Hi Doug and Azamat, thanks for joining in the translation. My
comments are below,
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 10:04 PM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
On Mon, August 16, 2010 14:36, AzamatAbdoullaev said:
> RC wrote:
>> ...
>> "Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you
use the word
>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words
like object, plurality,
>> stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word
"thing", as the
>> most abstract of all objects?
> ASHA: Yes, Thing refers to the Universal Class of all sorts of
entities,
> implying the universal property of all entities, whereas Nothing
refers to
> the Null Class .
DF: There are many definitions of "thing". It is useful
to have a common
term for the universal class and many ontologies have used the word
"thing".
RC: In OOP parlance, the most general "thing" is the combined
TClass and TObject pair,
which cycle in a way that has to be controlled by the programmer writing derived
classes and instances that make up an application. I can live with a
vocabulary change to Thing without much trouble, assuming a Thing can be
defined as a Class of Thing circularly on itself (inheritance,
virtual methods, etc) so long as it is not circularly defined. In Delphi for example, the compiler is using the combined
TClass and TObject basis for encoding the conceptual framework into an functional
program.
> RC: Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan,
history of the
> foregoing?"
> ASHA: In the broad sense, it is a substance, state, change,
process as far
> as "every sign is also a thing, for what is not a thing is
nothing at
> all".
DF: Extending this, classes/types, relations/predicates, and functions
are
also "things" if they are in the universe of discourse.
Cyc's #$Thing
includes all these as instances as well as individuals.
RC: So it is NECESSARY to have classes,
relations, predicates and other functions in the domain of discourse of the content
being described – i.e. the content must be able to use the symbol ‘class’,
‘relation’ and so forth? Perhaps I misunderstand, and you don’t
mean that the universe of discourse includes these literal signs of those symbols,
which normally are considered more in the metadata layer than in the content
layer.
> In NL, words are the signs of ideas and images, thoughts and
feelings,
> while the mental signs are the similitudes of things.
> The beauty of machines consists in that they don't require the
mental
> signs (ideas and images) as the medium whereby symbols (physical
signals)
> could signify the real things.
They do require symbols other than the symbols used by humans, similar
to
the significants in human minds.
-- doug
An interesting point – they think in
binary ultimately, and do anything computable using that sparse notation, but
it would all be useless without our projections, both collective and
individual.
An awe inspiring subject if only it weren’t
nearly 11 PM.
-Rich
> Azamat Abdoullaev
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Rich Cooper
> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
> Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 12:20 AM
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>
>
> Hi Azamat,
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> "That confuses me no end if Peirceans can't tie
the theory to some
> commonly understood reality for me. Is there a more fruitful
> description that explains the language used and chosen for that
> representation?"
>
> Rich,
>
> The nature of signs and symbols and significations,
their definition,
> elements, and types, was mainly established by Aristotle,
Augustine, and
> Aquinas.
>
> According to these classic sources, significance is a
relationship
> between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they
signify
> (intend, express or mean), where one term necessarily causes
something
> else to come to the mind. Distinguishing natural signs and
conventional
> signs, the traditional theory of signs sets the following
threefold
> partition of things:
>
> 1.. There are things that are just things,
not any sign at all;
> 2.. There are things that are also signs
of other things (as natural
> signs of the physical world and mental signs of the mind);
> 3.. There are things that are always
signs, as languages (natural and
> artificial) and other cultural nonverbal symbols, as documents,
money,
> ceremonies, and rites. see a brief but comprehensive account,
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign
> Azamat Abdoullaev
>
>
>
> Thanks for your view on this; it helps me compare and
contrast my own
> theoretical understanding with yours.
>
>
>
> So a familiar sign S represents another sign S2 in one
agent's mind, yet
> can represent only S itself in another agent's mind, while
> simultaneously representing S3 (money, a document .) to still
another
> agent?
>
>
>
> Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you
use the word
> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like
object,
> plurality, stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the
word
> "thing", as the most abstract of all objects?
>
>
>
> Can a "thing" include an action, method,
plan, history of the foregoing?
>
>
>
> Thanks for the stimulating viewpoint,
>
> -Rich
>
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Rich Cooper
>
> EnglishLogicKernel.com
>
> Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
>
> 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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doug foxvog doug@xxxxxxxxxx
http://ProgressiveAustin.org
"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be
ours."
- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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