On Tue, August 17, 2010 1:26, FERENC KOVACS said: (01)
> In your paper referenced on "the classification of signs, three basic
> categories
> are Mark, Token, and Type" you write: "A mark is an uninterpreted sign
> of any
> kind", in other words it is an object that the interpreter does not
> relate to itself, whether human or machine. (02)
I interpreted this to mean that a "mark" is a physical sign, one that can
be sensed (possibly by a mechanical sensor. Such a "mark" is not an
interpretant of another sign. It would not cease to be a mark if and
when it is interpreted. (03)
> So it is simply disregarded, the
> question
> whether a friend or a foe is not even asked. As we look for objects in
> anticipation of what we already know about the world, anything identified
> as not
> known (identified) will be termed as "unidentified"� in terms of
> properties already identified. (04)
Note that this is an identification. A sign composed of stones piled
in a certain way might not be identified as being a sign at all. (05)
> In my analysis objects may be seen as form and content. If you can
> recognize a
> form (pattern), then you give it a name (another form), which may be�
> different
> by groups of people knowing the same or similar objects.
> If you cannot recognize it, ... (06)
... *but you do recognize it as being a pattern* ... (07)
> you can still abstract its properties which will be its content. And
> you may
> decide to use that property in naming them. In the classic example of
> seeing
> different object made of gold, you will call them golden thingies. �
> Further to that you write: "a type is a pattern for classifying
> marks"�. In my view
> type is just a name for a number of similar objects grouped as a set,
> hence an object of multiple incidences. (08)
?
There's a distinction you don't appear to be making. First, you define
a "type" as being a name; then consider it a class with instances. These
are two different things. (09)
The meaning of "type" being discussed is the class with instances. As
such, it is not a sign, although signs can signify it. (010)
> Therefore "a token is the result of classifying a mark according to some
> type"
> means to me that they are specific or individual memebrs of the former
> sets Just
> as you say in your example: "For example, a pattern of green and yellow
> in the
> lawn is a mark, which could be interpreted according to the viewer's
> interests
> as a token of type Plant, Weed, Flower, SaladGreen, Dandelion, etc." (011)
> But in my view "a pattern of green and yellow in the lawn"� is just the
> same as
> saying that a number of unidentified objects are in an known object. (012)
Why unidentified? It is identified as being a physical object (which
takes significant world knowledge, treating yellow flower image and
green leaf images as part of the same object). The example had the
observer interpreting the object as being an instance of one of several
overlapping types. (013)
> (which is a
> little exageration, as I am going to explain below): why?
> The only difference between these words (noun phrases) used for
> identification
> is that they differ in specificity. (014)
The distinction is lacking here, too. The words are signs. It is not
the signs that differ in specificity; each refers to a specific category.
There may be multiple signs that refer to the same category. (015)
> Every one of them (016)
By "them", you mean the category, not the sign. (017)
> may be placed in a continuum of specific and generic, (018)
My first impression was that you were referring to a linear continuum.
A continuum of an indeterminate number of dimensions would seem more
appropriate to me. (019)
Each individual would probably accept different extensions for the
categories specified, depending on context. (020)
> another dual facets of objects (like form and
> content), which is not necessarily identical or best represented with a
> tree structure (021)
I did not interpret these categories as a tree structure. (022)
> Further comments: "A sign may be characterized by the way the mark
> determines the referent"
>� I am sorry, this is the other way round, it is the interpreter
> who determines the way to characterize a referent, (023)
The point was different types of sign. The first class (icon) portrays
a similarity to its referent, allowing one who has never experienced a
similar sign before a chance of figuring out the referent; the less
symbolic the icon (e.g., a photograph), the easier this is. The second
class (index) depends on context, with the same sign meaning different
things in different contexts; but yes, the interpreter must understand
that something is being pointed to. The third class (symbol) relies on
the interpreter to already know the meaning of the sign. (024)
> especially via its capabilities (e.g. senses)
> Therefore an intepreter in the analysis (comparison of one stimulus
> (object)
> with old expereience and expectations) he/it will find it to be an
> "1. Icon: according to some similarity of image, pattern, or
> structure."�
> But not just that, for instance in terms of varying degrees of a property
>
> "2. Index: according to some physical relationship; e.g., immediate
> presence, pointing to
> something remote, or causally indicating something not directly
> perceptible."�
> Indexing is just pointing to something else (locatable in space or time),
> so it is close to soemthing specific. (025)
This is true of computer indexing in databases. However, the discussion
is in no way restricted to indexes in computer programs. (026)
-- doug (027)
> "3. Symbol: according to some convention; e.g., spoken words, written
> words,
> money, flag, uniform..."
