Hi John, (01)
> CP
> > Let's agree to disagree.
>
> No. You have caught a philosophical virus, and I'm trying to help you get
rid
> of it.
> (02)
I quite like my virus, it's your virus that I am worried about :-). (03)
You seem to miss my methodological point, which is that whatever choice one
makes for the ontological framework, one needs to (a) make that choice
explicit and (b) show that one has assessed the pros and cons for doing so
in that situation - part of this is offering up the analysis for discussion.
Whether one prefers Peirce or extensionalism or whatever, one should follow
the methodology.
If we agree on this then that is probably far enough for now. (04)
Regards,
Chris (05)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
> Sent: 12 July 2011 11:57
> To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] intangibles (was RE: Why most classifications
> are fuzzy)
>
> Chris and Doug,
>
> The word 'intangible' is the source of the confusion. I suggest that you
stop
> using that word. It has been infected with a philosophical virus.
>
> DF
> >> The intangibles that we are discussing are mental artifacts which are
> >> shared by multiple people.
>
> The term "mental artifact" is another philosophical virus.
> Don't use it. And most definitely avoid saying that two or more people
> could ever "share" anything mental.
>
> CP
> > So, if I understand correctly, when one person makes a promise to
> > another, you believe that this creates a (single) mental artefact -
> > the promise - that has temporal but not spatial extent and is shared by
> both people.
>
> In Peirce's terminology, you would say that a written contract is a token
of a
> sign type. Whatever occurs in the brain when somebody thinks about the
> contract is another token of the same type -- but it might not be an exact
> replica of the written token.
>
>
> When two people talk about the contract, each of them has a neural token
> in the brain. Those tokens are physical, and there is no sharing of those
> tokens. But each token can be a fairly accurate instance of the same type
as
> the written token.
>
> CP
> > When deciding on the architecture for one's ontology one can choose
> > whether to include intangibles or not.
> > Then one needs to motivate this choice.
> > In the case of intangibles/abstract object, the classical hurdle is
> > explaining*in principle* how one can know something one cannot
> > perceive in any way at all.
>
> Any adequate ontology will need to represent mathematics.
>
> When mathematicians use logic, they use existential quantifiers for those
> things. They can define a predicate cube(x) that is true iff x happens to
be a
> cube.
>
> When you have a sign with mark/token/type, the type is of the same nature
> as a mathematical structure. The token is a mark that has been classified
> according to a type.
>
> CP
> > Let's agree to disagree.
>
> No. You have caught a philosophical virus, and I'm trying to help you get
rid
> of it.
>
> CP
> > "Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds". So your claim
> > "they cannot deal with anything that involves intentionality"
> > probably needs a little more justification.
>
> I did not say anything of the sort. I said very explicitly that what goes
on in
> the brain is physical and localized in space & time.
> You can process mathematical notations in the brain just as well as you
can
> on paper. Both are physical.
>
> But the structures that the mathematical notation refers to are *not*
> physical. Mathematics defines cubes, but there is no perfect cube in the
> universe. Mathematics can define infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces, or
> Cantor's hierarchies of infinity. None of those things can be localized.
>
> When I talk about sign types as abstract, I use them in exactly the same
way
> as any mathematical structure. I can describe them in physical marks.
Like
> any mathematician, I am happy to put an existential quantifier in front of
> the variables that refer to them. They can exist in a Tarski-style model,
but
> that model does not exist in space and time.
>
> > If someone wants to adopt an "only tool" syndrome approach (e.g. adopt
> > Peirce :-) )...
>
> You can't make that charge against me. Peirce never limited himself to
any
> finite set of tools. He would be happy to use any or all tools that
anybody
> might invent. He (and I) very happily used extensional methods when they
> were appropriate. But he also showed where they fail.
>
> John
>
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