mainstream for interchanging and
> integrating diverse, and diversely expressed, knowledge that
> emanates from diverse perspectives (realities)?
>
>In my work, I see a lot of sentiment in favor of (a) (048)
Do you? I have never advocated this, and I havnt
heard it advocated much in Ontolog discussions
(though 'controlled vocabularies' do have this
flavor, I will admit.) (049)
>, and very little
>in favor of (b). (050)
That might be because (b) is, on the face of it,
impossible, or maybe meaningless. An ontology is
a formalization of a conceptualization. There
cannot be a conceptualization-free ontology: the
idea doesn't make sense. (051)
> Experience tells me that (a) can work well within a
>small community, and even in a large community with very smart
>leadership and very compliant members, but *not* otherwise. I'm
>interested in (b) because I think it might make things better. (052)
Well, as I say, you go ahead. I have no idea what
you plan to do, and I don't expect you to be able
to make very much progress, but I'd be delighted
to be proved wrong. In the meantime, the rest of
us will try to get some actual ontological work
done. (053)
Pat (054)
>
>-- Steve
>
>Steven R. Newcomb, Consultant
>Coolheads Consulting
>
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>
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