>Jon Awbrey schrieb:
>> IJ = Ingvar Johansson
>> JA = Jon Awbrey
>> JA: I think it is fair to say that key, active ingredients of
>> truth are missing from [the] correspondence theory recipe.
>> IJ: I agree, more needs to be said; and I think it can be said. However,
>> I will here just rest content with pointing out a seemingly neglected
>> thing. As long as epistemological questions about the veridicality of
>> everyday perception are bracketed, then everyday life supplies us with
>> very good examples of the essence the correspondence theory of truth.
>> We simply check statmentents such as 'the cat is on the mat', 'it is
>> raining', 'there's beer in the fridge', etc. against what we perceive.
>> If what we pereceive *corresponds* to the statement, we regard the
>> statement as true -- otherwise not. Don't mix semantic questions
>> such as 'what is the correspondence theory of truth saying?' with
>> epistemological questions such as 'how do we know that a certain
>> statement is true?'.
>> One can of course ''pose'' a distinction between epistemological
>> and semantic, but is that distinction real or merely a pose --
>> a nominal or verbal distinction without a difference? There
>> has been a lot of discussion of physics lately, so let me
>> try to recall some lesson of physics that got engrained
>> in my brain in times now dim.
>> Can we really and truly dissociate the semantics of terms like
>> "duration", "length", and "mass" from the epistemological stance
>> of a particular frame of reference, or the operational resources
>> of the apparatus that we use to measure them? I don't think so.
I do. In fact, we must. How would we talk about accuracy of a
measuring apparatus, if there were not a meaningful distinction
between a real magnitude and a measurement? To even discuss a
measuring apparatus, we need to have a theory of the physical
magnitudes which they are designed to measure. (02)
More fundamentally, however, these are clearly distinct concepts.
Magnitude is not an epistemic notion, but measurement is. And truth,
perhaps unlike knowledge of truth, does not require verification or
measurement to be meaningfully spoken of. (03)
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