I generally agree with Doug Foxvog on his comments, but here add a few
clarifications: (01)
(1)
DF: > When have you found this necessary? I suggest that such cases
> were when the need for the locations of the physical representations
> was found necessary -- e.g., the extent of the spread of some
> classified document.
>
PC > > I haven't yet encountered an occasion to actually *use* the physical
> > 'location'. It can be problematic.
>
DF: > Agreed.
>
Right. The main point of my question was to inquire whether any other
ontology user has found a practical use for specifying the spatial location
of abstract entities, since this seems to have been one subthread in the
parent thread for this thread. (02)
(2)
PC: > > But one also needs to decide whether it in fact 'exists'. My
> treatment
> > considers abstract entities as 'existing' only as long as there is
> some
> > physical representation (which may be , e.g., on paper or in the mind
> of
> > some agent). When the last representation disappears, that abstract
> > entity no longer 'exists'.
>
DF: > This is a philosophical question.
>
PC: > > Can it be re-created? No, not as the same individual.
>
DF: > If an author forgets a work, but goes through the same process as
> before to regenerate the work, would you consider the regenerated
> work the "same individual"?
>
No, unless the author, in recreating the work is actually prodding
him/herself to remember what was in the original, in which case it is a
remembering of what already exists. This difference may well be
indeterminate, even to the author. In my analyses, I find this existential
distinction useful, though others may have no use for it. I am trying to
include in COSMO any *primitive* concept that anyone *might* find useful.
I am not concerned with logical redundancy via alternative modes of
representation. (03)
(3)
PC: > > There may be other individual abstract entities (e.g. a sentence)
>
DF: > Here, you are referring to patterns of symbols. Once a set of symbols
> has been created, all linear combinations of such symbols
> mathematically
> exist. So patterns of such symbols technically are not created (nor do
> they cease to exist) -- they are used by people for some purpose.
> Different people may use them with different meaning or with
> (approximately) the same meaning.
>
Hmm. I was referring to specific sentences created by an individual at a
particular time, which to me is a "conceptual work", which is an individual
of which there may well be some corresponding class. I thought that
ConceptualWorks did exist in time in CYC. They have a creation time. I
distinguish between a ConceptualWork and some *possible* sequence of words
which might have an equivalent textual representation (and which might be
created in a physical representation at some other time by some team of
monkeys typing randomly) (04)
Pat (05)
Patrick Cassidy
MICRA Inc.
cassidy@xxxxxxxxx
908-561-3416 (06)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of doug foxvog
> Sent: Monday, May 27, 2013 2:09 AM
> To: [ontolog-forum]
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Spatial Extent of Abstract Entities?
>
> On Thu, May 23, 2013 12:15, Patrick Cassidy wrote:
>
> > I'm curious to know how others have handled the issue of spatial
> extent of
> > abstract objects, which Doug and Matthew have been discussing.
>
> Cyc treats abstract objects as non-spatial.
>
> > Here I describe my current treatment, open to criticism or
> modification.
>
> > Abstract entities, in particular information such as text or images
> > (abstracted as pixilated raster objects), do not themselves have mass
> or
> > extent, but they may have physical representations (as markings on
> paper,
> > solid models, audible sounds, light wave patterns).
>
> Agreed.
>
> > So do they can be said to have physical "location" or "extent".
>
> Their representations have physical location and extent. To claim
> that the abstract entities do seems to me to be similar to claiming
> that classes/types such as Tiger, Document, Dodo, Song have
> physical location and extent because their instances do.
>
> > In COSMO I avoid specifying any
> > physical 'location', but when necessary, the 'location' is either the
> > contiguous region in which all physical representations exist, or the
> > disjoint spatial extent of all of the physical representations.
> Neither
> > is easy to identify.
>
> When have you found this necessary? I suggest that such cases
> were when the need for the locations of the physical representations
> was found necessary -- e.g., the extent of the spread of some
> classified document.
>
> > I haven't yet encountered an occasion to actually *use* the physical
> > 'location'. It can be problematic.
>
> Agreed.
>
> > ...
