On Oct 5, 2009, at 5:44 AM, Matthew West wrote: (01)
> Dear John,
>
> You are conflating two usages of intensional, so it is not I who is
> suffering from a philosophers desease.
>
>> I believe that Matthew has caught a "philosopher's disease"
>> as Wittgenstein would say. Matthew is trying to force
>> extensional definitions on concepts that cannot be defined
>> by pointing to a concrete set.
>>
>> MW>> Then I ask you how I know when I look at a temperature whether
>>>> it is maximum allowable one or not.
>>
>> PH> The question is meaningless.
>
> MW: If you are claiming that maximum allowable working temperature
> is a
> subtype of temperature, (02)
BUt I did not claim this. I said, m.a.t's are temperatures. This means
that the SET of mits is a subSET (not subtype) of the SET of
temperatures, indeed. I have no idea how large this subset is, nor do
I care. The answer will depend upon historical research and has no
bearing on the ontology. (03)
> it seems perfectly reasonable to me. It is not
> different from asking "How do I know which pieces of equipment are
> pumps?" Is that a meaningless question? (04)
No, and its not like asking that. It is more like asking, which colors
are pretty? There isn't any way, given a color in isolation, to judge
whether or not it is pretty. The question is meaningless.
Nevertheless, people do refer to pretty colors, and every pretty color
is indeed a color. (05)
I will ignore the rest of the debate (about intensionality). (06)
Pat (07)
>>
>> Making meaningless statements that only a philosopher could imagine
>> is another symptom of a philosopher's disease. Wittgenstein would
>> prescribe a course of therapy that would guide the patient toward
>> more sensible speech.
>>
>> MW>> There is a possible world in which there is something that
>>>> has that temperature.
>>
>> PH> Ah, OK, if you allow possible words then no problem.
>> (Interesting
>>> move, for a nominalist, but lets have that discussion in another
>>> thread)
>>
>> This point is key to a cure. The original motivation for a purely
>> extensional philosophy is to give clear, precise definitions by
>> pointing to specific sets. But many important concepts cannot be
>> defined extensionally. Those include hypothetical notions or plans
>> for the future.
>
> MW: Certainly.
>>
>> To preserve a semblance of consistency, Matthew was forced to adopt
>> not just a four-dimensional ontology that treats extensions in an
>> unobservable future as if they were just as concrete as anything
>> observable in the present, but also sets in an infinity of purely
>> imaginary possible worlds.
>
> MW: You try to make it sound as if this is something I just thought
> up,
> whereas it is a quite standard approach. There is no such thing as a
> "semblance of consistency" you are either consistent or not, and
> this is
> consistent. It simply avoids traditional modal logic.
>>
>> But possible worlds are only definable by intensions.
>
> MW: You confuse two different sorts of intentionality. There is the
> sort
> where I create a class by make a definition, and then see what fits,
> and
> there is intentionally as in intentionally constructed objects (see
> Searle "The construction of social reality"). These are quite
> different.
> So there is no problem in my constructing plans intentionally. That
> does
> not however mean that their identity is defined intentionally rather
> than extensionally.
>
>> There is no
>> way to define them extensionally because they don't exist (or at
>> least there is no way to observe them, point to them, travel to
>> them, or get any news or reports from them). Nobody can say
>> anything about the possible worlds except by making claims about
>> unobservable fictions.
>
> MW: Indeed. They are intentionally constructed, but their identity is
> extensional.
>>
>> In summary, it may be possible to formulate a coherent extensional
>> theory that accounts for observable phenomena. But there is no way
>> to generalize such a theory to support hypotheses or plans for the
>> future. Any attempt to generalize such a theory inevitably leads
>> to unsubstantiated statements about unobservable futures or claims
>> about purely imaginary possible worlds.
>
> MW: This is only not possible in the philosophical world you have
> constructed in which the two different uses of intentional are
> confused.
>
> Regards
>
> Matthew West
> Information Junction
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>
>>
>> John
>>
>>
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