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Re: [ontolog-forum] {Disarmed} Reality and Truth

To: "[ontolog-forum] " <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: "Barker, Sean (UK)" <Sean.Barker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 16 May 2007 09:15:29 +0100
Message-id: <E18F7C3C090D5D40A854F1D080A84CA40389AC@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>


Sean Barker
0117 302 8184    (01)


> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of 
> Waclaw Kusnierczyk
> Sent: 11 May 2007 17:07
> To: [ontolog-forum]
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] {Disarmed} Reality and Truth
> 
> 
> 
> Barker, Sean (UK) wrote:
> > 
> > Sean Barker
> > 0117 302 8184
> >  
> > 
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf 
> Of Waclaw 
> >> Kusnierczyk
> >> Sent: 11 May 2007 11:57
> >> To: [ontolog-forum]
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] {Disarmed} Reality and Truth
> >>
> >> Once we are here, I have the following metaphor in mind.
> >>
> >> In geometry we speak about figures (say, we constrain the world to 
> >> figures in a Euclidean 2D space).  There are squares; I 
> assume we do 
> >> not disagree on the definition of a square.
> > 
> > Even in Euclidean 2D, one might ask which of (0, 1)x(0, 1) and {0, 
> > 1]x[0, 1] (the open and closed sets) is a square, and if 
> one, why not 
> > the other.
> 
> Of course;  but in both cases, a particular figure is a square or not.
>     (02)

The point is, that a precise definition of a square would include one
and not the other - both a square but only one is a square - and
presumably the other is squarelike    (03)

> 
> The question is, is Euclidean 2D space the only place where
> > we want to use the concept square?
> 
> Surely not, but how does it matter here?    (04)

It matters because by choosing a well defined system that relies on
classical logic, it then makes other things not squares, such as a
straight-line figure with four corners, all of them right angles on the
surface of a sphere.    (05)

> 
> > 
> >> A particular figure is a square, or it is not.  We may look at it 
> >> from different distances, angles, etc., and decide that it is a 
> >> square or not (or, rather, decide whether we think it is a 
> square or 
> >> not);  the figure is or is not a square, independently of our 
> >> decision and our confidence in that the decision is correct.
> > 
> > I order a square cover for a hole. In engineering terms, this is 
> > specified by two identical dimensions, together with 
> tolerances, and 
> > the constraints which make it a square - angles at corners, plus 
> > tolerances on the accuracy of the angles, or equivent 
> specifications 
> > such as how parallel the edges are.
> > 
> > I suspect that by arguing in terms of 2D Euclidean space - which 
> > assumes manipulation through classical logic - that you 
> have assumed 
> > the hypothesis that you are trying to demonstrate.
> 
> This was just a metaphore, no attempt to prove any theory.
>     (06)

The problem is that the metaphor is inappropriate    (07)

> 
> >> Consider non-square figures.  These figures are not squares.  
> >> But they may be squarelike, and they may be squarelike to 
> different 
> >> degrees.  But how squarelike they are is not merely a 
> function of how 
> >> they are, but is dependent on the observer.
> > 
> > Or - it depends on the "squarelikeness" function the 
> observer selects.
> > What this says is that there is not an ideal "squarelikeness" 
> > function, or, if you prefer
> 
> Yes; what would 'ideal' mean?    (08)

There does exists a partial ordering of 
 squarelikeness functions 
 A1, A2, ... s.t. A1(x) < An(x) for all n > 1, all x, x a figure
with A1 the ideal    (09)

> 
> > 
> >     There does not exist an unique ordering of 
> squarelikeness functions 
> > A, B, ... s.t. A(x) < B(x) for all x, x a figure
> >>  Squarelikeness parasites on both the figures and the
> >> observer:  a polygon might be seen as more squarelike than 
> a circle 
> >> in that a square is a polygon, but a circle is not;  a 
> tetragon might 
> >> be seen as more squarelike than a pentagon, in that it has four 
> >> rather than five edges;  an equilateral tetragon (a 
> rhombus) might be 
> >> seen as more squarelike than an eqiangular tetragon, or vice versa.
> >>
> >> Nevertheless, any non-square figure is not a square.  It is not a 
> >> square at all.  It may be squarelike.  You might also say that a 
> >> square is perfectly squarelike, in that it is square.  But 
> you might 
> >> also say that a square is less squarelike (and is not 
> square) than, 
> >> say, a non-square rectangle, if you look from some 
> particular angle 
> >> -- this does not, however, change the fact that the square 
> is square 
> >> and the non-square rectangle is not.
> > 
> > You seem to want to restrict all discussion to formal 
> systems, which 
> > would mean that the ontology 101 pizza example is not an ontology.
> 
> Not quite sure what you mean by 'formal systems' in this context.
> How does it imply that (I would mean that) the pizza ontology 
> is not an ontology?  (But yes, an ontology which tries to 
> convince me that a pizza is a concept is not of much interest to me.)
> 
> 
> > 
> >> And here I see an analogy to truth:  truthness is like squareness, 
> >> and truthlikeness is like squarelikeness.  The latter may be more 
> >> useful in that we decide whether something is more or less 
> truthlike, 
> >> while we may never be able to decide (in the sense of forming a 
> >> belief rather than making
> >> orders) whether something is true or not.  (So John might say here 
> >> that this notion of truth is mystical, religious, and
> >> inapplicable.)
> > 
> > This is based on a claim that only two valued logic are 
> valid, which I 
> > would claim is invalid at the 99% level.
> 
> Again, what would 'valid' mean here?  I acknowledge mvl, and 
> fuzzy logics, but as argued earlier, it seems to me that 
> speaking of degrees of truth in these logics is a misunderstanding.    (010)

