We agree on the formalism. I agree that Lewis's metaphor
of possible worlds had some stimulating influence on the imagination. The
question is whether there is any conclusion derivable from Lewis's worlds
that cannot be derived equally well from Dunn's laws and
facts. CM
> Dunn came up with a formal semantics for
modal
> languages equivalent to Kripke's. It can be used for the
same sorts of
> formal purposes that Kripke semantics can be used
for — proving soundness
> and completeness results, proving the
consistency of certain modal
> principles, etc. Dunn did NOT
provide (nor did he purport to provide)
> alternatives to the
solutions to numerous problems in semantics,
> philosophy of
language, metaphysics, philosophy of mind etc that Lewis
>
propounded in terms of worlds.
Could you please give one
example of a problem that can be solved by Lewis's approach, but not by
Dunn's laws and facts.
You set the bar too high; I can't give an example that CANNOT be solved by Dunn's approach. All I can say is that Lewis provided world-based solutions to, e.g., the analysis of modality, the analysis of intensional entities, and the problem of mental content, among others, and that, to my knowledge, no solutions to those problems exist in terms of laws and facts. (For another thing, I don't think there has been any detailed philosophical account of what laws and facts even ARE in anything other than a purely formal sense. It is thus not even clear how one would develop Dunn's account to metaphysical ends.)
-chris
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