JS - John Sowa
FK - Ferenc Kovacs
RC - Rich Cooper
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
JS> The point I would qualify is that we directly
More precisely, we experience *contrast*. That
is a more
immediate experience that does not depend on retrieval
comparison with anything from background knowledge.
RC> Objection! Contrast is by
definition a comparison. Ordinarily, it means comparison with neighboring
pixels, against frequency buckets, comparison against memory settings, all
forms of identity (IMHO) resulting from a comparison function's unique
positioning of that identity within a domain of all such identities.
That's why comparison early in the process
is important IMHO: it requires that there be a PROPERTY of some kind.
After there are existence, property perhaps it will be easier to decide what's
next. Maybe a DOMAIN for the PROPERTY values? That makes more sense
to me than jumping into conjuncts.
JS> For example, the experience of something
vanishing or popping
into view is a contrast. But a report that there
hippopotamus in the room is unlikely to be the result
experiencing a hippo that suddenly went
RC> And then there's a contrast in two
time samples Hippo0 and Hippo1, which could as well have been spaced out by two
samples in any other dimension. Why choose time next? If I follow a
recipe I produce an end product but I don't reason my way through its logical rationalization.
Why is time after conjunction after existence? What is the rationale for
that very specific choice of sequence of dimensions?
FK> When we have concepts to identify the chunks of
> we have verbal forms to be used to make a
picture, which is
> the clue to understanding or making sense.
But verbal forms
> are not suitable for assembly, and content
must be aligned
> with the use of forms between the speakers
of any language.
JS> I agree, but I would emphasize that immediate
prior to any verbalization. In fact, most use of
involves a great deal of reasoning (by analogy with
experience and by induction, deduction, and abduction
previously processed experience as codified in
The fact that verbal forms encode so much background
makes it difficult for us to say what is immediately
our eyes (and ears, nose, hands). What we report
tends to be
a combination (by various forms of reasoning) that
colors the immediate experience with previous
FK> But unfortunately, the concept of meaning,
context and the
> communication model of a bargaining
situation where we should
> arrive at an agreement as to the sense of
any form, or concept
> is not dealt properly among ontologists.
JS> I believe that *every* large ontology that has
so far been
presented or even proposed is far, far too simplistic
a suitable foundation for understanding experience and
verbalization in natural languages (or in logic, which
a further abstraction away from language).
That is why I have been emphasizing an open-ended
of ontologies, in which the most important are *not*
levels, but the lowest levels that are closest to the
And every different subject is a different way of
reality, thinking about it, and acting upon it.
levels cannot be defined *in advance*. They are
abstractions from the more concrete lower levels.
Any attempt to fix and freeze an upper level in
guaranteed to be hopelessly inadequate. As I
have said to
Pat C, the best upper level should be little more than
collection of words that are linked by very few
The most important reasoning must be done at the
that are closest to the experience and action required
the subject matter at hand. Note the word
'hand'. I mean it
literally as an important part of what we use to
the world, not as a metaphor for something close by.
RC>But John, I think Pat is describing
an FO that will be only for the purpose of describing ontologies in general a
metaFO description language. An FO like Turing's machine, so that it's
formally as precise as provable as possible, like your controlled English
language. But the FO must also be communicable in simple language of a
six year old (with a damn good dictionary/encyclopedia).