> > If in fact a 'location' must be specified for the information content,
> > perhaps it is easier just to say that it is in the world (real or
> > possible) in which it originated.
>
> This can be handled by specifying the context in which the information
> content exists, without specifying a spatial extent.
>
> > But one also needs to decide whether it in fact 'exists'. My
> treatment
> > considers abstract entities as 'existing' only as long as there is
> some
> > physical representation (which may be , e.g., on paper or in the mind
> of
> > some agent). When the last representation disappears, that abstract
> > entity no longer 'exists'.
>
> This is a philosophical question.
>
> > Can it be re-created? No, not as the same individual.
>
> If an author forgets a work, but goes through the same process as
> before to regenerate the work, would you consider the regenerated
> work the "same individual"?
>
> > There may be other individual abstract entities (e.g. a sentence)
>
> Here, you are referring to patterns of symbols. Once a set of symbols
> has been created, all linear combinations of such symbols
> mathematically
> exist. So patterns of such symbols technically are not created (nor do
> they cease to exist) -- they are used by people for some purpose.
> Different people may use them with different meaning or with
> (approximately) the same meaning.
>
> > that are in every attribute (except time, location, and origin)
> identical to
> > another, but that would be a different individual, just as atoms of
> some
> > element are all identical, but are distinct individuals.
>
> Cyc treats #$ConceptualWorks (CWs) as abstract temporal aspatial
> individuals that have physical instantiations as physical objects
> and/or events. Patterns of symbols are abstract individuals known as
> #$AbstractInformationStructures (AISes) that are related to
> #$ConceptualWorks by the relation #$cwTypeHasInfoStructureType.
> An instantiation of an AIS is related to the AIS by the relation
> #$instantiationOfAIS. An instantiation of a CW is related to the CW
> by #$instantiationOfWork.
>
> What you are referring to here is two different CWs that have the same
> AIS. As such it may be difficult to determine which CW an intantiation
> of that AIS is an instantiation of.
>
> > Likewise, the same
> > sentence generated by two different people, existing simultaneously,
> are
> > still different individuals, though they may have the same
> propositional
> > content.
>
> They, as conceptual works, are different individuals, although their
> abstract information structures are the same.
>
> Note that a CW (even of a sentence) may have multiple information
> structures. One info structure may be a string of words. The next
> may be a string of characters in some character set. (E.g., a word
> in Serbo-Croatian has one structure in the Cyrillic alphabet and
> another in the Latin alphabet.) A more specific information
> structure may specify font, size, color, etc. of the letters.
>
> Note also that a single information structure of letters may represent
> different words in different languages. For example, "sin pronto"
> is supposed to mean "no downpayment" in Argentine Spanish, but
> English speakers might interpret it differently.
>
> > Other treatments?
>
> See the Cyc treatment i mention above.
>
> -- doug f
>
> > Pat
> >
> > Patrick Cassidy
> > MICRA Inc.
> > cassidy@xxxxxxxxx
> > 908-561-3416
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-
> >> bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Matthew West
> >> Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2013 9:25 AM
> >> To: doug@xxxxxxxxxx
> >> Cc: '[ontolog-forum] '
> >> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] What is the role of an upper level
> >> ontology?
> >>
> >> Dear Doug,
> >>
> >> > >> In 4D, i would too. But i would consider the organization an
> >> object
> >> > >> with a temporal, but not a spatial dimension.
> >> > >
> >> > > MW: That is a rather half hearted 4 dimensionalism. I go for
> strong
> >> 4D
> >> > > which has the 4D extent as the identity of any individual (not a
> >> set
> >> > > or relationship). So I do not even know what it means to exist
> if
> >> you
> >> > > have a temporal but not a spatial extent.
> >> >
> >> > At work i have a sick leave account and a vacation leave account.
> >> > Such accounts (as well as bank accounts, credit card accounts) are
> >> useful
> >> to
> >> > model in an ontology.
> >> > They certainly have temporal existence. But it seems
> >> > to me quite a stretch (not that Rose Mary Wood couldn't do it 8)# )
> >> to
> >> claim
> >> > that they have a spatial extent.
