John F. Sowa schrieb:
> Ingvar,
>
> I accept the notion of 'truthlikeness' with the option
> of degrees of truthlikeness, as well as many degrees of
> confidence, certainty, approximation, etc.
>
> But I wouldn't equate truthlikeness with truth.
>
> Given Peirce's definition of truth as the ultimate goal that
> might require an indefinite amount of research by indefinite
> number of scientists, it wouldn't make sense to have
> different degrees of truth.
> (01)
I am almost stunned by the reaction on my introduction of the notion of
'truthlikeness' into this forum. Waclaw, who at first looked like a
social constructivist prepared to admit the reasonableness of any idea
whatsoever, has now a couple of times just like a complete dogmatist
merely stated "truth does not take degrees!". John, who endorses
Peirce's view that the scientific community *approaches* truth, equally
stubbornly simply refuses to consider my (originally Popper's) proposal
to introduce a notion of 'truth' according to which truth is a
determinable that can take degrees. I don't know what blocks them, but
here are some further words that might help to make the notion of
'truthlikeness' clearer. (02)
On my proposal, of course, the term 'truth' becomes *out of context*
ambiguous. It can then mean (i) 'truth' in the bipolar sense (which does
not take degrees), (ii) 'truth' in the determinable sense (which takes
degrees), and (iii) complete and absolute truthlikeness (which does not,
just like any determinate truthlikeness, take degrees). (03)
'Truthlikeness' is introduced as a notion *beside* the bipolar notion of
'true-false' used in everyday life and in two-valued logic. I have by no
means claimed that the introduction of 'truthlikeness' implies that
two-valued logic has to be replaced by many-valued logic. The notion of
'truthlikeness' is needed in order to make sense of the history of
science and to get a reasonable view of the future of science. When,
*within* an empirical science, reseachers are discussing theories and
hypotheses and what observable consequences they might yield, ordinary
two-valued logic functions well. (04)
Ingvar (05)
> I also accept the fallibilist point that we may already have
> discovered a large number of true statements, but that we
> have no way of being absolutely certain that any particular
> statement is absolutely true (although we may have a very high
> degree of certainty in its degree of approximation).
>
> As I said, I am willing to bet my life on the science and
> engineering that supports our cars and airplanes.
>
> John
>
>
>
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> (06)
--
Ingvar Johansson
IFOMIS, Saarland University
home site: http://ifomis.org/
personal home site:
http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/index.html (07)
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