On Sun, Feb 26, 2006 at 03:05:11PM -0500, Obrst, Leo wrote:
> ...
> LEO: Ok, I answer (4) (i.e., no, don't force me into your decision
> tree! ;). To me a logical ontology (as opposed to weaker models) is
> both A) a logical theory, i.e., a theory expressed in a logic, and B)
> a logical theory which purports to be something about the world (real
> or possible, the latter grounded in the real world). (01)
I'm happy with (B) as a gloss, but not as part of a definition. "X
purports to be about Y" is simply not a scientific relation. Seems to
me that the only scientifically respectable definition in the
neighborhood here is this: On ontology is a theory, i.e., a set of
sentences in some language. Any such set. Period. There are then many
properties we can usefully ascribe to ontologies so defined, some
scientific (consistent, complete, DL, finitely axiomatizable, a
conservative extension over theory T, etc) and some more evaluative
("good", "useful", a favorite ontology of George Bush, etc). (02)
> We can for example have completely consistent logical theories about
> arbitrary crap; (03)
Right, "crappy". Yes, an excellent evaluative category! :-) Though I
think it would be better to take this to be a 2-place relation: crappy
for purpose P. And thus one reason not to use (B): suppose someone
writes an ontology of paranoids, but, interpreted differently, the same
axioms turn out to be reasonably useful as an ontology of, say, ant
colonies. Relative to different purposes, one and the same theory is
crappy or not. So let's just let any theory be an ontology and then
simply judge their usefulness relative to a given purpose. (04)
Furthermore, are you going to correct someone who sends you something
that doesn't meet your criterion B and tell them it is not an ontology?
Or send it back with an apology? :-) I just don't see the point. (B)
to me expresses only a methodological ideal, not something essential to
what an ontology is by nature. (05)
> one "real world" example: the elaborate consistent models of
> paranoids. Given magic premises and the usual logical apparatus, much
> is possible. (06)
Crappy ontologies all! But ontologies nonetheless; or so sez I. (07)
> I don't buy extreme actualism. I am a profligate ontologist, a
> scientist/engineer/semanticist not a philosophical ontologist: I want
> logically formalized theories that characterize the world (real and
> possible) for use by software, with the additional meta-addendum that
> I would like it to be as concise as possible, thinking that like the
> best scientific theories, the fewer constructs that cover (describe
> and predict from) the same domain and map to other well-known theories
> simply, the better the theory. (08)
I commend you on a fine methodological stance, Leo! (8^) (09)
-chris (010)
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