Tom,
Thanks for the lovely, well organized, and well presented list
of choices! It was beautifully done, it seems complete to me, and it
thoroughly summarizes the situation.
One small portion escapes my understanding however. When you
wrote:
what I called the "epistemological
interpretation" above (approximately Rich's position, I think),
you distinguished my rendition to an "epistemological"
interpretation, rather than an ontological one, specifically. Could you
explain to me why exactly you make that distinction? Perhaps you could also
identify what part of my statement is epistemological in your opinion, versus
the ontological.
Since you write so clearly and so well, it would be very helpful
to more fully understand your reasoning re that distinction.
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper,
Rich Cooper,
Chief Technology Officer,
MetaSemantics Corporation
MetaSemantics AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
( 9 4 9 ) 5 2 5-5 7 1 2
http://www.EnglishLogicKernel.com
From: Thomas Johnston
[mailto:tmj44p@xxxxxxx]
Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2015 11:27 AM
To: [ontolog-forum]; Rich Cooper
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The "qua-entities" paradigm
re Matthew's statement
that
<<<Each grain of sand exists in the
real world and has identity ...>>>
re Pat's comment, I do not agree that Matthew
clearly meant the exact opposite of what Rich thought he meant. What is
clear is that to say that something "in the real world ... has
identity" is not clear.
On an epistemological interpretation, it
would seem to mean something like "can be identified", where it is
some kind of conscious agent who could do the identifying. With Rich, I have no
problem with this interpretation.
On an ontological interpretation, having
identity is mysterious. Does a grain of sand "have" an identity
in the same sense that it has size and weight? Or in the same sense that it has
a location in space and time? If not, what does "has identity" mean?
Perhaps you can clear up the mystery?
The best case I could make for an ontological
interpretation would be that Matthew (and you?) are, whether consciously or
not, expressing your agreement with Leibniz's principle of the identity of
indiscernibles. That is indeed an ontological claim, not just an
epistemological one. But it doesn't involve claiming that there is a
property/attribute/quality called "identity" that physical things
have.
So is Leibniz's principle what Matthew (and
you) mean? If so, it certainly wasn't clear to me, at least, from Matthew's
statement.
If that isn't what you mean, but what you do
mean is not what I called the "epistemological interpretation" above
(approximately Rich's position, I think), then what is it that Matthew meant,
and that is apparently clear to you?
Another avenue of response for you is some
variant of saying that, by just using "good old common sense", what
Matthew means is indeed clear, and that what I've suggested here is just
philosophical hair-splitting which only obscures otherwise plain and clear
meanings. But, as we are all ontologists, and if, as John Sowa's work makes
completely clear (8>), classical ontology and ontology engineering are both
about "ontology" in much the same sense, then I would hope that you
don't propose some variant of this response.
On Wednesday, June 17, 2015 9:29
PM, Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx> wrote:
On Jun 17, 2015, at 11:39 AM, Rich Cooper <metasemantics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> Thanks Pat,
>
> for explaining your take on the idea, but we differ again on this
issue. Maybe if we keep this up another fifteen years, we will agree on
something. (:->)
>
> PH: NO, Rich, that is EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE of what Matthew said. Did you
actually read his words? He said that the identity of each grain of sand is IN
THE REAL WORLD, WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN IT. He did not say that it
depends upon your perspective. You and your perspective could cease to exist,
and the grains of sand would still be real, in the real world, with their
identities intact. The identities of things in the real world do not depend
upon your or anyone else's perspectives upon them. They are, you see, REAL.
>
> RC: I find the view that something exists without someone to experience it
unsatisfyingly theoretical, Pat.
I was not trying to convince you of anything, nor expressing "my
take". I was making the point that you had completely misquoted, or
misunderstood, what Matthew actually SAID. Whether you agree with what he said
is another question altogether, and one I am not particularly interested in;
but unless you actually understand what others are saying, there is little
point in debating with them.
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