>Some comments below.
>Regards,
>Azamat
>>>
>>>----- Original Message -----
>>>From: "Pat Hayes" <<mailto:phayes@xxxxxxx>phayes@xxxxxxx>
>>>To: "Azamat Abdoullaev"
>>><<mailto:abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2007 10:15 PM
>>>Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Terminology Question concerning
>>>WebArchitecture and LinkedData
>>>
>>> > >----- Original Message ----- From: "Pat Hayes"
>>><<mailto:phayes@xxxxxxx>phayes@xxxxxxx>
>>>>>To: "Azamat" <<mailto:abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>abdoul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>Cc: "[ontolog-forum] "
>>>>><<mailto:ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2007 8:33 PM
>>>>>Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Terminology Question concerning
>>>>>WebArchitecture and LinkedData
>>>>>
>>>>>> >Denise,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>''A common world model'', or a single global ontology, is a
>>>>>>>necessary and
>>>>>>>sufficient condition of powerful intelligent systems.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Well, that is wrong both ways round. It is certainly not
>>>>>>sufficient: an ontology by itself, no matter how global or common
>>>>>>or all-encompassing, does not DO anything, and intelligence is only
>>>>>>revealed in activity of some kind. And it is not necessary, since
>>>>>>the only exemplars we have of intelligence are ourselves - human
>>>>>>intelligence - and we do not have a single common world model.
>>>>>
>>>>>You do have it. Just don't feel it.
>>>>
>>>> No, we really do not have a single common ontology. This is quite
>>>> evident when one tries to get people to agree on a formal ontology.
>>>> They seriously disagree - that is, they each find the other's point
>>>> of view insane, and will argue for hours, in some cases for years -
>>>> about questions such as:
>>>>
>>>> -- is the paint on the wall of a room in the room, or part of the room?
>>>> -- is saying that a cat is eating at a time t the same as saying that
>>>> the temporal part of the cat at t is eating?
>>>> -- is a cat at a time t the same thing as the same cat at a
>>>>different time t'?
>>>>
>>>> and many, many others.
>>>
>>>This is a sort of sophistical technicalities, created by
>>>endurantists and perdurantists, and irrelevant to a serious
>>>discussion.
>>
>>Im afraid it is highly relevant. I wish it
>>weren't, but it is. Any real ontology, as opposed
>>to a general dream of an ontology, needs to
>>grapple with issues such as this. And in any
>>case, my point here is that people do not agree.
>>If it were the case that people typically had no
>>opinion on matters like this, then maybe that
>>might be some (very weak) evidence that these
>>issues are irrelevant; but that is not what one
>>finds. In fact, people do have very firm
>>opinions, deeply held, and they often find any
>>other views than their own almost impossible to
>>understand without careful study. They use terms
>>like 'ridiculous' and 'implausible' and 'wildly
>>counterintuitive' and 'incoherent' when faced
>>with the other point of view. All of which
>>strongly suggests to me (and there is
>>laboratory-grade evidence to back this up) that
>>people may well have extremely different
>>ontologies in their heads.
>>
>3D endurance theory and 4D perdurance theory are just special attempts to
>explain the continuity over time of material objects, their persistence and
>identity. That objects have temporal parts (perdurantism) as much as spatial
>parts (endurantism) is not something making a great point. (01)
That is not the chief division between them. I agree that alone would
not amount to much. The big issue is the endurantist's notion of a
'continuant'. This is an entity which fully exists at every time it
exists, and has no temporal duration or structure, yet endures
through time; its properties are not temporally relative, yet they
may differ at different times. This idea, if taken seriously,
requires one to re-build the foundations of temporal logic. I have
not yet seen a coherent formalization which does this notion justice,
in fact. As others on this list have urged, it requires one to
re-think what it means for something to exist in time; or to admit
two fundamentally different ways or modes of being in time. (02)
> Although, it
>might be funny for the fiction writers to apply such ideas to time travel or
>Original Sin, or something of this irreal topic. Now imagine that You ( a
>sequence of temporal parts as well) are responsible for the Adam and Eve's
>sins, just because humanity is a temporally continous whole, where each
>temporal part is liable for misdeeds of other temporal parts.
>This issues presents only some special aspects of the standard ontological
>problem of change and identity, which can be principally solved just by
>fundamental, or universal ontology. (03)
Well, I look forward to seeing yet another proposal for tackling this
long-standing issue. :-) (04)
Pat (05)
>Neither perdurantists nor endurantists
>(exdurantists, wormists, or what-not) are of great use in establishing a
>true relationship between change and identity.
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>>>
>>>>>>>....
>>>>>>>A fundamental ontology is not a matter of choice or discussion. It is an
>>>>>>>essential constituent of any knowledge, human or
>>>>>>>machine-understandable, of
>>>>>>>any reasoning, natural or artificial, of any language, natural
>>>>>>>or formal, of
>>>>>>>any artefacts, physical or intelligent,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Sorry, but this is nonsense. Reasoning takes place in mathematics,
>>>>>>for example, without the benefit of a fundamental ontology.
>>>>>
>>>>>Sorry, but this is a real nonsense. All great mathematical theories
>>>>>are underpinned by fundamental ontology, its categories and rules.
>>>>
>>>> What categories and rules of an ontology are required for, say,
>>>> algebraic topology, or formal set theory?
>>>
>>>the universe, set, class, entity, object, structure, order and relationship.
>>
>>Set theory assumes sets and (in some cases)
>>proper classes, nothing else. Algebraic topology
>>assumes topological spaces (which include
>>continuous mappings) and groups (with
>>homomorphisms) nothing else.
>>
>The things here look more interesting. By the way, ''nothing'', or
>''nonentity'' or ''nonbeing'', interpreted as the empty set, is another
>ontological category.
>>
>>
>>> No wonder that the originator of set theory in his foundational
>>>work (Cantor, 1883), considered his creation as an extension of a
>>>classical ontology.
>>
>>What ontologies even existed in 1883?
>>
>>>
>>>Cantor, G. (1883). Foundations of a General Theory of Aggregates.
>>>In W. Ewald (Ed.) (1996). From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in
>>>the Foundations of Mathematics. 2 Vols. Oxford: Oxford Uni. Press.
>>>
>>>Exploiting your interest and expertise, and for more systematic
>>>answer, i am ready to present for your editorial comments the
>>>Chapter III titled,
>>>THE WORLD CODE: Mathematical Ontology as the Real Road to Reality
>>>(9 pages, single spaced) .
>>
>>By all means point me at it. I doubt if we will
>>agree on its contents, though :-)
>>
>To my mind, any professional criticism, agreeable or disagreeble, is of
>valuable use. The content will be emailed to day, with a humble request to
>return your comments as soon as you can.
>>
>>Pat
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>>> Pat
>>>>
>>>>> Also all the great mathematicians have been also good ontologists
>>>>>like Cantor.
>>>>>Azamat
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Pat
>>>>>>
>>>>>>--
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>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>
>>
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