Ingvar, (01)
At the bottom of this note is a quotation from Peirce, which
should put to rest the idea that he had merely "anticipated"
the work of Austin, Grice, Searle, etc. (02)
I also recommend the following article by Pietarinen, who
compared detailed quotations by Peirce and Grice: (03)
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/papers/peirce-grice.pdf
Grice in the Wake of Peirce (04)
Pietarinen has a recent book, _Signs of Logic_, with more detail
and many explicit comparisons of quotations by Peirce and others.
Unfortunately, it is one of those expensive ($147 at Amazon.com)
books published by the Synthese Library (now part of Springer). (05)
I also recommend the book _Diagrammatology_ by Stjernfelt,
who makes detailed comparisons of Peirce and Husserl (and
others). It is $189 at Amazon. (06)
(The two volumes of _The Essential Peirce_ are $29.95 each.) (07)
> I think it would be good for logicians to realize that not
> only assertives, but also directives, commissives, expressives,
> and declarations allow for a kind of formal investigation. (08)
I certainly agree with that point, and so would Peirce. See
below and in other quotations cited by Pietarinen. (09)
> The 'garbage can definition' of pragmatics is not a good one,
> and the Peirce-Sowa definition is definitely much better, but
> it can be improved on by means of speech act theory. (010)
I agree, and so would Peirce. But note that Fabian had found
some linguists, who had studied Austin, to be confused about
the distinctions. I believe that Austin et al. could have
formulated their ideas in greater breadth, depth, and precision
if they had studied Peirce. (011)
(By the way, Frank Ramsey had recommended Peirce's writings to
Wittgenstein, and W. had later recommended the collection in
the book _Chance, Love, and Logic_ in a letter to one of his
sisters. Rush Rhees also reported discussions with W. that
come directly from the CLL book.) (012)
John
_________________________________________________________________ (013)
[Excerpt from "New Elements", pp. 300-324 in _The Essential Peirce_,
Volme 2 (1893-1913), Indiana University Press.] (014)
Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. A sign is
something that exists in replicas. Whether the sign "it is raining" or
"all pairs of particles of matter have component accelerations toward
one another inversely proportional to the square of the distance"
happens to have a replica in writing, in oral speech, or in silent
thought, is a distinction of the very minutest interest to logic, which
is a study, not of replicas, but of signs. But this is not the only,
nor the most serious error involved in making logic treat of "judgments"
in place of propositions. It involves confounding two things which must
be distinguished if a real comprehension of logic is to be attained. (015)
A _proposition_, as I have just intimated, is not to be understood as
the lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that sign
of which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another.
But a judgment is distinctly _more_ than the mere mental replica of a
proposition. It not merely _expresses_ the proposition, but it goes
further and _accepts_ it. (016)
I grant that the normal use of a proposition is to affirm it; and its
chief logical properties relate to what would result in reference to
its affirmation. It is, therefore, convenient in logic to express
propositions in most cases in the indicative mood. But the proposition
in the sentence, "Socrates est sapiens", strictly expressed, is
"Socratem sapientum esse". The defence of this position is that in
this way we distinguish between a proposition and the assertion of it;
and without such distinction it is impossible to get a distinct notion
of the nature of the proposition. (017)
One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted,
inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for,
effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby
commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby become a
different proposition. What is the nature of these operations? The
only one that need detain us is affirmation, including judgment, or
affirmation to oneself. (018)
As an aid in dissecting the constitution of affirmation I shall employ
a certain logical magnifying-glass that I have often found efficient in
such business. Imagine, then, that I write a proposition on a piece of
paper, perhaps a number of times, simply as a calligraphic exercise. It
is not likely to prove a dangerous amusement. But suppose I afterwards
carry the paper before a notary public and make affidavit to its
contents. That may prove to be a horse of another color. The reason
is that this affidavit may be used to determine an assent to the
proposition it contains in the minds of judge and jury; -- an effect
that the paper would not have had if I had not sworn to it. For
certain penalties here and hereafter are attached to swearing to a
false proposition; and consequently the fact that I have sworn to it
will be taken as a negative index that it is not false. This assent
in judge and jury's minds may effect in the minds of sheriff and posse
a determination to an act of force to the detriment of some innocent
man's liberty or property. Now certain ideas of justice and good order
are so powerful that the ultimate result may be very bad for me. (019)
This is the way that affirmation looks under the microscope; for the
only difference between swearing to a proposition and an ordinary
affirmation of it, such as logic contemplates, is that in the latter
case the penalties are less and even less certain than those of the law.
The reason there are any penalties is, as before, that the affirmation
may determine a judgment to the same effect in the mind of the
interpreter to his cost. It cannot be that the sole cause of his
believing it is that there are such penalties, since two events cannot
cause one another, unless they are simultaneous. There must have been,
and we well know that there is, a sort of hypnotic disposition to
believe what one is told with an air of command. It is Grimes's
credenciveness, which is the essence of hypnotism. This disposition
produced belief; belief produced the penalties; and the knowledge of
these strengthens the disposition to believe. (020)
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