Think of UML - universal ontology stands to ontology as UML stands to ml
is this analogy clear?
John- thanks yes I forgot the convention discussed earlier, please consider R(uw.lw.iw)
just R for brevity
On 7/23/07, Jenny ure <jure2@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Thanks - the Umwelt, Lebenswelt and Innenwelt does make a very useful
I suppose the indirect question I still have is - if one size doesnt fit
all - how can ontology design harness the value of a shared
interoperable core on which we have fairly stable agreement and the
value and usability of dynamic, or purpose specific local
infrastructures such as folksonomies.
John F. Sowa wrote:
>I agree with the points you make. I'd just like to add
>a few more comments:
> > perhaps you have to take account of the fact that in
> > collectively taking and acting on a particular view of
> > the domain it is
> > (a) purpose specific
> > (b) constructed and enacted rather than discovered -
> > there is a sense in which we construct the reality we live in
>Although I agree, I avoid the verb 'construct' when applied to
>external reality. At the end of this note is a copy of a note
>I sent on May 20, in which I cited the terms 'Umwelt', 'Lebenswelt',
>and 'Innenwelt' for making finer distinctions about the kinds of
>"worlds" we live in and create internally.
> > To give the concrete example - after some group discussion on how to
> > express the difference between river and lake in a geographical
> > ontology for ordnance survey mapping - we realised
> > (a) the definition for an environmentalist, a fisherman, a geographer,
> > a sailor etc was purpose specific and based on purpose specific
> > criteria, rather than on features of the domain itself
> > (b) the existence of an ordnance survey application that was widely
> > adopted would create de facto standard for pragmatic reasons rather
> > than ontological ones
>That's a good example, and similar examples can be found whenever
>different people analyze the same subject matter for different
>reasons from different points of view. To use the terminology below,
>those people may inhabit the same Umwelt, but their Lebenswelt and
>Innenwelt are different.
>My primary reason for introducing the terms Umwelt, Lebenswelt,
>and Innenwelt was to avoid using the word 'reality' in too many
> > I am interested in exploring your proposed distinction between
> > umwelt (UW), its rough equivalent lebenswelt (LW) and InnerWelt (IW),
> > as possible categorization of reality based on the subjective or
> > objective stance.
>As I mentioned in my previous note, I like John Deely's distinction
>between UW and LW because it distinguishes what is biologically
>perceptible (UW) from a language-influenced classification (LW).
>Following is the URL of Deely's analysis:
> Reality -- What exists independent of any observer or any system
> of perception and interpretation. Reality is same for all
> beings, independent of their sensory apparatus or mental
> capacity. Reality would be the same for an alien from
> outer space or even a robot designed by the aliens. But
> there may be aspects of reality that are inaccessible
> without some kind of sensory enhancers (such as telescopes,
> microscopes, microphones, or gamma-ray detectors).
> Umwelt (UW) -- "a vehicle for expressing especially the role of
> biological heritage in the use and function of signs, rather
> than for expressing what is species-specifically human in
> the use and function of signs." (Deely's definition)
> Lebenswelt (LW) -- "I have proposed that the term Lebenswelt
> should be adopted to express an Umwelt which is species-
> specifically human, retaining Umwelt to express the
> generic idea of an objective world which is in every
> case species-specific consequent upon biological
> constitution." (Deely)
> Innenwelt (IW) -- The inner world of human experience, thought,
> mental models, feelings, wishes, hopes, fears, etc.
> > ... although reality can be expressed with truth values.
>No. Reality is not "expressed" in truth values. It just is.
>What is expressed are statements in some language, whose truth
>or falsity is evaluated in terms of their correspondence with
> > what truths pertain to the UW and what to the IW?
> > Surely there are overlaps, dichotomies and dependencies between
> > the two stances.
>Yes, there are definite overlaps. Everything that is true about
>reality in the IW must have been perceived through the biological
>mechanisms that determine the UW and the linguisitic interpretation
>in the LW.
>It is also important to recognize that statements that have
>been written, spoken, or thought are also part of reality.
>Therefore, there can be metalevel truths:
> - The following sentence has four words: "The sky is blue."
> - In ordinary arithmetic, "2+2=4" is a theorem.
> - Most people believe that the earth is spherical.
>But in all cases, truth is determined by testing the statements
>by some method for examining the evidence (UW) of what is.
>Note that both object-level and metalevel statements can be
>objective, in the sense that their truth or falsity can be
>tested by someone other than the speaker.
>I would classify some of your categories as object-level
>or and metalevel:
>Object level truths, determined by UW mechanisms, possibly
>enhanced by sensory extenders such as microscopes:
> > ontological (when truth resides in things);
> > factual or empirical (physical, chemical, biological, and social);
>Metalevel truths, determined by UW mechanisms and LW interpretation
> > logical (truth resides in ideas, tautologies);
> > mathematical (truth is validity or coherency, axioms);
> > semantic (truth is meaning);
>I don't know what you mean by "verbal (truth of words or speech);".
>If you mean statements in linguistics, those would be metalevel.
>But if you mean the truth of something stated in language, that
>would be object level or metalevel or one of the following:
>The remaining three categories raise more complex issues.
>For "poetic or fictitious truths;" those could be metalevel
>statements about what some author wrote, or they could be
>object-level statements that use analogies and metaphors to
>make observations about society and human feelings for which
>there is no established non-metaphorical terminology.
>For "moral norms and imperatives;" this gets into serious
>philosophical issues about the grounds for ethics. Some would
>say that there are object-level, metalevel, or metaphorical
>grounds. But the amount of writing on this topic is too
>voluminous even to summarize.
>For "religious truths (divine verities)" the issue is similar
>to the basis for moral norms.
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Paola Di Maio
School of IT
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