Doug, Ferenc, Rich & All: (01)
I haven't followed this thread closely, but the following statement
caught my eye. I'll bet there's a context that explains the statement,
but wanted to check. (02)
On Tue, 2010-09-21 at 19:38 -0400, doug foxvog wrote:
> Exactly. Limiting Objects which can be described to physical ones
> greatly limits what can be stated. (03)
You might remember the recent discussion on original intentionality that
challenged the unrestricted use of triads to explain meaning. I
suggested there was some restricted value in explaining extents by which
I mean membership based on what's in the world, the mind and the
machine. (04)
Do you Doug, or others here, actually believe in the existence of
objects that are not material? Do you believe that abstract objects
exist? What about non-existent objects? There's no shortage of papers
that make these claims. Here are two: [1], [2]. (05)
Frankly, I don't. (06)
I understand the detailed analysis of intentionality, but when we say we
have objects in our mind I think we're making a mistake. (07)
The metaphysical aspects of the interpretant triangle are a stretch goal
to support extents. JMHO, but claims about non-material, abstract and
non-existent objects are more than metaphysical, they're pataphysical. (08)
In light of the following statement about original intentionality, I'm
more convinced than ever to acknowledge the restricted value, not only
of triads, but also terminology, vocabularies and ontology based
explanations of meaning. (09)
PH > Either way, it is a serious theoretical problem for folk in our
profession who are busily using both the formal techniques and the ideas
of CS while relying upon the traditional triangular view of meaning and
intentionality. (010)
At least where there's computation involved aspects of logic like
quantification, connectives, introduction and elimination rules, boolean
valuation, type inference keep us close to the metal. (011)
> -- doug foxvog (012)
1. http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/142/as.pdf
2. http://mally.stanford.edu/Papers/salzburg.pdf (013)
--
Rick (014)
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