My apologies, but I feel impelled to hurl an insult at this point -
Platonist!
More seriously, it depends on your understanding of language - does
language model the world? or does it talk about the world? (Plato v.
Aristotle, or Tractatus v. Philosophical Investigations if you're in to
Wittgenstein)    (011)

> 
> vQ
> 
> > 
> >> Ingvar seems, to me, to have the wish to call squarelikeness 
> >> 'squareness'.
> >>
> >> vQ
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Barker, Sean (UK) wrote:
> >>> Sean Barker notes:
> >>>
> >>>   In computational geometry, it is useful to distinguish
> >> between what
> >>> is inside a shape and what is outside. Basic topology
> >> defines what is
> >>> -in- or -out- in terms of open sets (or closed sets), however the 
> >>> computational space of floating point numbers is not a
> >> metric space,
> >>> and this tends to make the boundary "fuzzy", that is, it seems 
> >>> appropriate to define set membership in terms of fuzzy logic.
> >>>
> >>>   In practice, fuzzy sets are painful to reason over,
> >> particularly
> >>> because applications of computational geometry, such as 
> CAD, use a 
> >>> large number of set operations (intersection, union, set
> >> difference)
> >>> to construct complex shapes out of simple primitives. It is more 
> >>> convenient to quantize the logic, e.g. into -in-, -on- and
> >> -out-. Set
> >>> operations in geometry then become operations using a three value 
> >>> logic, which, conveniently enough, turns out to be the Logic of 
> >>> Partial Functions (or strictly, one of the LPF's). This approach 
> >>> explicitly defines the quantisation function, which is 
> the point at 
> >>> which one changes the value of "truthfulness" in quantized
> >> logic system.
> >>>   The question of truth v. truthfulness seems to me to be
> >> a discussion
> >>> on the criteria for selecting a two-valued logic over a
> >>> multi- or continuous-valued logic. The selection of a continuous 
> >>> valued logic, such as fuzzy logic, does not imply that
> >> things are not
> >>> TRUE. In fact, one might strongly assert something is 
> TRUE if it is 
> >>> TRUE for all quantization functions (for all uncertainties in the 
> >>> boundary between true and false).
> >>>
> >>>   And, btw, once you have decided on the criteria (C1)
> >> for selecting a
> >>> two-valued logic over any other logic, then you get to debate the 
> >>> criteria (C2) for deciding the criteria (C1) on which you
> >> based that
> >>> decision. And then, the criteria (C3)....
> >>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >>>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf
> >> Of Ingvar
> >>>> Johansson
> >>>> Sent: 11 May 2007 10:50
> >>>> To: [ontolog-forum]
> >>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] {Disarmed} Reality and Truth
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>                *** WARNING ***
> >>>>
> >>>> This mail has originated outside your organization, 
> either from an 
> >>>> external partner or the Global Internet.
> >>>>      Keep this in mind if you answer this message. 
> >>>>
> >>>> Waclaw Kusnierczyk schrieb:
> >>>>> Ingvar Johansson wrote:
> >>>>>   
> >>>>>> John, who endorses
> >>>>>> Peirce's view that the scientific community 
> *approaches* truth, 
> >>>>>> equally stubbornly simply refuses to consider my (originally
> >>>>>> Popper's) proposal
> >>>>>>     
> >>>>> Hm.  Might it be that you present your own preferred views
> >>>> as if they
> >>>>> were Popper's?  (Pardon me my ignorance.)
> >>>>>   
> >>>> They may by some be taken to differ in one detail, but I
> >> think they
> >>>> are essenntially identical. I mentioned Popper in order
> >> not to become
> >>>> accused of having stolen any idea. In what follows, I 
> will simply 
> >>>> defend my own views.
> >>>>
> >>>>>> to introduce a notion of 'truth' according to which truth is a 
> >>>>>> determinable that can take degrees. I don't know what
> >> blocks them,
> >>>>>> but here are some further words that might help to make
> >>>> the notion of
> >>>>>> 'truthlikeness' clearer.
> >>>>>>     
> >>>>> Fine.  I agree with you that this theory might be seen as a
> >>>> reasonable
> >>>>> one.  I don't see it this way, which does not appear to
> >> me to be a
> >>>>> proof of its falseness -- which is completely coherent with my 
> >>>>> previous social constructivism, call it as you like.  I
