|From:||FERENC KOVACS <f.kovacs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>|
|Date:||Wed, 18 Aug 2010 05:44:06 +0000 (GMT)|
On Tue, August 17, 2010 4:39, FERENC KOVACS said:
> You wrote:
DF> I interpreted this to mean that a "mark" is a physical sign, one that
DF> can be sensed (possibly by a mechanical sensor). Such a "mark" is
DF> not an interpretant
DF> of another sign. It would not cease to be a mark if and when it is
FK> That is fine. Nothing ceases to be a different thing, becasue
FK> someone interprets it.
This is why i rejected the interpretation of a "mark" being a sign that is not interpreted.
>FK So mark is a change in an object that is not interpreted in more specific terms?
FK> the point is whether we, the observers relate ourselves to it or
FK> not. Millions of people believe that certain objects are "messages for
FK> them" erroneously
DF> Note that this is an identification. A sign composed of stones piled
DF> in a certain way might not be identified as being a sign at all.
> FK Well. What is not identification? being aware of something,
The identification i mention was the identification of some complex set
of sensations as being the sensation of an object. Boundaries of the
object are to some extent identified. Without identifying the set of
sensations as being from the same object, the object can not be classified
because its existence is not sensed.
>FK In addition to the identification of some complex sense of sensations as being the sensation of an object you also have the inseparable awareness of your own self/consciousness. Why think that such a set comes from the same object before perceiving the existence of details that should be used to classify it as known, unknown, etc. The number one experience is existence and light which is defined in terms of its shortage, a naural change in stimuli.
> or seeing it
> idential or known, familiar, etc. is also identification just as saying
> "this is an apple". The point is tha a natural langauge is used in
> details to make sense. And if the explicit wording is limited, it is
> becasue the
> context is extensive. Both are needed to make anything a sign, symbol or a
> ... *but you do recognize it as being a pattern* ...
FK> But you do, because even a tiny dot or a cloud are patterns whether you
FK> know more about them or not.
There are googles of patterns being sensed by a conscious person every
second. A near infinitesimal fraction of them are recognized as patterns.
> I agree. But for me sensing anything not recognized as patterns is sensing content (as opposed to form, i.e. pattern recognized), the number one property of which is existense and of course change and non existence (in space and time, of whic we are also conscious of).
Patterb is a whole, content is not, it is just one or more proeprties (that ultimately make up a form)
FK> In NLs your definitions come from the basic set,
FK> objects, properties and relstions. If you see or hear something, then
FK> that *i*s
FK> an object (check out the meaning of the word object in Latin).
It takes a lot of processing from the input soundscape or visual field
before one sees or hears "something". Many sounds impinge on the ears
at the same time [I hear fan noises, passing vehicles, cicadas, other
insects, birds, the keyboard as i am typing, a passing plane, ...], but
one is able to segment it into different audio objects.
By identifying certain audio objects, I don't consider the existence of
the googles of other combinations of sound as being other audio objects.
>FK the name for other combinations of sound is noise, which is an audio object.
FK> And the most
FK> generic property of such an object is that it exists (ask John).
Do you mean they exist in the observer's head or in the outside world?
[assuming for now that the observer is not a machine, but a headed animal].
Do audio and visual objects i sense while watching the cinema exist?
>FK If they exist in space and time (as physical objects do), yes, they do. But they may not have a name other than just object (meaning something obstructing your vision) and which is about the first word to be used recursively to develop a natural language.
FK> And such an
FK> object, if the pattern is not recognized, then may be recognized as
FK> content -
FK> content known from previous experience (abstraction included)
FK> And contetn is a
FK> property, and then you may look for other objects with the same
FK> or similar property.
Only after identifying them as objects.
>FK It is a question of definition. The universe, the world, etc. are objects. They are also form and content, and quality and quantity.
>>> In my view, type is just a name for a number of similar objects grouped
>>> as a set, hence an object of multiple incidences.
DF> There's a distinction you don't appear to be making. First, you
DF>define a "type"
DF> as being a name; then consider it a class with instances. These are
DF> two different things. The meaning of "type" being discussed is the
DF> class with instances. As such, it is not a sign, although signs can
DF> signify it.
FK> Something eludes us here both. But I agree that a type is a
FK> class with instances, and the name of the class is also type, which
FK> is a sign.
> Want examples?
DF> Why unidentified? It is identified as being a physical object (which
DF> significant world knowledge, treating yellow flower image and green leaf
DF> as part of the same object). The example had the observer interpreting
DF> the object as being an instance of one of several overlapping types.
FK> We have the issue of precision on hand if it is identified as a
FK> object, then it is not identified az there are brazilian phyiscal
FK> objects out there.
DF> The distinction is lacking here, too. The words are signs. It is
DF> not the signs
DF> that differ in specificity; each refers to a specific category.
DF> There may be multiple signs that refer to the same category.
FK> The words are signs, and they are at the same time objects.
Sure. They are intangible objects.
FK> If they denote chunks of reality, they are names,
... or pronouns ...
>FK it is just a technical difference
FK> if they denote concepts (categories) they are
FK> (again) further broken down into form and content. the form of
FK> a concept is its name,
I'd question this, as a concept could have multiple names.
>Fk No problem. Any object in space has at least six surfaces to look at. Of course, a concept conceived as being without any dimensions must be hard to represent in the real word.
FK> and the content of a concept is its extension and intension,
FK> which may further be broken down, if you like.
DF> My first impression was that you were referring to a linear continuum. A
DF> continuum of an indeterminate number of dimensions would seem more
DF> appropriate to me.
FK> I do not like the term dimension, especially when we talk about a
FK> linear continuum, which is a direction, rather than a dimension.
Something linear is one dimensional, even if it has a direction.
You removed the context here.
>FK What i mean is being one dimensional to me is the same as directional, as movement is only one directional
DF> Each individual would probably accept different extensions for the
DF> categories specified, depending on context.
DF> I did not interpret these categories as a tree structure.
FK> Not you personally, I agree
DF> The point was different types of sign. The first class (icon)
DF> portrays a similarity to its referent, allowing one who has
DF> never experienced a similar
DF> sign before a chance of figuring out the referent; the less symbolic
DF> the icon
DF> (e.g., a photograph), the easier this is. The second class (index)
DF> depends on
DF> context, with the same sign meaning different things in different
DF> contexts; but
DF> yes, the interpreter must understand that something is being
DF> pointed to. The
DF> third class (symbol) relies on the interpreter to already know
DF>the meaning of the sign.
FK> 1. How do you create different types (of signs)? Obviously by
FK> abstractions. So what is the difference in making types of automobiles,
FK> etc. and
FK> creating types of signs?
FK> 2. You always depend and rely on context, which includes your mind and
FK> experience, whatever that is.
DF> This is true of computer indexing in databases. However, the
DF>discussion is in
DF> no way restricted to indexes in computer programs.
FK> I am glad to hear that.
FK> And also true of books, search engine bookmarks, etc.
I was responding to your comment about a "Type II" sign being
dependent on standard symbols, or something similar. A book can
refer to things by marks highlighting parts of images printed in
the books. The pointing marks need not be from a standard set of
Search engines, on the other hand, just like databases, require a
predefined set of symbols for pointing.
>KF I see.
doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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