On Fri, July 13, 2012 03:55, Matthew West wrote:
> Dear Doug, (01)
> I think I was more or less with you until here. (02)
> DF> while a copy of a copy of a
>> copy of a lifted fingerprint is the same thing as the lifted
>> fingerprint. (03)
> MW: I would think a copy of a copy of a fingerprint was a copy of a copy
> of a fingerprint, and not the same thing. (04)
Yet the expert when pointing to features of a projection of a photo
in court says, "This is the fingerprint that was left on the glass.". (05)
-- doug f (06)
> Regards
>
> Matthew West
> Information Junction
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>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
>> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog
>> Sent: 12 July 2012 21:33
>> To: [ontolog-forum]
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The class of the planet Venus
>>
>> On Wed, July 11, 2012 20:38, Chris Menzel wrote:
>> > On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 7:29 PM, joel luis carbonera
>> <joelcarbonera@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> The various issues of identity usually ignore that identity is something
>> assigned to things by a sentient being. Identity is assigned to some
>> collection of things and the assigner maintains the identity as a 4D
>> worm
> by
>> having it assigned to different collections of things at different
>> times.
>>
>> [How's this for a way to stir up trouble!]
>>
>> We take collections of experiences and group them into things depending
> upon
>> perceived patterns. Groups of patterns that remain generally stable
>> over
> time
>> are more likely to be identified as things. Once we find patterns of
> patterns
>> that recur, we identify them as types of things. Once we've identified
>> a
> type
>> of thing by a pattern of patterns, whenever some group of patterns
>> matches
>> that pattern we define it as an instance of that type.
>>
>> By defining something as an instance of a type, we indicate some types
>> of
>> aspects of the thing we consider important and some which we do not for
> the
>> thing's identity.
>>
>> For most things, a change of location is immaterial to assigned
>> identity.
>> The loss or gain of atoms is also ignored. The loss or gain of chunks
>> of
>> matter of over 1% of the size of a physical thing may or may not result
>> in
> a
>> change of identity depending upon how crucial that affected mass is in
>> the
>> assigned identity criteria. A main criteria for identity is whether
> various
>> properties that are true of unaltered thing are also true of the altered
>> thing. Which properties those are depend upon the way the thing is
> classified
>> and for what purposes.
>>
>> One person could identify a certain mass as a blob of Soft Clay, while
> another
>> could identify it as a Piece of Art. If person A rolls it into a ball,
> the
>> blob continues to exist merely experiencing a change of shape, while the
> piece
>> of art ceases to exist. If person B fires the blob before Person A
>> acts,
> the
>> piece of art is preserved for the future, while the blob of soft clay
> ceases
>> to exist.
>>
>> Aristotle's essential vs. accidental changes are descriptions of
>> patterns
> that
>> are used or not used in defining a pattern that is used to define a
>> thing.
>>
>> Whether something is the same "thing" as something at another time
>> depends
>> upon the purpose of the question being asked. In most cases, cleaning
>> something does not change its identity, but to a fingerprint expert,
> cleaning
>> may cause a piece of evidence to cease to exist, while a copy of a copy
>> of
> a
>> copy of a lifted fingerprint is the same thing as the lifted
>> fingerprint.
>>
>> >> This case, seems to be related to the diachronic identity problem.
>> >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/
>>
>> > Yes, that is the temporal manifestation of (one aspect of) the
>> problem.
>> > The
>> > modal analog is sometimes called the problem of transworld identity:
>> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-transworld/
>>
>> > -chris
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
> (07)
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