On Thu, May 23, 2013 09:25, Matthew West wrote:
> doug foxvog wrote:
> > Matthew West wrote: (01)
>> > MW: I go for strong 4D
>> > which has the 4D extent as the identity of any individual (not a set
>> > or relationship). So I do not even know what it means to exist if you
>> > have a temporal but not a spatial extent. (02)
>> At work i have a sick leave account and a vacation leave account.
>> Such accounts (as well as bank accounts, credit card accounts) are
>> useful to model in an ontology.
>> They certainly have temporal existence. But it seems
>> to me quite a stretch to claim that they have a spatial extent. (03)
> MW: The question is what is the root of a day's leave? It is you for the
> day in a vacation state. (04)
The root is permission. The existence of leave in the account is not
wedded to any particular day or location (other than near-Earth). (05)
> That is a spatio-temporal extent, and any account of it
> is some representation of that, or an aggregate of similar objects. (06)
So an account is a representation. I suppose you would claim that
the representation has to be physical. (07)
>> Permission to do something has a temporal extent. Claiming that
>> its spatial extent it the area in which the thing may be done seems
>> specious to me. (08)
> MW: Not at all. You only need to bring possible worlds into the equation (09)
So to avoid abstract objects in the ontology, one needs to include
an infinite number of possible worlds in the ontology. (010)
If you allow for more than one "possible worlds", isn't your model 5D?
You have continually been stating that your ontology is 4D. (011)
1) Everything in a 4D ontology has three spatial dimensions and one
temporal dimension.
2) A 4D worm can be defined for everything in a 4D ontology.
3) 4D ontologies model possible worlds.
4) #2 + #3: A 4D worm can be defined for every possible world. (012)
How do the 4D worms of two different possible worlds that start
at the same 4D point differ? (013)
> to cover the future activity (a spatio-temporal extent)
> that is the execution of that permission. (014)
>> A patent is temporal, and is different from the sheet
>> of paper (or group of all
>> sheets of paper that document the
>> patent). Claiming that it has a spatial extent of the territory of
>> the issuing country also seems a stretch. (015)
> MW: A patent is about (generally) a design - that is universal, (016)
So the design is a physical object that exists in the whole universe?
Does it also have a mass? Or is it the patent whose scope is the
whole universe? (017)
> and placing restrictions on its use.
> Again we need possible worlds and activities, but
> not objects with temporal but no spatial boundaries. (018)
And the spatial boundaries of the possible worlds are what? (019)
>> What would the physical extent of an ontology be? (020)
> MW: An ontology, is an aggregate of signs of classes, individuals,
> relationships, and rules. The signs are spatio-temporal extents of some
> sort, even if they are bits in computers. (021)
>> What is the physical extent of an hour, a day, a year, a century be? (022)
> MW: The whole universe. That is actually obvious if you really think in
> 4D. (023)
The temporal extent of the day 24 May 2013 is different in California,
England, and China. Relativistic physics recognizes that simultaneity
in distant objects is context dependent. Is your 4D system non-
relativistic? (024)
>> A time zone, the Earth, the observable universe, an
>> expanding/contracting
>> sphere around the time zone/Earth with its radius being in light-units
>> of time, the instantaneous greatest distance
>> in time from the specific time to the time of the sphere?
>
> MW: It actually makes a lot more sense when you add the spatial
> dimensions in. I suggest you try drawing a space-time diagram
> for this problem. (025)
Note that the relative motion of objects affects the observed temporal
differences. (026)
>> I accept 4D models of physical objects, situations, and events, but also
>> accept the existence of temporal non-physical objects. (027)
> MW: I consider that unnecessary, and therefore to be avoided. (028)
But you don't consider possible worlds as something to be avoided,
thus you consider them necessary. Possible worlds are certainly
temporal. Thus you consider them to be temporal objects which
are not non-physical. So, your position is that possible worlds
are temporal physical objects? (029)
>> > In the strong 4D that I use, an organization consists of the temporal
>> > parts of the people involved in it, whilst they are in an
>> > organizational role. (030)
And an organization of organizations -- such as the UN? Does it consist
of physical parts of its member organizations? (031)
>> Then in any KB using that model, Apple, Inc., didn't have a presence
>> in the countries in which it rented post office box numbers, but had
>> no employees?
>
> MW: It is actually an interesting question what exactly is the
> constitution of an organization. Is it just the people?
> Or does it include what the organization owns/rents as well?
