JFS>Short summary: Any
propositional representation in any language,
natural or artificial, is an
approximation that is based on some
"interesting position on the
tradeoff". But there is no limit to
the number and kinds of tradeoffs
for different purposes. Peirce's
"twin gates" of perception and
action determine the symbol grounding
for any and all representations. (01)
John (02)
Then you seem to believe that perception and
action (i.e., embodied agent with such) handle all
designation of the vocabulary used to describe
what was perceived and what action(s) were
performed. Is that correct: (03)
-RIch (04)
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2 (05)
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2014 6:32 AM
To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology vs KR (06)
Ali, Steven, Ed, (07)
That claim is a narrow view, which requires much
more qualification: (08)
Brian Cantwell Smith
> Any mechanically embodied intelligent process
will be comprised of
> structural ingredients that a) we as external
observers naturally take
> to represent a propositional account of the
knowledge that the overall
> process exhibits, and b) independent of such
external semantic
> attribution, play a formal but causal and
essential role in engendering
> the behavior that manifests that knowledge. (09)
I agree with Steven's criticisms, and I also agree
with Ed's point: (010)
EJB
> Ontologies are indeed representations of "a
propositional account of
> knowledge", but not necessarily knowledge
exhibited by any particular process. (011)
Brian CS stated his claim in his PhD dissertation
of 1982. But in the
same book in which it was reprinted, Levesque and
Brachman made further
qualifications:
http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse574/01
wi/readings/levesque-brachman-fundamental.pdf (012)
HL & RB
> There is no single best language, it is argued,
only more or less
> interesting positions on the tradeoff. (013)
As soon as you admit that there are multiple
representations and
tradeoffs, that implies that no single
representation of any kind
(propositional or whatever) can be fundamental. (014)
But if so, what would be fundamental? Many
researchers in cognitive
science, ranging from Aristotle to modern
neuroscience, would say
that imagery derived directly from perception is
more fundamental.
(And 'imagery' includes versions from all senses,
not just vision.) (015)
Short summary: Any propositional representation
in any language,
natural or artificial, is an approximation that is
based on some
"interesting position on the tradeoff". But there
is no limit to
the number and kinds of tradeoffs for different
purposes. Peirce's
"twin gates" of perception and action determine
the symbol grounding
for any and all representations. (016)
John (017)
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