> Yes, that is fine, but I should add, that all of the above items are a
> product
> of convention, not just your symbols. A symbol is a man made object to
> stand in
> for a not man made object, a "surrogate". But it is not just man made
> objects
> that are used that way. Think of a rainbow, etc. (028)
> Regards,
> ferenc (029)
> ________________________________
> From: doug foxvog <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>
> To: [ontolog-forum] <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Tuesday, 17 August, 2010 6:04:15
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>
>
> On Mon, August 16, 2010 14:36, AzamatAbdoullaev said:
>> RC wrote:
>>> ...
>>> "Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
>>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
>>> plurality,
>>> stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word "thing", as
>>> the
>>> most abstract of all objects?
>
>> ASHA: Yes, Thing refers to the Universal Class of all sorts of entities,
>> implying the universal property of all entities, whereas Nothing refers
>> to
>> the Null Class .
>
> There are many definitions of "thing". It is useful to have a common
> term for the universal class and many ontologies have used the word
> "thing".
>
>> RC: Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
>> foregoing?"
>
>> ASHA: In the broad sense, it is a substance, state, change, process as
>> far
>> as "every sign is also a thing, for what is not a thing is nothing at
>> all".
>
> Extending this, classes/types, relations/predicates, and functions are
> also "things" if they are in the universe of discourse. Cyc's #$Thing
> includes all these as instances as well as individuals.
>
>> In NL, words are the signs of ideas and images, thoughts and feelings,
>> while the mental signs are the similitudes of things.
>
>> The beauty of machines consists in that they don't require the mental
>> signs (ideas and images) as the medium whereby symbols (physical
>> signals)
>> could signify the real things.
>
> They do require symbols other than the symbols used by humans, similar to
> the significants in human minds.
>
> -- doug
>
>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: Rich Cooper
>> To: '[ontolog-forum] '
>> Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 12:20 AM
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Triadic Sign Relations
>>
>>
>> Hi Azamat,
>>
>>
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> "That confuses me no end if Peirceans can't tie the theory to some
>> commonly understood reality for me. Is there a more fruitful
>> description that explains the language used and chosen for that
>> representation?"
>>
>> Rich,
>>
>> The nature of signs and symbols and significations, their definition,
>> elements, and types, was mainly established by Aristotle, Augustine, and
>> Aquinas.
>>
>> According to these classic sources, significance is a relationship
>> between two sorts of things: signs and the kinds of things they signify
>> (intend, express or mean), where one term necessarily causes something
>> else to come to the mind. Distinguishing natural signs and conventional
>> signs, the traditional theory of signs sets the following threefold
>> partition of things:
>>
>> 1.. There are things that are just things, not any sign at all;
>> 2.. There are things that are also signs of other things (as
>> natural
>> signs of the physical world and mental signs of the mind);
>> 3.. There are things that are always signs, as languages (natural
>> and
>> artificial) and other cultural nonverbal symbols, as documents, money,
>> ceremonies, and rites. see a brief but comprehensive account,
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign
>> Azamat Abdoullaev
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for your view on this; it helps me compare and contrast my own
>> theoretical understanding with yours.
>>
>>
>>
>> So a familiar sign S represents another sign S2 in one agent's mind,
>> yet
>> can represent only S itself in another agent's mind, while
>> simultaneously representing S3 (money, a document .) to still another
>> agent?
>>
>>
>>
>> Another interesting aspect of your answer is that you use the word
>> "thing" as the most general of all thingish words like object,
>> plurality, stuff, material .; is that your mental image of the word
>> "thing", as the most abstract of all objects?
>>
>>
>>
>> Can a "thing" include an action, method, plan, history of the
>> foregoing?
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for the stimulating viewpoint,
>>
>> -Rich
>>
>>
>>
>> Sincerely,
>>
>> Rich Cooper
>>
>> EnglishLogicKernel.com
>>
>> Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
>>
>> 9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
> ============================================================doug foxvog
> doug@xxxxxxxxxx http://ProgressiveAustin.org
>
> "I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
> initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours."
> - Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
>
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"I speak as an American to the leaders of my own nation. The great
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- Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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