Re: [ontolog-forum] Wittgenstein and the pictures

[FERENC KOVACS <f.kovacs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

John,

>The short answer is that any language, natural or artificial,
>linear or graphical, must have syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

But you do not need to have a "natural language" to communicate or to convey meaning, to express intent.

>In Peircean terms, the syntax determines the permissible forms,
the semantics determines the reference of terms and the truth
of statements, and the pragmatics determines the purpose or
reason why an agent would use a language to communicate with
other agents to satisfy goals.  The word 'meaning' includes
>both semantics and pragmatics.

you do not only communicate to satisfy goals, but to clarify the situation. Mostly to identify other agents abd conditions to see what to do next. If you co-operate with your environment smoothly, you do not need to communicate at all.

 

Context is inseparable from menaing , just as pragmatics from semantics. Context is proportional to the length of anything expressely communicated. The more you know, the less you need to be told.

 

> My understanding is that Tarski presents a "Semantic Conception
> of Truth" and that's very different than meaning.

>Peirce would accept a Tarskian-style theory for determining
reference and truth.  In fact, he developed such a theory for
his existential graphs about 30 years before Tarski.  But he
also insisted that just knowing whether a statement is true
>or false is insufficient for knowing how to use the language.

Truth is not the only quality of anything communicated. Since communication is valued as information and from a number of aspects relevant to information processing, a dozen of other attributes are in place and relevant, such as timeliness, completeness, reliabilitz, you know them all.  

 

>In fact, modern studies of language acquisition by children
show that children learn how to use language from their very
first words -- and their primary use is *not* to make true
statements.  Their earliest uses are *imperatives* like "gimme".
Questions are next in importance, and declarative statements
>come much later.

My humble experience shows that children understand the world a lot earlier before they can speak or use any vocalisations of a langauge type. This also means that thinking is not tied up with using an NL, and the building blocks of thinking are not concepts, especially not words.

 

 

Cheers

 

Frank/ferenc

 
For more about Peirce, Wittgenstein, and modern AI, see the
following paper, which I recently presented at ICCS 2008:

    http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/pursuing.pdf
    Pursuing the Goal of Language Understanding

The paper covers more of the philosophical background, and the
slides for the accompanying talk say more about some applications
that we are implementing at VivoMind:

    http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/pursuing.pdf
    Slides for the talk

And by the way, Frank Ramsey, who was a brilliant logician at
Cambridge who died at the age of 27, went to visit Wittgenstein
in the Austrian mountain village, and W. credits FR with having
a strong influence in showing him the limitations of his earlier
views.  Ramsey had read some of Peirce's writings and recommended
them to Wittgenstein.  Although W. never cited anybody in his
bibliography, W. did write a letter to his sister, in which he
recommended a book of papers by Peirce.  So there is evidence
of a Peircean influence on Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

 

Kindest regards,

 

 

Ferenc Kovacs

alias Frank

Genezistan

"Starting all over"

+44 77 70654068 (Vodafone)
www.firkasz.com and http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?FerencKovacs

 

 

----- Original Message ----
From: John F. Sowa <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: rick@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx; [ontolog-forum] <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, 31 July, 2008 5:20:13 AM
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Wittgenstein and the pictures

Rick,

The short answer is that any language, natural or artificial,
linear or graphical, must have syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

In Peircean terms, the syntax determines the permissible forms,
the semantics determines the reference of terms and the truth
of statements, and the pragmatics determines the purpose or
reason why an agent would use a language to communicate with
other agents to satisfy goals.  The word 'meaning' includes
both semantics and pragmatics.

> My understanding is that Tarski presents a "Semantic Conception
> of Truth" and that's very different than meaning.

Peirce would accept a Tarskian-style theory for determining
reference and truth.  In fact, he developed such a theory for
his existential graphs about 30 years before Tarski.  But he
also insisted that just knowing whether a statement is true
or false is insufficient for knowing how to use the language.

In fact, modern studies of language acquisition by children
show that children learn how to use language from their very
first words -- and their primary use is *not* to make true
statements.  Their earliest uses are *imperatives* like "gimme".
Questions are next in importance, and declarative statements
come much later.

For more about Peirce, Wittgenstein, and modern AI, see the
following paper, which I recently presented at ICCS 2008:

    http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/pursuing.pdf
    Pursuing the Goal of Language Understanding

The paper covers more of the philosophical background, and the
slides for the accompanying talk say more about some applications
that we are implementing at VivoMind:

    http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/pursuing.pdf
    Slides for the talk

And by the way, Frank Ramsey, who was a brilliant logician at
Cambridge who died at the age of 27, went to visit Wittgenstein
in the Austrian mountain village, and W. credits FR with having
a strong influence in showing him the limitations of his earlier
views.  Ramsey had read some of Peirce's writings and recommended
them to Wittgenstein.  Although W. never cited anybody in his
bibliography, W. did write a letter to his sister, in which he
recommended a book of papers by Peirce.  So there is evidence
of a Peircean influence on Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

John



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