Dear Matthew and Doug,
>
>Dear Doug,
>> > MW: I would think a copy of a copy of a fingerprint was a copy of a
>> > copy of a fingerprint, and not the same thing.
>>
>> Yet the expert when pointing to features of a projection of a photo in
>court
>> says, "This is the fingerprint that was left on the glass.".
>>
>MW: That kind of short cut statement is made all the time when it is not
>strictly true. And just because it is what is said does not make it true
>either.
>
>Regards
> (01)
But what you call "short cut" is not exception but rule (even strictly
logically , as it may be a real business rule). And when that rule is applied
the statement above becomes strictly true. That is exactly the kind of rule
that would be a part of context. The question then becomes: when do these
context rules live? To say that the statements like "this is the
fingerprint..." are 4D worms is not enough. This also goes to the question of
what is the application of Truth. Wittgenstein said something to the effect
that "knowledge is use". (02)
>Matthew West
>Information Junction
>Tel: +44 1489 880185
>Mobile: +44 750 3385279
>Skype: dr.matthew.west
>matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
>http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
>
>This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in England
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>
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: doug foxvog [mailto:doug@xxxxxxxxxx]
>> Sent: 13 July 2012 17:16
>> To: Matthew West
>> Cc: doug@xxxxxxxxxx; '[ontolog-forum] '
>> Subject: RE: [ontolog-forum] The class of the planet Venus
>>
>> On Fri, July 13, 2012 03:55, Matthew West wrote:
>> > Dear Doug,
>>
>> > I think I was more or less with you until here.
>>
>> > DF> while a copy of a copy of a
>> >> copy of a lifted fingerprint is the same thing as the lifted
>> >> fingerprint.
>>
>> > MW: I would think a copy of a copy of a fingerprint was a copy of a
>> > copy of a fingerprint, and not the same thing.
>>
>> Yet the expert when pointing to features of a projection of a photo in
>court
>> says, "This is the fingerprint that was left on the glass.".
>>
>> -- doug f
>>
>> > Regards
>> >
>> > Matthew West
>> > Information Junction
>> > Tel: +44 1489 880185
>> > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
>> > Skype: dr.matthew.west
>> > matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
>> > http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
>> >
>> > This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in
>> > England and Wales No. 6632177.
>> > Registered office: 2 Brookside, Meadow Way, Letchworth Garden City,
>> > Hertfordshire, SG6 3JE.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
>> >> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog
>> >> Sent: 12 July 2012 21:33
>> >> To: [ontolog-forum]
>> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The class of the planet Venus
>> >>
>> >> On Wed, July 11, 2012 20:38, Chris Menzel wrote:
>> >> > On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 7:29 PM, joel luis carbonera
>> >> <joelcarbonera@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> The various issues of identity usually ignore that identity is
>> >> something assigned to things by a sentient being. Identity is
>> >> assigned to some collection of things and the assigner maintains the
>> >> identity as a 4D worm
>> > by
>> >> having it assigned to different collections of things at different
>> >> times.
>> >>
>> >> [How's this for a way to stir up trouble!]
>> >>
>> >> We take collections of experiences and group them into things
>> >> depending
>> > upon
>> >> perceived patterns. Groups of patterns that remain generally stable
>> >> over
>> > time
>> >> are more likely to be identified as things. Once we find patterns of
>> > patterns
>> >> that recur, we identify them as types of things. Once we've
>> >> identified a
>> > type
>> >> of thing by a pattern of patterns, whenever some group of patterns
>> >> matches that pattern we define it as an instance of that type.
>> >>
>> >> By defining something as an instance of a type, we indicate some
>> >> types of aspects of the thing we consider important and some which we
>> >> do not for
>> > the
>> >> thing's identity.
>> >>
>> >> For most things, a change of location is immaterial to assigned
>> >> identity.
>> >> The loss or gain of atoms is also ignored. The loss or gain of
>> >> chunks of matter of over 1% of the size of a physical thing may or
>> >> may not result in
>> > a
>> >> change of identity depending upon how crucial that affected mass is
>> >> in the assigned identity criteria. A main criteria for identity is
>> >> whether
>> > various
>> >> properties that are true of unaltered thing are also true of the
>> >> altered thing. Which properties those are depend upon the way the
>> >> thing is
>> > classified
>> >> and for what purposes.
>> >>
>> >> One person could identify a certain mass as a blob of Soft Clay,
>> >> while
>> > another
>> >> could identify it as a Piece of Art. If person A rolls it into a
>> >> ball,
>> > the
>> >> blob continues to exist merely experiencing a change of shape, while
>> >> the
>> > piece
>> >> of art ceases to exist. If person B fires the blob before Person A
>> >> acts,
>> > the
>> >> piece of art is preserved for the future, while the blob of soft clay
>> > ceases
>> >> to exist.
>> >>
>> >> Aristotle's essential vs. accidental changes are descriptions of
>> >> patterns
>> > that
>> >> are used or not used in defining a pattern that is used to define a
>> >> thing.
>> >>
>> >> Whether something is the same "thing" as something at another time
>> >> depends upon the purpose of the question being asked. In most cases,
>> >> cleaning something does not change its identity, but to a fingerprint
>> >> expert,
>> > cleaning
>> >> may cause a piece of evidence to cease to exist, while a copy of a
>> >> copy of
>> > a
>> >> copy of a lifted fingerprint is the same thing as the lifted
>> >> fingerprint.
>> >>
>> >> >> This case, seems to be related to the diachronic identity problem.
>> >> >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/
>> >>
>> >> > Yes, that is the temporal manifestation of (one aspect of) the
>> >> problem.
>> >> > The
>> >> > modal analog is sometimes called the problem of transworld identity:
>> >> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-transworld/
>> >>
>> >> > -chris
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
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