DF wrote:
Event is defined as a subclass of IntangibleIndividual.
> I'm not sure why this was unclear to you.
The relationship is misleadingly treated as a formal entity,
> Why does this mislead you?
> The inference engine seems to work well. Is it the name of the upper
ontology class that kills Cyc for you?
AA: We have to agree that the quality (credibility and validity) of upper,
foundation ontology means everything for future knowledge technologies and
semantic applications. That is mostly determined by 2 things:
ontological status the developers assign to the key entities: substances,
states, qualities, quantities, events, changes, and processes;
ontological status the developers assign to the key parts of the world, the
relationships of causality, space, time, part-whole, etc.
If somebody creates a world model for machines where events and
relationships are nonexistent, both really and virtually, then such
machines and applications will sure fail to face "harsh realities."
Again, if somebody's own reality excludes events and relationships as real
world things, then such person will certainly fail to face "harsh
realities".
Azamat Abdoullaev (01)
----- Original Message -----
From: "doug foxvog" <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2010 8:34 AM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations (02)
> On Tue, August 17, 2010 14:56, AzamatAbdoullaev said:
>> DF wrote:
>>> 'Extending this, classes/types, relations/predicates, and functions are
>>> also "things" if they are in the universe of discourse.'
>
>> Agree.
>
>>> "Cyc's #$Thing includes all these as instances as well as individuals."
>
>> Here sorry to disagree.
>
> You may wish this wasn't so, but it is a feature of the Cyc language.
>
>> Indeed, Thing is dubbed as "the universal collection" of which everything
>> is
>> a member. But the ontological distinction between universals and
>> particulars, classes and members, collections and individuals, is
>> confusing.
>
> This can be confusing to those who first start to look at Cyc.
>
>> Thing is divided into Individual ("the collection of all things that are
>> not collections, abstract and concrete, include physical objects, events,
>> numbers, relations, and groups") and Intangible Thing ("things that are
>> not physical, including events...and ideas").
>
> This is not a partition, as you state below. There is a huge intersection
> between Individual and IntangibleThing. Abstract Individuals are also
> IntangibleThings.
>
>> Individuals, concrete and abstract, and Intangible, not having physical
>> substance, both are neither separate classes, nor disjoint things.
>> Now what events are unclear: Individuals or Intangible things.
>
> Event is defined as a subclass of IntangibleIndividual.
> I'm not sure why this was unclear to you.
>
>> The third level is made of relations, sets, and collections, or natural
>> kinds and classes, with elements, supercollections and subcollections
>
> Cyc uses #$Collection to denote "class". #$Set denotes the concept of
> mathematical set. As a mathematical set can not change, while a class
> may have different members at different times, #$Collection and #$Set
> are disjoint. Cyc does not define "natural kind", but the #$comments
> inform the reader that natural kinds are intended to be represented by
> #$Collections.
>
> The ideas of element, supercollection, and subcollection are predicates,
> not classes.
>
>> The relationship is misleadingly treated as a formal entity,
>
> Why does this mislead you?
>
> The class #$Relation is partitioned into #$Function and #$Predicate.
>
>> and it is
>> improperly among "sets" and "collections", deprecated as a conceptual
>> thing:
>> "relationship is a mathematical object".
>
> There is no depreciation here. #$MathermaticalThing has set, collection,
> and #$MathematicalObject as disjoint subclasses. #$MathematicalObject
> is the intersection of #$MathematicalThing and #$IntangibleIndividual
> and has #$Relation as a subcollection. Is your objection to the
> name "Mathematical Object" being given to s #$Collection which hasRelation
> as subclass? Do you feel that a "conceptual thing" cannot be
> mathematical?
>
>> That alone kills all the big effort.
>
> The inference engine seems to work well. Is it the name of the upper
> ontology class that kills Cyc for you?
>
> -- doug
>
>> ...
>
>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "doug foxvog" <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2010 8:04 AM
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, August 16, 2010 14:36, AzamatAbdoullaev said:
>>>> RC wrote:
>>>>> ...
>>>>> "Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
>>>>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
>>>>> plurality,
>>>>> stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word "thing", as
>>>>> the
>>>>> most abstract of all objects?
>>>
>>>> ASHA: Yes, Thing refers to the Universal Class of all sorts of
>>>> entities,
>>>> implying the universal property of all entities, whereas Nothing refers
>>>> to
>>>> the Null Class .
>>>
>>> There are many definitions of "thing". It is useful to have a common
>>> term for the universal class and many ontologies have used the word
>>> "thing".
>>>
>>>> RC: Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
>>>> foregoing?"
>>>
>>>> ASHA: In the broad sense, it is a substance, state, change, process as
>>>> far
>>>> as "every sign is also a thing, for what is not a thing is nothing at
>>>> all".
>>>
>>> Extending this, classes/types, relations/predicates, and functions are
>>> also "things" if they are in the universe of discourse. Cyc's #$Thing
>>> includes all these as instances as well as individuals.
>>>
>>>> In NL, words are the signs of ideas and images, thoughts and feelings,
>>>> while the mental signs are the similitudes of things.
>>>
>>>> The beauty of machines consists in that they don't require the mental
>>>> signs (ideas and images) as the medium whereby symbols (physical
>>>> signals)
>>>> could signify the real things.
>>>
>>> They do require symbols other than the symbols used by humans, similar
>>> to
>>> the significants in human minds.
>>>
>>> -- doug
>>>
>>>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> From: Rich Cooper
>>>> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
>>>> Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 12:20 AM
>>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Azamat,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "That confuses me no end if Peirceans can't tie the theory to some
>>>> commonly understood reality for me. Is there a more fruitful
>>>> description that explains the language used and chosen for that
>>>> representation?"
>>>>
>>>> Rich,
>>>>
>>>> The nature of signs and symbols and significations, their definition,
>>>> elements, and types, was mainly established by Aristotle, Augustine,
>>>> and
>>>> Aquinas.
>>>>
>>>> According to these classic sources, significance is a relationship
>>>> between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they signify
>>>> (intend, express or mean), where one term necessarily causes something
>>>> else to come to the mind. Distinguishing natural signs and conventional
>>>> signs, the traditional theory of signs sets the following threefold
>>>> partition of things:
>>>>
>>>> 1.. There are things that are just things, not any sign at all;
>>>> 2.. There are things that are also signs of other things (as
>>>> natural
>>>> signs of the physical world and mental signs of the mind);
>>>> 3.. There are things that are always signs, as languages (natural
>>>> and
>>>> artificial) and other cultural nonverbal symbols, as documents, money,
>>>> ceremonies, and rites. see a brief but comprehensive account,
>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign
>>>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for your view on this; it helps me compare and contrast my own
>>>> theoretical understanding with yours.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So a familiar sign S represents another sign S2 in one agent's mind,
>>>> yet
>>>> can represent only S itself in another agent's mind, while
>>>> simultaneously representing S3 (money, a document .) to still another
>>>> agent?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
>>>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
>>>> plurality, stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word
>>>> "thing", as the most abstract of all objects?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
>>>> foregoing?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for the stimulating viewpoint,
>>>>
>>>> -Rich
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>
>>>> Rich Cooper
>>>>
>>>> EnglishLogicKernel.com
>>>>
>>>> Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
>>>>
>>>> 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>> =============================================================
>>> doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
>>>
>>> "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
>>> initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
>>> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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>>
>
>
> =============================================================
> doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
>
> "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
> initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
> =============================================================
>
>
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