Dear Ravi,
Even within those many references (thanks!), I was unable to
turn up an English definition of the word "prescissed"
on ANY of the major search engines, each search focused on those sites. At
least google realized that the word wasn't "precise", which bing and
yahoo seemed completely unable to do; they insisted that the word was
"precise" no matter what switches I flipped at them.
But here seems to be an example sentence usage that has some
intuitive value:
To use a weak analogy, I can
conceive of the redness of a red cube even if I cannot in principle perceive
redness apart from such an instantiation. Redness, as with prime matter, can be
analytically prescissed from its instantiation in particulars.
So I deduce that "prescission" means "extracting
the core interest portion of an object (thing?) for analysis". Which
indicates that it is kosher to pick a feature (e.g., redness) even when there
is no particular (instance) that stands alone. E.g., a "red table"
has both redness and tableness. Seeing a red bicycle leaning on
a brown table makes that viewpoint easier to generalize separately, into redness
and tableness.
OK, so "prescission" apparently means "taking
a feature of an object (thing?) and analyzing that feature independently of the
object (thing) itself".
I hope I have prescissed the meaning properly from the poverty
of the example stimulus.
You continued:
What I am meaning is a slightly different mechanism that
sensation-perception discussed above and it is not precise to
strictly call it "seeing" but more like to recognize
or realize as related to reality.
What falls on the eye of retina is same pattern, but embodied
understanding of that pattern does not only depend on previous patterns
experienced, but really being different from person to person (and observing
from history), Einstein was a person who realized the space-time aspects of
gravity ahead of many others even from people around him. Also someone
discovers planets and galaxies of significance from same data images while
others do not. Thus physical universe is perceived differently by different
people even if data about it used are same.
Yes, the word "seeing" was an inarticulate choice. I
should have said "sensing", since it is as true of any one sense as
any other sense. The word used in that reference was "sensing" as opposed
to "perceiving", and that seems like a reasonable characterization.
Here is a schedule of the life history of one fictitious scientist:
Activity Year
------------ ------
Birth 0
Education 23
Observation 46
The point is that the infant Alice (later to become the
scientist) develops those sensations and stores them over the years 0 to 23.
At age 23, she starts a career as an earth planetologist. So when she observes
at age 46, she generates possible objects (things?) from her past experience
which she expects are possible in this newest observation. That means Alice
did not look at the same objects as her twin sister scientist Beta, who
followed a different path from age 0 to 23 and became a musician.
At age 46, Alpha and Beta went on a vacation together and
observed the scenes together. Alpha sensed geological features, fossils, the structures
in which ancient peoples had lived, grown corn, and in time disappeared, as she
could plainly see. Beta was interested in the musical instruments shown in the
museum with the claim that the ancient peoples had made instruments and played
them.
Each twin sensed a different reality from the other. Instead, each
sensed the same kinds of objects (things) and relationships each had sensed
from ages 0 to 23. The main difference was that each sensed them in a possibly
new, different combination than the other.
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper,
Rich Cooper,
Chief Technology Officer,
MetaSemantics Corporation
MetaSemantics AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
( 9 4 9 ) 5 2 5-5 7 1 2
http://www.EnglishLogicKernel.com
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ravi Sharma
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 2:40 PM
To: Thomas Johnston; [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Ontology based conversational interfaces
Although I have to study what Tom has posted on Hans
Kamp & Uwe Reyle (1996) and Principia which is favorite of
many learned people, I found references to " prescissed "
What
I am meaning is a slightly different mechanism that sensation-perception
discussed above and it is not precise to strictly call it "seeing"
but more like to recognize or realize as related to reality.
What
falls on the eye of retina is same pattern, but embodied understanding of that
pattern does not only depend on previous patterns experienced, but really being
different from person to person (and observing from history), Einstein was a
person who realized the space-time aspects of gravity ahead of many others even
from people around him. Also someone discovers planets and galaxies of
significance from same data images while others do not. Thus physical universe
is perceived differently by different people even if data about it used are
same.
On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 9:27 AM, Thomas Johnston <tmj44p@xxxxxxx> wrote:
Thanks for the link to the
discourse analysis book. Based on looking at its TOC, I think it's definitely
worth a read, although, being published in 1983, most of its value probably
lies in documenting the history of discourse analysis. I also don't see any of
the formal ontology in the book that you alluded to.
Another strange thing is that
except for the Big Names in the bibliography -- Chafe, Fillmore, Johnson-Laird,
Partee, Quine, Searle, etc -- I don't recognize many of the other authors
listed there. But perhaps that just indicates that I haven't read enough. Or
perhaps it represents a break with the past, that a genuine new path was taken
by more current authors. I don't know.