> >>>> think we were
> >>>>> discussing what truth *is*, and then I simply stick to my
> >>>> own beliefs.  
> >>>>> If it were obvious to me that we discuss how truth *could*
> >>>> be, I would
> >>>>> (I think) agree with you.
> >>>>>   
> >>>> Statements are *about* something. What they are about
> >> depends on the
> >>>> concepts used. *Different concepts* are now and then (in 
> everyday 
> >>>> life, in science, and in philosophy) embodied in the *same
> >> graphical
> >>>> sign*. In this discussion the graphical sign 'truth' has 
> been used 
> >>>> both for the concept of bipolar truth and the concept of
> >> truth as a
> >>>> determinable that can take degrees. I have tried to show 
> that the 
> >>>> latter concept is
> >>>> (i) a semantically coherent concept, and (ii) a concept
> >> that makes it
> >>>> possible in a simple way to speak about science as progressing 
> >>>> towards 100%-truths.
> >>>>
> >>>> Given 'truth as truthlikeness', one can meaningfully ask: 
> >>>> "what *is* this truth or truthlikeness?" And then my short-hand 
> >>>> answer is:
> >>>> "truthlikeness is an internal relation between a 
> proposition and a 
> >>>> truthmaker". This means, among other things, that to ascribe a 
> >>>> certain truthlikeness to a proposition is *not* to ascribe it a 
> >>>> monadic property, but a *relational property*.
> >>>>
> >>>> Ingvar
> >>>>
> >>>>>> On  my proposal, of course, the term  'truth'  becomes *out of
> >>>>>> context* ambiguous. It can then mean (i) 'truth' in the
> >>>> bipolar sense
> >>>>>> (which does not take degrees), (ii) 'truth' in the
> >>>> determinable sense
> >>>>>> (which takes degrees), and (iii) complete and absolute
> >>>> truthlikeness
> >>>>>> (which does not, just like any determinate truthlikeness,
> >>>> take degrees).
> >>>>>> 'Truthlikeness' is introduced as a notion *beside* the
> >>>> bipolar notion
> >>>>>> of 'true-false' used in everyday life and in two-valued
> >>>> logic. I have
> >>>>>> by no means claimed that the introduction of
> >>>> 'truthlikeness' implies
> >>>>>> that two-valued logic has to be replaced by many-valued
> >> logic. The
> >>>>>> notion of 'truthlikeness' is needed in order to make
> >> sense of the
> >>>>>> history of science and to get a reasonable view of the 
> future of 
> >>>>>> science. When,
> >>>>>> *within* an empirical science, reseachers are discussing
> >>>> theories and
> >>>>>> hypotheses and what observable consequences they might yield, 
> >>>>>> ordinary two-valued logic functions well.
> >>>>>>     
> >>>>> Good, but you did make claims that it is truth that takes
> >>>> degrees.  It
> >>>>> appears to me that both John and me (and now you?) see
> >>>> truthlikeness
> >>>>> as distinct from truth, and calling it 'truth' (as in 
> (ii) above, 
> >>>>> where you seem to speak of determinate truthlikeness while
> >>>> proposing
> >>>>> to name it
> >>>>> 'truth') is simply begging for problems -- and thus the
> >> discussion.
> >>>>> vQ
> >>>>>  
> >>>>> 
> _________________________________________________________________
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> >>>>>  
> >>>>>   
> >>>> --
> >>>> Ingvar Johansson
> >>>> IFOMIS, Saarland University
> >>>>      home site: http://ifomis.org/
> >>>>      personal home site:
> >>>>      http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/index.html
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>  
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> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> 
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> >> --
> >> Wacek Kusnierczyk
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------
> >> Department of Information and Computer Science (IDI) Norwegian 
> >> University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Sem Saelandsv. 7-9
> >> 7027 Trondheim
> >> Norway
> >>
> >> tel.   0047 73591875
> >> fax    0047 73594466
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> 
> -- 
> Wacek Kusnierczyk
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------
> Department of Information and Computer Science (IDI)
> Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)
> Sem Saelandsv. 7-9
> 7027 Trondheim
> Norway
> 
> tel.   0047 73591875
> fax    0047 73594466
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>     (012)

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