On Tue, August 17, 2010 14:56, AzamatAbdoullaev said:
> DF wrote:
>> 'Extending this, classes/types, relations/predicates, and functions are
>> also "things" if they are in the universe of discourse.' (01)
> Agree. (02)
>> "Cyc's #$Thing includes all these as instances as well as individuals." (03)
> Here sorry to disagree. (04)
You may wish this wasn't so, but it is a feature of the Cyc language. (05)
> Indeed, Thing is dubbed as "the universal collection" of which everything
> is
> a member. But the ontological distinction between universals and
> particulars, classes and members, collections and individuals, is
> confusing. (06)
This can be confusing to those who first start to look at Cyc. (07)
> Thing is divided into Individual ("the collection of all things that are
> not collections, abstract and concrete, include physical objects, events,
> numbers, relations, and groups") and Intangible Thing ("things that are
> not physical, including events...and ideas"). (08)
This is not a partition, as you state below. There is a huge intersection
between Individual and IntangibleThing. Abstract Individuals are also
IntangibleThings. (09)
> Individuals, concrete and abstract, and Intangible, not having physical
> substance, both are neither separate classes, nor disjoint things.
> Now what events are unclear: Individuals or Intangible things. (010)
Event is defined as a subclass of IntangibleIndividual.
I'm not sure why this was unclear to you. (011)
> The third level is made of relations, sets, and collections, or natural
> kinds and classes, with elements, supercollections and subcollections (012)
Cyc uses #$Collection to denote "class". #$Set denotes the concept of
mathematical set. As a mathematical set can not change, while a class
may have different members at different times, #$Collection and #$Set
are disjoint. Cyc does not define "natural kind", but the #$comments
inform the reader that natural kinds are intended to be represented by
#$Collections. (013)
The ideas of element, supercollection, and subcollection are predicates,
not classes. (014)
> The relationship is misleadingly treated as a formal entity, (015)
Why does this mislead you? (016)
The class #$Relation is partitioned into #$Function and #$Predicate. (017)
> and it is
> improperly among "sets" and "collections", deprecated as a conceptual
> thing:
> "relationship is a mathematical object". (018)
There is no depreciation here. #$MathermaticalThing has set, collection,
and #$MathematicalObject as disjoint subclasses. #$MathematicalObject
is the intersection of #$MathematicalThing and #$IntangibleIndividual
and has #$Relation as a subcollection. Is your objection to the
name "Mathematical Object" being given to s #$Collection which hasRelation
as subclass? Do you feel that a "conceptual thing" cannot be
mathematical? (019)
> That alone kills all the big effort. (020)
The inference engine seems to work well. Is it the name of the upper
ontology class that kills Cyc for you? (021)
-- doug (022)
> ... (023)
> Azamat Abdoullaev
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "doug foxvog" <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>
> To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2010 8:04 AM
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>
>
>>
>> On Mon, August 16, 2010 14:36, AzamatAbdoullaev said:
>>> RC wrote:
>>>> ...
>>>> "Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
>>>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
>>>> plurality,
>>>> stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word "thing", as
>>>> the
>>>> most abstract of all objects?
>>
>>> ASHA: Yes, Thing refers to the Universal Class of all sorts of
>>> entities,
>>> implying the universal property of all entities, whereas Nothing refers
>>> to
>>> the Null Class .
>>
>> There are many definitions of "thing". It is useful to have a common
>> term for the universal class and many ontologies have used the word
>> "thing".
>>
>>> RC: Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
>>> foregoing?"
>>
>>> ASHA: In the broad sense, it is a substance, state, change, process as
>>> far
>>> as "every sign is also a thing, for what is not a thing is nothing at
>>> all".
>>
>> Extending this, classes/types, relations/predicates, and functions are
>> also "things" if they are in the universe of discourse. Cyc's #$Thing
>> includes all these as instances as well as individuals.
>>
>>> In NL, words are the signs of ideas and images, thoughts and feelings,
>>> while the mental signs are the similitudes of things.
>>
>>> The beauty of machines consists in that they don't require the mental
>>> signs (ideas and images) as the medium whereby symbols (physical
>>> signals)
>>> could signify the real things.
>>
>> They do require symbols other than the symbols used by humans, similar
>> to
>> the significants in human minds.
>>
>> -- doug
>>
>>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: Rich Cooper
>>> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
>>> Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 12:20 AM
>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>>>
>>>
>>> Hi Azamat,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "That confuses me no end if Peirceans can't tie the theory to some
>>> commonly understood reality for me. Is there a more fruitful
>>> description that explains the language used and chosen for that
>>> representation?"
>>>
>>> Rich,
>>>
>>> The nature of signs and symbols and significations, their definition,
>>> elements, and types, was mainly established by Aristotle, Augustine,
>>> and
>>> Aquinas.
>>>
>>> According to these classic sources, significance is a relationship
>>> between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they signify
>>> (intend, express or mean), where one term necessarily causes something
>>> else to come to the mind. Distinguishing natural signs and conventional
>>> signs, the traditional theory of signs sets the following threefold
>>> partition of things:
>>>
>>> 1.. There are things that are just things, not any sign at all;
>>> 2.. There are things that are also signs of other things (as
>>> natural
>>> signs of the physical world and mental signs of the mind);
>>> 3.. There are things that are always signs, as languages (natural
>>> and
>>> artificial) and other cultural nonverbal symbols, as documents, money,
>>> ceremonies, and rites. see a brief but comprehensive account,
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign
>>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks for your view on this; it helps me compare and contrast my own
>>> theoretical understanding with yours.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So a familiar sign S represents another sign S2 in one agent's mind,
>>> yet
>>> can represent only S itself in another agent's mind, while
>>> simultaneously representing S3 (money, a document .) to still another
>>> agent?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
>>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
>>> plurality, stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word
>>> "thing", as the most abstract of all objects?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
>>> foregoing?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks for the stimulating viewpoint,
>>>
>>> -Rich
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sincerely,
>>>
>>> Rich Cooper
>>>
>>> EnglishLogicKernel.com
>>>
>>> Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
>>>
>>> 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>> =============================================================
>> doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
>>
>> "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
>> initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
>> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
>> =============================================================
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> (024)
=============================================================
doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org (025)
"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
============================================================= (026)
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