> >>
> >> MW: The question is what is the root of a day's leave? It is you for
> >> the day
> >> in a vacation state. That is a spatio-temporal extent, and any
> account
> >> of it
> >> is some representation of that, or an aggregate of similar objects.
> >> >
> >> > Permission to do something has a temporal extent. Claiming that
> its
> >> spatial
> >> > extent it the area in which the thing may be done seems specious
> to
> >> me.
> >>
> >> MW: Not at all. You only need to bring possible worlds into the
> >> equation to
> >> cover the future activity (a spatio-temporal extent) that is the
> >> execution
> >> of that permission.
> >>
> >> > A
> >> > patent is temporal, and is different from the sheet of paper (or
> >> group of
> >> all
> >> > sheets of paper that document the
> >> > patent). Claiming that it has a spatial extent of the territory
> of
> >> > the issuing country also seems a stretch.
> >>
> >> MW: A patent is about (generally) a design - that is universal, and
> >> placing
> >> restrictions on its use. Again we need possible worlds and
> activities,
> >> but
> >> not objects with temporal but no spatial boundaries.
> >> >
> >> > What would the physical extent of an ontology be?
> >>
> >> MW: An ontology, is an aggregate of signs of classes, individuals,
> >> relationships, and rules. The signs are spatio-temporal extents of
> some
> >> sort, even if they are bits in computers.
> >> >
> >> > What is the physical extent of an hour, a day, a year, a century
> be?
> >>
> >> MW: The whole universe. That is actually obvious if you really think
> in
> >> 4D.
> >>
> >> > A time zone, the Earth, the observable universe, an
> >> expanding/contracting
> >> > sphere around the time zone/Earth with its radius being in light-
> >> units of
> >> > time, the instantaneous greatest distance in time from the
> specific
> >> time
> >> to
> >> > the time of the sphere?
> >>
> >> MW: It actually makes a lot more sense when you add the spatial
> >> dimensions
> >> in. I suggest you try drawing a space-time diagram for this problem.
> >> >
> >> > I accept 4D models of physical objects, situations, and events,
> but
> >> also
> >> > accept the existence of temporal non-physical objects.
> >>
> >> MW: I consider that unnecessary, and therefore to be avoided.
> >> >
> >> > > In the strong 4D that I use, an organization consists of the
> >> temporal
> >> > > parts of the people involved in it, whilst they are in an
> >> > > organizational role.
> >> >
> >> > Then in any KB using that model, Apple, Inc., didn't have a
> presence
> >> in
> >> the
> >> > countries in which it rented post office box numbers, but had no
> >> employees?
> >>
> >> MW: It is actually an interesting question what exactly is the
> >> constitution
> >> of an organization. Is it just the people? Or does it include what
> the
> >> organization owns/rents as well? The answer is a matter of law,
> which
> >> may
> >> vary from place to place.
> >>
> >> MW: If there was a company set up, and it had a PO box, then there
> are
> >> officers of the company, and even if they are not resident in the
> >> country,
> >> then the company exists (there is not a restraint on companies to
> >> operate
> >> only within their country). Whether just a PO box counts as a
> >> "presence" is
> >> interesting. I would look for legal precedence. However, the
> >> consequence
> >> determines what spatio-temporal extents count as part of a company,
> not
> >> whether or not a company is a spatio-temporal extent.
> >> >
> >> > Such a model may be consistent and useful for your purposes. But
> >> there
> >> seems
> >> > to me to be no reason to impose it on everyone who
> >> > wishes to use any ontology.
> >>
> >> MW: I carefully declare that this is a 4D view of the world. I quite
> >> agree
> >> that this does not require everyone else to take the same view. I
> only
> >> argue
> >> that it is a valid, compact and rigorous view.
> >>
> >> > I'd accept it as an upper-level microtheory,
> >> > but not as part of an upper level ontology designed for general
> use.
> >>
> >> MW: It is perfectly suitable for general use. I have not yet found
> >> something
> >> (together with the other elements I mentioned, a basic set theory,
> >> mathematical objects, and possible worlds) that it cannot cover.
