Hi Pat, (01)
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Pat Hayes [mailto:phayes@xxxxxxx]
>Sent: 20 June 2007 16:49
>To: Chris Partridge
>Cc: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: RE: [ontolog-forum] Two
>
>>Life is too short for me to retype the longer earlier mail.
>>
>>Pat,
>>
>>It looks as if you are after an argument. I guess it would be impolite to
>>refuse.
>
>Thanks
>
>>It seems to me that your argument should be extended to other specialists,
>>whose work requires some effort to understand.
>>
>>For example, there is a dangerous tendency, which (unfortunately) others
>in
>>these lists have not noted, for logical writings to be treated with a kind
>>of uncritical awe by non-logicians, so that they - the texts - are treated
>>with a reverence that they do not deserve. One should never forget that
>most
>>logicians work not by doing anything empirical or even by talking to
>people
>>who do anything empirical, but by reading and criticizing what other
>>logicians have written.
>
>Actually that last point is not true. A quibble.
>
>>The result can be rather in-bred, and indeed is
>>often so remote from the actual world that it is hard to even make any
>>sensible connection between the concerns of a good deal of logic
>(including
>>FOL) and anything in the real world at all.
>>
>>On the whole, I suggest, it is probably better to re-do ones own logic
>from
>>scratch than to try to read through the history of logic (not sure why one
>>should need to read the history) and sort out the very small fraction that
>>may be relevant.
>
>Hee hee.
>
>Now, if we had been having this debate in, say, 1870, then you would
>have had a very good point in this riposte. (02)
Minor historical point, pre 1870 wasn't Aristotelian Logic accepted as some
final word on the matter. Isn't this rather like saying pre-Einsteinian
physics was not really physics. (03)
The difference now is
>that logic *has* become a field in which technical progress
>(mathematical rather than scientific, but progress for all that) has
>been made, and in which firm, uncontrovertible results, and a related
>technology (ies, actually) based on them, are available; so that I
>won't say that alternatives are impossible, but the effort (and
>hubris) involved in setting out to construct one's own alternative is
>now *very* high. (04)
Where to start: So your criterion has moved from empirical (including
science both hard and soft) to a discipline at a Kuhnian paradigm stage,
where there is a community that accepts the 'normal' paradigm. This, of
course, now excludes the soft sciences such as economics and sociology,
which are pre-paradigm. But maybe you are happy about this. (Are you about
to construct your own?) I would suggest a criterion of pragmatics, if it
works, is more appropriate. Also, philosophy is often regarded as dealing
with pre-paradigm, pre-empirical matters - when they become more tractablem,
they become science - as natural philosophy became natural science. (05)
None of this applies to the more descriptive parts
>of philosophy. There are no universally accepted results, no 'normal
>science', no theorems, in metaphysics or even philosophical ontology
>(a different field from ours, but related). There are only rival
>opinions, arguments and points of view: some of them most persuasive
>and the result of very deep thinking, but opinions nevertheless. By
>all means know them and even be persuaded by them: but do not cite
>them as authoritative *because* they are philosophy. (06)
I think this is not quite right. Academic philosophy spends at least part of
its effort in categorising the options. This helps to map the conceptual
landscape - and also mark out combinations that work together and ones that
do not. These are reasonably widely accepted. What differs is which position
the philosopher finds congenial. (07)
So if you are arguing that we should not regard the philosophers'
preferences as definitive - I think both they and I would agree with you.
Firstly, because there is no agreement, but also because we are not talking
about using philosophy within its traditional range of application. (08)
However, if you are saying that the analysis of the 'conceptual landscape'
(or the interesting bits of it) is not useful - I take issue. It seems to me
that, for example, your defence of 4D owes something to your reading in
philosophy on the subject. I would also suggest a good way of getting to
grips with the debate is to read the philosophy textbooks. The best result
one can hope for is that the ontology engineers do not unthinkingly then
build a heterogeneous 3D/4D ontology (rather a homogeneous 3D, 4D or
bicategorical one). (09)
If I may offer a personal example. I find Loux's introductory textbook on
metaphysics extremely useful. However I disagree with almost all of his
positions. But, I do find his description of the conceptual landscape
convincing and useful. I take the landscape and leave the opinions. I
believe this is a common response even among philosophers. (010)
>
>>But, isn't the way ontological engineers use philosophy much like the way
>>most engineering disciplines use science (arcane, ivory tower science).
>
>Yes, and that is exactly what I am complaining about. Because unlike
>(empirical) science and mathematics, philosophy has no valid claim
>upon truth, and does not exhibit the Popperian 'normal'+'revolution'
>pattern typical of empirical science. It is, rather, in a state of
>constant revision and changes of direction. (011)
I suspect you will lose the 'changes of direction' claim - I know of no
other discipline that still accepts distinctions and directions from the
Ancient Greeks. (012)
The professional skill
>which philosophers gain in graduate school is the careful, detailed
>and painstaking analysis and criticism of *arguments*. Arguments, not
>facts or theorems, are the stuff of professional philosophy.