> The answer is a matter of law, which may
> vary from place to place. (032)
I don't think the law concerns itself with the physical constitution
of organizations. It concerns itself with officers of organizations,
tangible and non-tangible assets of organizations. (Oops! Is there
a problem modelling what the International Accounting Standards
Board standard 38 (IAS 38)[1] defines as: "an identifiable
non-monetary asset without physical substance."?)
[1] http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard37 (033)
> MW: If there was a company set up, and it had a PO box, then there are
> officers of the company, and even if they are not resident in the country,
> then the company exists (there is not a restraint on companies to operate
> only within their country). Whether just a PO box counts as a "presence"
> is interesting. I would look for legal precedence. (034)
So you would equate the legal term "presence" with the physical extent
of a company? Does the law consider the "presence" of a company
to follow the business travels of its officers and employees? (035)
> However, the consequence determines what spatio-temporal extents
> count as part of a company, not
> whether or not a company is a spatio-temporal extent. (036)
Sure. Both are just matters of definition. (037)
>> Such a model may be consistent and useful for your purposes.
>> But there seems
>> to me to be no reason to impose it on everyone who
>> wishes to use any ontology.
>
> MW: I carefully declare that this is a 4D view of the world. (038)
As mentioned above, it seems to be a 5D view of an infinity of worlds. (039)
> I quite agree that this does not require everyone else
> to take the same view. I only argue
> that it is a valid, compact and rigorous view. (040)
I am not disputing that it can not be consistent with reality if terms
such as physical and spatial extent aren't redefined. I haven't seen
yet how you collapse the infinitude of possible worlds into the one
that happens to continue, or how you differentiate them. (041)
>> I'd accept it as an upper-level microtheory,
>> but not as part of an upper level ontology designed for general use. (042)
> MW: It is perfectly suitable for general use. (043)
In that most users would have a different mindset,
it would not be suitable for them. An ontology need
not proselytize. (044)
> I have not yet found something
> (together with the other elements I mentioned, a basic set theory,
> mathematical objects, and possible worlds) that it cannot cover. (045)
Does your ontology require geometrical objects (triangles, Platonic
solids) to have temporal extent as well as spatial extent? Or do
you accept them as 3D objects? (046)
>> > Note that I have no problem constructing one kind of object out of the
>> > temporal parts of another kind (or kinds) of object.
>> > In any case, given the nature of space-time, I don't know what it
>> > means to exist with a temporal extent, but no spatial extent.
>> > I therefore reject abstract individuals as an unnecessary commitment. (047)
>> Some people would reject a 4D model as an unnecessary commitment. (048)
> MW: If you do not commit to 4D you have to commit to something else. (049)
For some purposes, yes. For many, no. (050)
> It is a choice you have to make, not an unnecessary one. (051)
A personnel system can assign dates to events. These assignments
can be interpreted one way in 4D, another in 3D+1, both of which
would be consistent with "the real world". (052)
> There are of course
> people who make alternative choices, such as 3D + time, or even as Barry
> does, 4D for activities and 3D + time for physical objects.
>
>> It seems to me that enforced 4D (or 3D+1) models as well as there being
>> subclasses of abstract individual should be stated in microtheories that
>> users can accept/reject/ignore according to their needs. (053)
> MW: If you are trying to build a tower of Babel that contains all possible
> theories, then you should certainly include alternatives. Most of my work
> has been in data integration. Here the objective is to bring different
> ways
> of looking at the world together in one place using one way of looking at
> the world. I have found 4D unsurpassed for that because of its rigour. (054)
>> >> Would you say, "Part of the Red Sox has a daughter named Sue."? (055)
>> > MW: That strikes me as rather unlikely, but not impossible. Let us
>> > look at the case. Presumably you do not mean any part of the Red Sox
>> > (say all the pitchers, or the right arm of one of them) but a
>> > particular player. (056)
>> Isn't a temporal part of a particular player a part of the Red Sox, if
>> that player is part of the Red Sox?
>>
>> From the above comment, it seems you would have the same
>> objection to these two sentences.
>> + A Red Sox player has a daughter named Sue.
>> * Part of the Red Sox has a daughter named Sue. (057)
>> I'd guess that most English speakers would find the first statement
>> acceptable, but not the second. (058)
> MW: Yes, the second statement is not sufficiently precise to be
> meaningful, though not actually wrong. (059)
You previously spent paragraphs arguing that the first statement
was wrong. (060)
>...
>> This means that there is only one father -- only one specific temporal
>> part of the person who is a father.
>> Which means that I, today, am not a father,
>> although there is a temporal part of me (of which I, today, am a
>> temporal part) that is.