> >> >
> >> > > Note that I have no problem constructing one kind of object out
> of
> >> the
> >> > > temporal parts of another kind (or kinds) of object.
> >> > > In any case, given the nature of space-time, I don't know what
> it
> >> > > means to exist with a temporal extent, but no spatial extent.
> >> > > I therefore reject abstract individuals as an unnecessary
> >> commitment.
> >> >
> >> > Some people would reject a 4D model as an unnecessary commitment.
> >>
> >> MW: If you do not commit to 4D you have to commit to something else.
> >> It is
> >> a choice you have to make, not an unnecessary one. There are of
> course
> >> people who make alternative choices, such as 3D + time, or even as
> >> Barry
> >> does, 4D for activities and 3D + time for physical objects.
> >>
> >> > It seems to me that enforced 4D (or 3D+1) models as well as there
> >> being
> >> > subclasses of abstract individual should be stated in
> microtheories
> >> that
> >> users
> >> > can accept/reject/ignore according to their needs.
> >>
> >> MW: If you are trying to build a tower of Babel that contains all
> >> possible
> >> theories, then you should certainly include alternatives. Most of my
> >> work
> >> has been in data integration. Here the objective is to bring
> different
> >> ways
> >> of looking at the world together in one place using one way of
> looking
> >> at
> >> the world. I have found 4D unsurpassed for that because of its
> rigour.
> >> >
> >> > >> Would you say, "Part of the Red Sox has a daughter named Sue."?
> >> >
> >> > > MW: That strikes me as rather unlikely, but not impossible. Let
> us
> >> > > look at the case. Presumably you do not mean any part of the Red
> >> Sox
> >> > > (say all the pitchers, or the right arm of one of them) but a
> >> particular
> >> > player.
> >> >
> >> > Isn't a temporal part of a particular player a part of the Red Sox,
> >> if
> >> that
> >> > player is part of the Red Sox?
> >> >
> >> > From the above comment, it seems you would have the same objection
> >> to
> >> these
> >> > two sentences.
> >> > + A Red Sox player has a daughter named Sue.
> >> > * Part of the Red Sox has a daughter named Sue.
> >> >
> >> > I'd guess that most English speakers would find the first
> statement
> >> > acceptable, but not the second.
> >>
> >> MW: Yes, the second statement is not sufficiently precise to be
> >> meaningful,
> >> though not actually wrong.
> >> >
> >> > > Of course, a particular player is not the whole life of the
> person,
> >> > > but the temporal part of the person whilst they are a player for
> >> the
> >> > > Red Sox. Now what has a daughter is a father (or mother - but I
> am
> >> > > going to presume that there are no women players for the Red
> Sox).
> >> >
> >> > > The father is the temporal part of the person from when the
> >> daughter
> >> > > is born until they die
> >> >
> >> > By "they", it appears you mean the father,
> >>
> >> MW: Yes.
> >>
> >> > not both the father and the
> >> > daughter. Do you use "they" instead of "he", to accept the
> >> possibility of
> >> the
> >> > father changing gender?
> >>
> >> MW: No. But I am assuming that if he did change gender that would
> not
> >> stop
> >> him being a father (though that might make a mess of some databases).
> >> >
> >> > > (I presume that you remain a father until your death, even if
> your
> >> > > daughter dies before you - you could make other choices).
> >> >
> >> > This means that there is only one father -- only one specific
> >> temporal
> >> part of
> >> > the person who is a father. Which means that I, today, am not a
> >> father,
> >> > although there is a temporal part of me (of which I, today, am a
> >> temporal
> >> > part) that is.
> >>
> >> MW: Yes, but it is a state extended in time, not a series of time
> >> slices. I
> >> take a perdurant view. That means I am a father from when a child is
> >> born
> >> until my death.
> >> >
> >> > > Now it is true that a Red Sox player has a daughter if the
> temporal
> >> > > part of the person is identical to (has the same spatio-temporal
> >> > > extent) as the father of the daughter. That is unlikely,
> >> >
> >> > ... and very counter-intuitive. If you told a Red Sox fan that
> none
> >> of
> >> the
> >> > Red Sox players were fathers, you would find that s/he disagreed
> with
> >> you.
