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Re: [ontolog-forum] Two

To: "Chris Partridge" <mail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 10:49:22 -0500
Message-id: <p06230902c29ef97981d6@[10.100.0.39]>
>Life is too short for me to retype the longer earlier mail.
>
>Pat,
>
>It looks as if you are after an argument. I guess it would be impolite to
>refuse.    (01)

Thanks    (02)

>It seems to me that your argument should be extended to other specialists,
>whose work requires some effort to understand.
>
>For example, there is a dangerous tendency, which (unfortunately) others in
>these lists have not noted, for logical writings to be treated with a kind
>of uncritical awe by non-logicians, so that they - the texts - are treated
>with a reverence that they do not deserve. One should never forget that most
>logicians work not by doing anything empirical or even by talking to people
>who do anything empirical, but by reading and criticizing what other
>logicians have written.    (03)

Actually that last point is not true. A quibble.    (04)

>The result can be rather in-bred, and indeed is
>often so remote from the actual world that it is hard to even make any
>sensible connection between the concerns of a good deal of logic (including
>FOL) and anything in the real world at all.
>
>On the whole, I suggest, it is probably better to re-do ones own logic from
>scratch than to try to read through the history of logic (not sure why one
>should need to read the history) and sort out the very small fraction that
>may be relevant.    (05)

Hee hee.    (06)

Now, if we had been having this debate in, say, 1870, then you would 
have had a very good point in this riposte. The difference now is 
that logic *has* become a field in which technical progress 
(mathematical rather than scientific, but progress for all that) has 
been made, and in which firm, uncontrovertible results, and a related 
technology (ies, actually) based on them, are available; so that I 
won't say that alternatives are impossible, but the effort (and 
hubris) involved in setting out to construct one's own alternative is 
now *very* high. None of this applies to the more descriptive parts 
of philosophy. There are no universally accepted results, no 'normal 
science', no theorems, in metaphysics or even philosophical ontology 
(a different field from ours, but related). There are only rival 
opinions, arguments and points of view: some of them most persuasive 
and the result of very deep thinking, but opinions nevertheless. By 
all means know them and even be persuaded by them: but do not cite 
them as authoritative *because* they are philosophy.    (07)

>But, isn't the way ontological engineers use philosophy much like the way
>most engineering disciplines use science (arcane, ivory tower science).    (08)

Yes, and that is exactly what I am complaining about. Because unlike 
(empirical) science and mathematics, philosophy has no valid claim 
upon truth, and does not exhibit the Popperian 'normal'+'revolution' 
pattern typical of empirical science. It is, rather, in a state of 
constant revision and changes of direction. The professional skill 
which philosophers gain in graduate school is the careful, detailed 
and painstaking analysis and criticism of *arguments*. Arguments, not 
facts or theorems, are the stuff of professional philosophy.    (09)

>BTW If one of your underlying points is that philosophers should not decide
>what is relevant to ontological engineering for (e.g.) computer systems and
>how it is used. I agree.    (010)

That is my whole point.    (011)

>Philosophy is not the relevant background. But then
>scientists do not usually claim to tell engineers what to do.    (012)

If only it were true. In this field that is exactly what is actually happening.    (013)

>If this is a moan about the intellectual effort it takes to get useful stuff
>out of the philosophy texts - I can see your point.    (014)

Not primarily. I was once a philosopher, and I actually enjoy the 
stuff and the texts. But (to use another metaphor) it bears the kind 
of relation to actual thought that building up your muscles in a gym 
has to laying bricks.    (015)

>  But your proposed
>solution seems to me to make the situation worse.    (016)

Which situation?    (017)

Pat    (018)

>
>Regards,
>Chris
>
>
>>-----Original Message-----
>  >From: Pat Hayes [mailto:phayes@xxxxxxx]
>>Sent: 18 June 2007 21:58
>>To: Chris Partridge
>>Cc: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Two
>>
>>>John,
>>>
>>>I am not too bothered about the name itself. However, one reason I would
>>>suggest for being aware of the name, if not actually using it, is that so
>>>much work has been done in (blue-sky, impractical) philosophy in
>>rigorously
>>>laying out the choices - and the name 'metaphysics' (or 'metaphysical
>>>choices') points to this work. It would be a pity if people were not aware
>>>of it.
>>
>>Well, I guess I agree and disagree. Obviously it
>>is hard to argue with the proposition that it
>>would be nice if people were aware of stuff. On
>>the other hand, there is a dangerous tendency,
>>which others in these lists have noted, for
>>philosophical writings to be treated with a kind
>>of uncritical awe by non-philosophers, so that
>>they - the texts - are treated with a reverence
>>that they do not deserve. One should never forget
>>that most philosophers work not by doing anything
>>empirical or even by talking to people who do
>>anything empirical, but by reading and
>>criticizing what other philosophers have written.
>>The result can be rather in-bred, and indeed is
>>often so remote from the actual world that it is
>>hard to even make any sensible connection between
>>the concerns of a good deal of philosophy
>>(including metaphysics) and anything in the real
>>world at all. Recent debates about twin-Earth,
>>Mary the color expert and zombies provide a host
>>of examples.
>>
>>On the whole, I suggest, it is probably better to
>>re-do ones own metaphysics from scratch than to
>>try to read through the history of philosophy and
>>sort out the very small fraction that may be
>>relevant. Just be aware of a few common mental
>>traps, such as not making the use/mention
>>confusion, and you should do OK.
>>
>>Pat
>>
>>>Regards,
>>>Chris
>>>
>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
>>>>bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
>>>>Sent: 16 June 2007 13:38
>>>>To: [ontolog-forum]
>>>>Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Two ontologiesthat areinconsistent but
>>>>bothneeded
>>>>
>>>>Chris,
>>>>
>>>>I would suggest dropping the word "metaphysical" because many
>>>>people confuse that word with blue-sky theory that has no
>>>>practical applications.
>>>>
>>>>CP> It seems to me that these choices are metaphysical, in the
>>>>   > sense that no amount of empirical data can decide the issue.
>>>>
>>>>There are four very strong kinds of constraints:
>>>>
>>>>    1. Language (which encodes many generations of what people
>>>>       call "common sense"):  Do the categories of the ontology
>>>>       have a smooth mapping to and from the way people talk
>>>>       about the subject?
>>>>
>>>>    2. Science:  Can the categories be mapped consistently to and
>>>>       from the best empirical evidence as codified in well tested
>>>>       scientific theories?  (This is essentially refined common
>>>>       sense supported by instrumentation that extends and enhances
>>>>       the human senses.)
>>>>
>>>>    3. Logic:  Are the categories compatible, in the sense that
>>>>       they can fit together in a consistent description of the
>>>>       subject matter of interest?
>>>>
>>>>    4. Applications:  Do the categories cover all the available
>>>>       data that is relevant to the subject matter?
>>>>
>>>>Those four constraints characterize good metaphysics, and it
>>>>takes a lot of very hard work to satisfy all four of them.
>>>>
>>>>What gives the word 'metaphysical' bad connotations is laziness
>>>>on the part of people who write down a bunch of symbols without
>>>>testing them in sufficient detail against all four constraints.
>>>>
>>>>John
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>   >11:31
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>>
>>
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>13:12
>    (019)


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