>
> MW: Yes, ... (061)
>> > Now it is true that a Red Sox player has a daughter if the temporal
>> > part of the person is identical to (has the same spatio-temporal
>> > extent) as the father of the daughter. That is unlikely, (062)
>> ... and very counter-intuitive. If you told a Red Sox fan that none of
> the
>> Red Sox players were fathers, you would find that s/he disagreed with
>> you.
>> Your ontology might work for your purposes, but has little agreement
>> with the human world.
>
> MW: That is because what you have stated includes several short cuts.
> If you expand it fully, you could say, the person
> (for the whole of their life) that is currently a Red Sox Player
> (a state of the person whilst they are a Red Sox Player)
> is currently father (a temporal part of the person) to Sue. (063)
Yes, these are short cuts for the 4Der. But such translations could be
performed when translating from human to 4D. You need not force
everyone to speak 4D. (064)
>> > but if the person who had a temporal part that was a Red Sox Player,
>> > and had a temporal part that was a father and the daughter was born
>> > exactly when they joined the Red Sox and they died whilst still a Red
>> > Sox player,
>>
>> > then indeed, a part of the Red Sox would have a daughter.
>>
>> The conclusion here is that then a Red Sox player would have a daughter.
>> According to your logic, if a person became a father while playing for
>> the Red Sox, and he died while still being a Red Sox player,
>> then a part of the Red Sox,
>> more specifically a temporal part of one of its player parts,
>> would have a daughter. (065)
>> Such reasoning is consistent and mathematically valid, but seems to me
>> to be a model of reality that most would reject. (066)
> MW: That seems inconsistent to me,
> when it seems you wanted to be able to say
> that a Red Sox player had a daughter. (067)
It is consistent with the logic you proposed. (068)
Few people speak in formal 4D locutions. As you note below, translating
from standard English to 4D English involves a lot of functional slicing
and dicing. (069)
Yet you argue against various statements because they are not in such
a formal 4D language. Yet when i asked a 4D question, you interpreted
it as a mistranslation from 3D+1 and then argued against that. (070)
According to everything you have written in this discussion,
no one can be a father. (071)
If you find your model consistent, that's fine. You just have to learn
how to translate English to that form. I'm sure you can translate
sentences such as "I am a father", and "A Red Sox player is a father"
to logical 4D sentences. (072)
If you can do this, you have no need to argue against such English
sentences. If you can't, then your model is insufficient to model
common English sentences. (073)
>> By all means create an ontology
>> (microtheory) that encompasses it and can be used for
> > reasoning in conjunction
>> with a knowledge base that does not reject its assumptions.
>> But be aware that
>> many people would use contradictory microtheories,
>> and they might be interested in the same KBs that you are.
> > So i suggest avoiding having a KB inherit such an ontology,
>> instead use it for your reasoning modules. (074)
> MW: Of course. If you want to be precise, you have to translate
> things into 4D before you start reasoning. (075)
... in 4D. (076)
> 3D and 4D mixed together will give odd
> results, and possibly inconsistent ones. I find the translation
> brings out details and issues that are otherwise left hidden. (077)
Fine. 3D ontologies reference a single instant in time and
rules can specify temporal aspects of relations. 3D+1 ontologies
may allow reasonable temporal specification of information, but
KBs using them, very often do not (correctly) specify the temporal
information. (078)
Most KBs would not be interested in infinite possible worlds, however,
planning systems find it useful to reason about a few possible futures.
One way to do so is using multiple contexts, with each representing
a range of possible worlds. (079)
-- doug foxvog (080)
> Regards
>
> Matthew West
> Information Junction
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>>
>> -- doug foxvog
>>
>> > Regards
>> >
>> > Matthew West
>> > Information Junction
>> > Tel: +44 1489 880185
>> > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
>> > Skype: dr.matthew.west
>> > matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
>> > https://sites.google.com/site/drmatthewwest/
>> > This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in
>> > England and Wales No. 6632177.
>> > Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
>> > Hertfordshire,
>> > SG6 2SU.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >>
>> >> -- doug foxvog
>> >>
>> >> > Regards
>> >> >
>> >> > Matthew West
>> >> > Information Junction
>> >> > Tel: +44 1489 880185
>> >> > Mobile: +44 750 3385279
>> >> > Skype: dr.matthew.west
>> >> > matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> >> > http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/
>> >> > https://sites.google.com/site/drmatthewwest/
>> >> > This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in
>> >> > England and Wales No. 6632177.
>> >> > Registered office: 8 Ennismore Close, Letchworth Garden City,
>> >> > Hertfordshire,
>> >> > SG6 2SU.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
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