Greetings to all active members of the forum, (01)
I've just returned from my far travelling, and try to sort out the emails
What strike me as odd is a sort of intellectual aberration which may be
diagnosed as Piercomania, while holding all respect to this name. Like Pat,
I start wondering how far we can get with this kind of arguments in questing
after this large target, building real standard ontology and powerful
semantic machines. The situation reminds me the Soviet times philosophers
and logicians, most of which had started and ended their vapid reflections
citing Marx or Lenin, if it is relevent or irrelevent to the subject
For instance, what is the use of the below reference on semantics and logic
while the better solution here to carefully investigate the classic article
http://philosophy.eserver.org/aristotle/on-interpretation.txt. Always grub
about the roots of things. (02)
Azamat Abdoullaev (03)
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ingvar Johansson" <ingvar.johansson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Monday, September 03, 2007 11:24 AM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Current Semantic Web Layer pizza (was ckae) (04)
> John F. Sowa schrieb:
>> At the bottom of this note is a quotation from Peirce, which
>> should put to rest the idea that he had merely "anticipated"
>> the work of Austin, Grice, Searle, etc.
>> I also recommend the following article by Pietarinen, who
>> compared detailed quotations by Peirce and Grice:
>> Grice in the Wake of Peirce
> Don't conflate the contributions that Grice and Searle have made to
> pragmatics. Searle's taxonomy of speech acts (which I referred to) is
> quite a different achievement than Grice's analyses of 'conversational
> maxims' and 'conversational implicatures'. *Nothing* in what you or
> Peirce say below antiticipates Searle's analysis of directives,
> commissives, expressives, and declarations.
> The article by Pietarinen contains a serious misrepresentation of
> Austin's views. Pietarinen talks about "Austin's dichotomy", but Austin
> made a *tripartition* between the locutionary act, the illocutionary
> act, and the perlocutionary act, and then he proposed a classification
> of different kinds of illocutionarity. All these systematic aspects of
> the philosophy of Austin (who, in fact, seems to have disliked
> systematics) has been much improved on by Searle (who, happily for the
> scientific community, seems to like systematics).
>> Pietarinen has a recent book, _Signs of Logic_, with more detail
>> and many explicit comparisons of quotations by Peirce and others.
>> Unfortunately, it is one of those expensive ($147 at Amazon.com)
>> books published by the Synthese Library (now part of Springer).
>> I also recommend the book _Diagrammatology_ by Stjernfelt,
>> who makes detailed comparisons of Peirce and Husserl (and
>> others). It is $189 at Amazon.
>> (The two volumes of _The Essential Peirce_ are $29.95 each.)
>> > I think it would be good for logicians to realize that not
>> > only assertives, but also directives, commissives, expressives,
>> > and declarations allow for a kind of formal investigation.
>> I certainly agree with that point, and so would Peirce. See
>> below and in other quotations cited by Pietarinen.
>> > The 'garbage can definition' of pragmatics is not a good one,
>> > and the Peirce-Sowa definition is definitely much better, but
>> > it can be improved on by means of speech act theory.
>> I agree, and so would Peirce. But note that Fabian had found
>> some linguists, who had studied Austin, to be confused about
>> the distinctions. I believe that Austin et al. could have
>> formulated their ideas in greater breadth, depth, and precision
>> if they had studied Peirce.
>> (By the way, Frank Ramsey had recommended Peirce's writings to
>> Wittgenstein, and W. had later recommended the collection in
>> the book _Chance, Love, and Logic_ in a letter to one of his
>> sisters. Rush Rhees also reported discussions with W. that
>> come directly from the CLL book.)
>> [Excerpt from "New Elements", pp. 300-324 in _The Essential Peirce_,
>> Volme 2 (1893-1913), Indiana University Press.]
>> Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is
>> something that exists in replicas. Whether the sign "it is raining" or
>> "all pairs of particles of matter have component accelerations toward
>> one another inversely proportional to the square of the distance"
>> happens to have a replica in writing, in oral speech, or in silent
>> thought, is a distinction of the very minutest interest to logic, which
>> is a study, not of replicas, but of signs. But this is not the only,
>> nor the most serious error involved in making logic treat of "judgments"
>> in place of propositions. It involves confounding two things which must
>> be distinguished if a real comprehension of logic is to be attained.
>> A _proposition_, as I have just intimated, is not to be understood as
>> the lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign
>> of which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another.
>> But a judgment is distinctly _more_ than the mere mental replica of a
>> proposition. It not merely _expresses_ the proposition, but it goes
>> further and _accepts_ it.
>> I grant that the normal use of a proposition is to affirm it; and its
>> chief logical properties relate to what would result in reference to
>> its affirmation. It is, therefore, convenient in logic to express
>> propositions in most cases in the indicative mood. But the proposition
>> in the sentence, "Socrates est sapiens", strictly expressed, is
>> "Socratem sapientum esse". The defence of this position is that in
>> this way we distinguish between a proposition and the assertion of it;
>> and without such distinction it is impossible to get a distinct notion
>> of the nature of the proposition.
>> One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted,
>> inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for,
>> effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby
>> commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby become a
>> different proposition. What is the nature of these operations? The
>> only one that need detain us is affirmation, including judgment, or
>> affirmation to oneself.
>> As an aid in dissecting the constitution of affirmation I shall employ
>> a certain logical magnifying-glass that I have often found efficient in
>> such business. Imagine, then, that I write a proposition on a piece of
>> paper, perhaps a number of times, simply as a calligraphic exercise. It
>> is not likely to prove a dangerous amusement. But suppose I afterwards
>> carry the paper before a notary public and make affidavit to its
>> contents. That may prove to be a horse of another color. The reason
>> is that this affidavit may be used to determine an assent to the
>> proposition it contains in the minds of judge and jury; -- an effect
>> that the paper would not have had if I had not sworn to it. For
>> certain penalties here and hereafter are attached to swearing to a
>> false proposition; and consequently the fact that I have sworn to it
>> will be taken as a negative index that it is not false. This assent
>> in judge and jury's minds may effect in the minds of sheriff and posse
>> a determination to an act of force to the detriment of some innocent
>> man's liberty or property. Now certain ideas of justice and good order
>> are so powerful that the ultimate result may be very bad for me.
>> This is the way that affirmation looks under the microscope; for the
>> only difference between swearing to a proposition and an ordinary
>> affirmation of it, such as logic contemplates, is that in the latter
>> case the penalties are less and even less certain than those of the law.
>> The reason there are any penalties is, as before, that the affirmation
>> may determine a judgment to the same effect in the mind of the
>> interpreter to his cost. It cannot be that the sole cause of his
>> believing it is that there are such penalties, since two events cannot
>> cause one another, unless they are simultaneous. There must have been,
>> and we well know that there is, a sort of hypnotic disposition to
>> believe what one is told with an air of command. It is Grimes's
>> credenciveness, which is the essence of hypnotism. This disposition
>> produced belief; belief produced the penalties; and the knowledge of
>> these strengthens the disposition to believe.
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> Ingvar Johansson
> IFOMIS, Saarland University
> home site: http://ifomis.org/
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