> >> > Your ontology might work for your purposes, but has little
> agreement
> >> with
> >> the
> >> > human world.
> >>
> >> MW: That is because what you have stated includes several short cuts.
> >> If you
> >> expand it fully, you could say, the person (for the whole of their
> life)
> >> that is currently a Red Sox Player (a state of the person whilst
> they
> >> are a
> >> Red Sox Player) is currently father (a temporal part of the person)
> to
> >> Sue.
> >>
> >> >
> >> > > but if the person who had a temporal part that was a Red Sox
> Player,
> >> > > and had a temporal part that was a father and the daughter was
> born
> >> > > exactly when they joined the Red Sox and they died whilst still
> a
> >> Red
> >> > > Sox player,
> >> >
> >> > > then indeed, a part of the Red Sox would have a daughter.
> >> >
> >> > The conclusion here is that then a Red Sox player would have a
> >> daughter.
> >> > According to your logic, if a person became a father while playing
> >> for the
> >> Red
> >> > Sox, and he died while still being a Red Sox player, then a part
> of
> >> the
> >> Red
> >> > Sox, more specifically a temporal part of one of its player parts,
> >> would
> >> have
> >> > a daughter.
> >> >
> >> > Such reasoning is consistent and mathematically valid, but seems
> to
> >> me to
> >> be a
> >> > model of reality that most would reject.
> >>
> >> MW: That seems inconsistent to me, when it seems you wanted to be
> able
> >> to
> >> say that a Red Sox player had a daughter.
> >>
> >> > By all means create an ontology
> >> > (microtheory) that encompasses it and can be used for reasoning in
> >> conjunction
> >> > with a knowledge base that does not reject its assumptions. But
> be
> >> aware
> >> that
> >> > many people would use contradictory microtheories, and they might
> be
> >> > interested in the same KBs that you are. So i suggest avoiding
> >> having a
> >> KB
> >> > inherit such an ontology, instead use it for your reasoning
> modules.
> >>
> >> MW: Of course. If you want to be precise, you have to translate
> things
> >> into
> >> 4D before you start reasoning. 3D and 4D mixed together will give
> odd
> >> results, and possibly inconsistent ones. I find the translation
> brings
> >> out
> >> details and issues that are otherwise left hidden.
> >>
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >> Matthew West
> >> Information Junction
> >> Tel: +44 1489 880185
> >> Mobile: +44 750 3385279
> >> Skype: dr.matthew.west
> >> matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
> >> https://sites.google.com/site/drmatthewwest/
> >> This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in
> >> England
> >> and Wales No. 6632177.
> >> Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
> >> Hertfordshire,
> >> SG6 2SU.
> >>
> >> >
> >> > -- doug foxvog
> >> >
> >> > > Regards
> >> > >
> >> > > Matthew West
> >> > > Information Junction
> >> > > Tel: +44 1489 880185
> >> > > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
> >> > > Skype: dr.matthew.west
> >> > > matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> > > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
> >> > > https://sites.google.com/site/drmatthewwest/
> >> > > This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered
> in
> >> > > England and Wales No. 6632177.
> >> > > Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
> >> > > Hertfordshire,
> >> > > SG6 2SU.
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > >
> >> > >>
> >> > >> -- doug foxvog
> >> > >>
> >> > >> > Regards
> >> > >> >
> >> > >> > Matthew West
> >> > >> > Information Junction
> >> > >> > Tel: +44 1489 880185
> >> > >> > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
> >> > >> > Skype: dr.matthew.west
> >> > >> > matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> > >> > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
> >> > >> > https://sites.google.com/site/drmatthewwest/
> >> > >> > This email originates from Information Junction Ltd.
> Registered
> >> in
> >> > >> > England and Wales No. 6632177.
> >> > >> > Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
> >> > >> > Hertfordshire,
> >> > >> > SG6 2SU.
> >> > >> >
> >> > >> >
> >> > >> >
> >> > >> >
> >> > >> >
> >> > >>
> >> > >>
> >> > >>
> >> > >>
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