On Oct 5, 2009, at 4:13 AM, David Leal wrote: (01)
> Dear All,
>
> As far as I can see there are two views:
>
> 1) A trope-based view. With this view, length (a member of Ed's kind
> of
> quantity - Q1) is class of trope. Waterline length is a subclasses
> of the
> length trope.
>
> 2) A function-based based view. With this view, length (a member of
> Ed's
> kind of quantity - Q4) is a set of equivalence classes of point pairs. (02)
or, of finite lines in space. Leaving to another ontology (of spatial
geometry) the task of specifying what a finite spatial line is. This
allows for such things as the length of a curved line, which the point-
pair description misses. (03)
Pat (04)
> Waterline length is a function from ship to length.
>
> I think that a number of people agree that the function-based view is
> useful, even whilst arguing about the philosophy.
>
> The use of the term "indirect property" for these functions has not
> been
> helpful. The term "quantity valued function" may be better.
>
> Best regards,
> David
>
> At 10:07 05/10/2009 +0200, you wrote:
>>> Dear Matthew, Pat, and Ingvar,
>>>
>>> In these discussions, I completely agree with Pat and Ingvar.
>>
>> John, Many thanks for the mail below!
>> Ingvar
>>
>>>
>>> MW>>>> Why is maximum allowable temperature not a temperature?
>>>
>>> IJ>>> It is a temperature.
>>>
>>> MW>> Then tell me which temperatures are the maximum
>>>>> allowable ones?
>>>
>>> PH> How should I know? You will have to look at the relevant
>>>> spec.
>>>
>>> I believe that Matthew has caught a "philosopher's disease"
>>> as Wittgenstein would say. Matthew is trying to force
>>> extensional definitions on concepts that cannot be defined
>>> by pointing to a concrete set.
>>>
>>> MW>> Then I ask you how I know when I look at a temperature whether
>>>>> it is maximum allowable one or not.
>>>
>>> PH> The question is meaningless.
>>>
>>> Making meaningless statements that only a philosopher could imagine
>>> is another symptom of a philosopher's disease. Wittgenstein would
>>> prescribe a course of therapy that would guide the patient toward
>>> more sensible speech.
>>>
>>> MW>> There is a possible world in which there is something that
>>>>> has that temperature.
>>>
>>> PH> Ah, OK, if you allow possible words then no problem.
>>> (Interesting
>>>> move, for a nominalist, but lets have that discussion in another
>>>> thread)
>>>
>>> This point is key to a cure. The original motivation for a purely
>>> extensional philosophy is to give clear, precise definitions by
>>> pointing to specific sets. But many important concepts cannot be
>>> defined extensionally. Those include hypothetical notions or plans
>>> for the future.
>>>
>>> To preserve a semblance of consistency, Matthew was forced to adopt
>>> not just a four-dimensional ontology that treats extensions in an
>>> unobservable future as if they were just as concrete as anything
>>> observable in the present, but also sets in an infinity of purely
>>> imaginary possible worlds.
>>>
>>> But possible worlds are only definable by intensions. There is no
>>> way to define them extensionally because they don't exist (or at
>>> least there is no way to observe them, point to them, travel to
>>> them, or get any news or reports from them). Nobody can say
>>> anything about the possible worlds except by making claims about
>>> unobservable fictions.
>>>
>>> In summary, it may be possible to formulate a coherent extensional
>>> theory that accounts for observable phenomena. But there is no way
>>> to generalize such a theory to support hypotheses or plans for the
>>> future. Any attempt to generalize such a theory inevitably leads
>>> to unsubstantiated statements about unobservable futures or claims
>>> about purely imaginary possible worlds.
>>>
>>> John
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
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> David Leal
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> (05)
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