>
>>BTW If one of your underlying points is that philosophers should not
>decide
>>what is relevant to ontological engineering for (e.g.) computer systems
>and
>>how it is used. I agree.
>
>That is my whole point. (013)
If so then we agree - and I think this is an important point - but I suspect
that this is NOT the impression that what most of your readers would come
away with. (014)
>
>>Philosophy is not the relevant background. But then
>>scientists do not usually claim to tell engineers what to do.
>
>If only it were true. In this field that is exactly what is actually
>happening. (015)
Can you give an example. (016)
>
>>If this is a moan about the intellectual effort it takes to get useful
>stuff
>>out of the philosophy texts - I can see your point.
>
>Not primarily. I was once a philosopher, and I actually enjoy the
>stuff and the texts. But (to use another metaphor) it bears the kind
>of relation to actual thought that building up your muscles in a gym
>has to laying bricks.
>
>> But your proposed
>>solution seems to me to make the situation worse.
>
>Which situation? (017)
Trying to do ontological engineering. You seem to be encouraging people to
building their own metaphysics, with no recourse to the resources built up
over the millennia. (018)
>>>On the whole, I suggest, it is probably better to
>>>re-do ones own metaphysics from scratch
>
>Pat
>
>>
>>Regards,
>>Chris
>>
>>
>>>-----Original Message-----
>> >From: Pat Hayes [mailto:phayes@xxxxxxx]
>>>Sent: 18 June 2007 21:58
>>>To: Chris Partridge
>>>Cc: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Two
>>>
>>>>John,
>>>>
>>>>I am not too bothered about the name itself. However, one reason I would
>>>>suggest for being aware of the name, if not actually using it, is that
>so
>>>>much work has been done in (blue-sky, impractical) philosophy in
>>>rigorously
>>>>laying out the choices - and the name 'metaphysics' (or 'metaphysical
>>>>choices') points to this work. It would be a pity if people were not
>aware
>>>>of it.
>>>
>>>Well, I guess I agree and disagree. Obviously it
>>>is hard to argue with the proposition that it
>>>would be nice if people were aware of stuff. On
>>>the other hand, there is a dangerous tendency,
>>>which others in these lists have noted, for
>>>philosophical writings to be treated with a kind
>>>of uncritical awe by non-philosophers, so that
>>>they - the texts - are treated with a reverence
>>>that they do not deserve. One should never forget
>>>that most philosophers work not by doing anything
>>>empirical or even by talking to people who do
>>>anything empirical, but by reading and
>>>criticizing what other philosophers have written.
>>>The result can be rather in-bred, and indeed is
>>>often so remote from the actual world that it is
>>>hard to even make any sensible connection between
>>>the concerns of a good deal of philosophy
>>>(including metaphysics) and anything in the real
>>>world at all. Recent debates about twin-Earth,
>>>Mary the color expert and zombies provide a host
>>>of examples.
>>>
>>>On the whole, I suggest, it is probably better to
>>>re-do ones own metaphysics from scratch than to
>>>try to read through the history of philosophy and
>>>sort out the very small fraction that may be
>>>relevant. Just be aware of a few common mental
>>>traps, such as not making the use/mention
>>>confusion, and you should do OK.
>>>
>>>Pat
>>>
>>>>Regards,
>>>>Chris
>>>>
>>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>>From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
>>>>>bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
>>>>>Sent: 16 June 2007 13:38
>>>>>To: [ontolog-forum]
>>>>>Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Two ontologiesthat areinconsistent but
>>>>>bothneeded
>>>>>
>>>>>Chris,
>>>>>
>>>>>I would suggest dropping the word "metaphysical" because many
>>>>>people confuse that word with blue-sky theory that has no
>>>>>practical applications.
>>>>>
>>>>>CP> It seems to me that these choices are metaphysical, in the
>>>>> > sense that no amount of empirical data can decide the issue.
>>>>>
>>>>>There are four very strong kinds of constraints:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Language (which encodes many generations of what people
>>>>> call "common sense"): Do the categories of the ontology
>>>>> have a smooth mapping to and from the way people talk
>>>>> about the subject?
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Science: Can the categories be mapped consistently to and
>>>>> from the best empirical evidence as codified in well tested
>>>>> scientific theories? (This is essentially refined common
>>>>> sense supported by instrumentation that extends and enhances
>>>>> the human senses.)
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Logic: Are the categories compatible, in the sense that
>>>>> they can fit together in a consistent description of the
>>>>> subject matter of interest?
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. Applications: Do the categories cover all the available
>>>>> data that is relevant to the subject matter?
>>>>>
>>>>>Those four constraints characterize good metaphysics, and it
>>>>>takes a lot of very hard work to satisfy all four of them.
>>>>>
>>>>>What gives the word 'metaphysical' bad connotations is laziness
>>>>>on the part of people who write down a bunch of symbols without
>>>>>testing them in sufficient detail against all four constraints.
>>>>>
>>>>>John
>>>>>
>>>>>
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