FERENC KOVACS <f.kovacs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: (01)
John et al, (02)
In your paper referenced on “the classification of signs, three basic
categories
are Mark, Token, and Type” you write: “A mark is an uninterpreted sign of
any
kind”, in other words it is an object that the interpreter does not relate
to
itself, whether human or machine. So it is simply disregarded, the
question
whether a friend or a foe is not even asked. As we look for objects in
anticipation of what we already know about the world, anything identified
as not
known (identified) will be termed as “unidentified” in terms of properties
already identified.
In my analysis objects may be seen as form and content. If you can
recognize a
form (pattern), then you give it a name (another form), which may be
different
by groups of people knowing the same or similar objects. If you cannot
recognize
it, you can still abstract its properties which will be its content. And
you may
decide to use that property in naming them. In the classic example of
seeing
different object made of gold, you will call them golden thingies.
Further to that you write: “a type is a pattern for classifying marks”.
In my
view type is just a name for a number of similar objects grouped as a set,
hence
an object of multiple incidences.
Therefore “a token is the result of classifying a mark according to some
type”
means to me that they are specific or individual memebrs of the former
sets Just
as you say in your example: “For example, a pattern of green and yellow in
the
lawn is a mark, which could be interpreted according to the viewer's
interests
as a token of type Plant, Weed, Flower, SaladGreen, Dandelion, etc.
But in my view “a pattern of green and yellow in the lawn” is just the
same as
saying that a number of unidentified objects are in an known object.
(which is a
little exageration, as I am going to explain below): why?
The only difference between these words (noun phrases) used for
identification
is that they differ in specificity. Every one of them may be placed in a
continuum of specific and generic, another dual facets of objects (like
form and
content), which is not necessarily identical or best represented with a
tree
structure
Further comments:“A sign may be characterized by the way the mark
determines the
referent” I am sorry, this is the other way round, it is the interpreter
who
determines the way to characterize a referent, especially via its
capabilities
(e.g. senses)
Therefore an intepreter in the analysis (comparison of one stimulus
(object)
with old expereience and expectations) he/it will find it to be an
“1. Icon: according to some similarity of image, pattern, or structure.”
But not just that, for instance in terms of varying degrees of a property
“2. Index: according to some physical relationship; e.g., immediate
presence,
pointing to
something remote, or causally indicating something not directly
perceptible.”
Indexing is just pointing to something else (locatable in space or time),
so it
is close to soemthing specific.
“3. Symbol: according to some convention; e.g., spoken words, written
words,
money, flag, uniform...+
Yes, that is fine, but I should add, that all of the above items are a
product
of convention, not just your symbols. A symbol is a man made object to
stand in
for a not man made object, a “surrogate”. But it is not just man made
objects
that are used that way. Think of a rainbow, etc.
Regards,
ferenc (03)
________________________________
From: doug foxvog <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: [ontolog-forum] <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, 17 August, 2010 6:04:15
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations (04)
On Mon, August 16, 2010 14:36, AzamatAbdoullaev said:
> RC wrote:
>> ...
>> "Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
plurality,
>> stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word "thing", as
the
>> most abstract of all objects? (05)
> ASHA: Yes, Thing refers to the Universal Class of all sorts of entities,
> implying the universal property of all entities, whereas Nothing refers
to
> the Null Class . (06)
There are many definitions of "thing". It is useful to have a common
term for the universal class and many ontologies have used the word
"thing". (07)
> RC: Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
> foregoing?" (08)
> ASHA: In the broad sense, it is a substance, state, change, process as
far
> as "every sign is also a thing, for what is not a thing is nothing at
> all". (09)
Extending this, classes/types, relations/predicates, and functions are
also "things" if they are in the universe of discourse. Cyc's #$Thing
includes all these as instances as well as individuals. (010)
> In NL, words are the signs of ideas and images, thoughts and feelings,
> while the mental signs are the similitudes of things. (011)
> The beauty of machines consists in that they don't require the mental
> signs (ideas and images) as the medium whereby symbols (physical
signals)
> could signify the real things. (012)
They do require symbols other than the symbols used by humans, similar to
the significants in human minds. (013)
-- doug (014)
> Azamat Abdoullaev
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Rich Cooper
> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
> Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 12:20 AM
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>
>
> Hi Azamat,
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> "That confuses me no end if Peirceans can't tie the theory to some
> commonly understood reality for me. Is there a more fruitful
> description that explains the language used and chosen for that
> representation?"
>
> Rich,
>
> The nature of signs and symbols and significations, their definition,
> elements, and types, was mainly established by Aristotle, Augustine, and
> Aquinas.
>
> According to these classic sources, significance is a relationship
> between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they signify
> (intend, express or mean), where one term necessarily causes something
> else to come to the mind. Distinguishing natural signs and conventional
> signs, the traditional theory of signs sets the following threefold
> partition of things:
>
> 1.. There are things that are just things, not any sign at all;
> 2.. There are things that are also signs of other things (as natural
> signs of the physical world and mental signs of the mind);
> 3.. There are things that are always signs, as languages (natural and
> artificial) and other cultural nonverbal symbols, as documents, money,
> ceremonies, and rites. see a brief but comprehensive account,
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign
> Azamat Abdoullaev
>
>
>
> Thanks for your view on this; it helps me compare and contrast my own
> theoretical understanding with yours.
>
>
>
> So a familiar sign S represents another sign S2 in one agent's mind,
yet
> can represent only S itself in another agent's mind, while
> simultaneously representing S3 (money, a document .) to still another
> agent?
>
>
>
> Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
> plurality, stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word
> "thing", as the most abstract of all objects?
>
>
>
> Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
foregoing?
>
>
>
> Thanks for the stimulating viewpoint,
>
> -Rich
>
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Rich Cooper
>
> EnglishLogicKernel.com
>
> Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
>
> 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
------
>
>
>
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doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org (016)
"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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