JS - John Sowa
FK - Ferenc Kovacs
RC - Rich Cooper
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT
com
JS> The point I would
qualify is that we directly observe absence.
More precisely, we experience
*contrast*. That is a more
immediate experience that
does not depend on retrieval and
comparison with anything from
background knowledge.
RC> Objection! Contrast is by
definition a comparison. Ordinarily, it means comparison with
neighboring pixels, against frequency buckets, comparison against memory
settings, all forms of identity (IMHO) resulting from a comparison function's
unique positioning of that identity within a domain of all such
identities.
That's why comparison early in the
process is important IMHO: it requires that there be a PROPERTY of some
kind. After there are existence, property perhaps it will be easier to
decide what's next. Maybe a DOMAIN for the PROPERTY values? That
makes more sense to me than jumping into conjuncts.
JS> For example, the
experience of something vanishing or popping
into view is a
contrast. But a report that there is no
hippopotamus in the room is
unlikely to be the result of
experiencing a hippo that
suddenly went "POOF".
RC> And then there's a contrast in
two time samples Hippo0 and Hippo1, which could as well have been spaced out
by two samples in any other dimension. Why choose time next? If I
follow a recipe I produce an end product but I don't reason my way through its
logical rationalization. Why is time after conjunction after
existence? What is the rationale for that very specific choice of
sequence of dimensions?
FK> When we have concepts
to identify the chunks of reality,
> we have verbal
forms to be used to make a picture, which is
> the clue to
understanding or making sense. But verbal forms
> are not suitable
for assembly, and content must be aligned
> with the use of
forms between the speakers of any language.
JS> I agree, but I would
emphasize that immediate experience is
prior to any
verbalization. In fact, most use of
language
involves a great deal of
reasoning (by analogy with prior
experience and by induction,
deduction, and abduction from
previously processed
experience as codified in concepts).
The fact that verbal forms
encode so much background knowledge
makes it difficult for us to
say what is immediately before
our eyes (and ears, nose,
hands). What we report tends to be
a combination (by various
forms of reasoning) that mixes and
colors the immediate
experience with previous knowledge.
FK> But unfortunately, the
concept of meaning, context and the
> communication
model of a bargaining situation where we should
> arrive at an
agreement as to the sense of any form, or concept
> is not dealt
properly among ontologists.
JS> I believe that *every*
large ontology that has so far been
presented or even proposed is
far, far too simplistic to be
a suitable foundation for
understanding experience and its
verbalization in natural
languages (or in logic, which is
a further abstraction away
from language).
That is why I have been
emphasizing an open-ended collection
of ontologies, in which the
most important are *not* the upper
levels, but the lowest levels
that are closest to the subject
under
discussion.
And every different subject
is a different way of experiencing
reality, thinking about it,
and acting upon it. The upper
levels cannot be defined *in
advance*. They are always
abstractions from the more
concrete lower levels.
Any attempt to fix and freeze
an upper level in advance is
guaranteed to be hopelessly
inadequate. As I have said to
Pat C, the best upper level
should be little more than a
collection of words that are
linked by very few axioms.
The most important reasoning
must be done at the lowest levels
that are closest to the
experience and action required for
the subject matter at
hand. Note the word 'hand'. I mean it
literally as an important
part of what we use to experience
the world, not as a metaphor
for something close by.
John
RC>But John, I think Pat is
describing an FO that will be only for the purpose of describing ontologies in
general a metaFO description language. An FO like Turing's machine, so
that it's formally as precise as provable as possible, like your controlled
English language. But the FO must also be communicable in simple
language of a six year old (with a damn good dictionary/encyclopedia).
-Rich