Here's a 1996 article by Hans
Kamp, who is, in the current literature, one of the Big Names in discourse
representation theory. I cite it to indicate that those developing current DRT
are interested in formalization, and not just in philosophical generalizations.
(It costs $40 if you don't have access to a university library, so I haven't
read it myself yet, and it actually sounds like a book one could skip.)
2. This
paper presents a sound and complete proof system for the first order fragment
of Discourse Representation Theory. Since the inferences that
human language users draw from the verbal input they receive for the most
transcend the capacities of such a system, it can be no more than a basis on
which more powerful systems, which are capable of producing those inferences,
may then be built. Nevertheless, even within the general setting of first order
logic the structure of the formulas of DRS-languages, i.e. of the Discourse Representation
Structures suggest for the components of such a system inference rules that
differ somewhat from those usually found in proof systems for the first order
predicate calculus and which are, we believe, more in keeping with inference
patterns that are actually employed in common sense reasoning.This is why we
have decided to publish the present exercise, in spite of the fact that it is
not one for which a great deal of originality could be claimed. In fact, it
could be argued that the problem addressed in this paper was solved when Gödel
first established the completeness of the system of Principia Mathematica for
first order logic. For the DRS-languages we consider here are straightforwardly
intertranslatable with standard formulations of the predicate calculus; in fact
the translations are so straightforward that any sound and complete proof
system for first order logic can be used as a sound and complete proof system for
DRSs: simply translate the DRSs into formulas of predicate logic and then
proceed as usual. As a matter of fact, this is how one has chosen to proceed in
some implementations of DRT, which involve inferencing as well as semantic
representation; an example is the Lex system developed jointly by IBM and the
University of Tübingen (see in particular (Guenthner et al. 1986))
Thanks for the
reference. It's a three page definition of Umwelt, but here is a salient
quote of what you may have meant:
What UexkuÈ ll uniquely
realized was that the physical environment, in whatever sense it may be said to
be the `same' for all organisms (we are speaking, of course, of the environment
on earth, though much of what we say could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to
biospheres on other planets should such eventually be found), is not the world
in which any given species as such actually lives out its life. No. Each
biological life-form, by reason of its distinctive bodily constitution (its
`biological heritage', as we may say), is suited only to certain parts and
aspects of the vast physical universe. And when this `suitedness to' takes the
bodily form of cognitive organs, such as are our own senses, or the often quite
di€erent sensory modalities discovered in other lifeforms, then those aspects
and only those aspects of the physical environment which are proportioned to
those modalities become `objecti®ed', that is to say, made present not merely
physically but cognitively as well.
For those interested in
conversational interfaces, Here is a free pdf about discourse and
conversational analysis:
There are a lot of discourse
analysis papers in pdf on the web, but very few are really about the ontology
within which a conversational system must operate. Most are more Social
Science, or English or Philosophy in context and don't go to the symbolic level.
This is the best book I have come across so far, unless someone has a better
one, also available on the web in a PDF or a Kindle version, or otherwise
available to the casual researchers. I will invest some time in this one,
but only in studying it.
Chief Technology Officer,
MetaSemantics Corporation
MetaSemantics AT
EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
On 7/11/2015 10:48 PM, Rich
Cooper wrote:
> Since you are so
persistent about insisting that every observer sees
> the same objective
reality as the next one, I will concede the point to you.
Everybody knows that
different people (and animals) have different views, opinions, and ways of
perceiving, thinking, and acting.
For example, your pet dog,
cat, or whatever may live in your home.
But you and your pet have
very different experiences and ways of perceiving and acting. But it
would be misleading to say that you and your pet live in different houses.
If you want a technical term
that has an associated theory that has been explored in some depth, I suggest
'Umwelt'. The 'Welt'
component means 'world', but
the theory of the Umwelt focuses on the way it's experienced. See the
article by John Deely:
> an Umwelt is not merely
the aspects of the environment accessed in
> sensation. Far more is
it the manner in which those aspects are
> networked together as
and to constitute 'objects of experience'...
> Jakob von Uexküll ... saw
that the difference between objects of
> experience and elements
of sensation is determined primarily not by
> anything in the physical
environment as such but by the relation or,
> rather, network and set
of relations that obtains between whatever may
> be 'in fact' present
physically in the surroundings and the cognitive
> constitution of the
biological organism interacting with those
> surroundings here and
now.
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Thanks.
Ravi
(Dr. Ravi Sharma)
313 204 1740 Mobile
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