To: | Rich Cooper <metasemantics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "'[ontolog-forum] '" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
---|---|
From: | Thomas Johnston <tmj44p@xxxxxxx> |
Date: | Wed, 20 May 2015 15:23:51 +0000 (UTC) |
Message-id: | <799484747.3499579.1432135431923.JavaMail.yahoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
Hi Rich, Your questions and comments are very much to the point. My response, in brief, is this: 1. How would the Cal Tech scientists know what the basic "emotional neurochemicals" are? That would depend on knowing what fruit fly behavior resulted from what emotions. And, as you said: <<<<< That depends on the observer's interpretation. Why would flying indicate anything emotional? You are anthropomorphizing flying with human-interpreting events. >>>>> Indeed. Why would any fruit fly behavior indicate the presence of "emotional neurochemicals"? That's my point. It isn't me, but the Cal Tech scientists, who appear to be "anthropomorphizing flying with human-interpreting events". Also, my word-play on Venus fly traps was intended to make a serious point. On what grounds would the Cal Tech scientists interpret fruit fly behavior, but not interpret Venus fly trap behavior, as mediated by "emotional chemicals"? If it's the assumption that neurons are required for emotions, then what about the famous neurons in the snail Aplysia, the study of which led to Eric Kandel's receiving the Nobel prize? When Aplysia withdraws from a stimulus, are the neurochemicals involved "emotional neurochemicals"? If the Cal Tech scientists said they are, wouldn't they be guilty of your charge of anthropomorphizing? And if that is true, aren't they already guilty of that charge by doing research on the "emotional neurochemicals" of Drosophilia? For a very good short introduction to these neurological issues, I highly recommend: Michael O'Shea. The Brain: a Very Short Introduction (2005). 2. "Draining the concept of concept of meaning" simply means being willing to attribute concept possession on the basis of very little evidence. What meaning the concept of concept has, that could be drained away, is evidenced in the immense body of literature in philosophy of mind. One might best begin looking up topics like "concepts", "theories of meaning" and "mental representation", not to mention "externalism" and "internalism", and the connectionist vs. representationalist debate between, among others, Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy are open sources, and both are peer-reviewed. But in getting started, the IEP is usually best, with the SEP for a deeper dive. Regards, Tom On Wednesday, May 20, 2015 10:44 AM, Rich Cooper <metasemantics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: Hello Thomas,
Thanks for your comments:
TJ: I
don't know how we could derive ontological categories from observations of
fruit files, even from observations correlated with identifiable patterns of
stimuli in identifiable regions of the fly's brain (something, anyway, which I
doubt can be reliably done).
If a
fruit fly flies off in one direction, is it flying towards a desired object (a
mate, food) or away from a feared object (a bird, any other large moving
object)? If it is flying towards a mate, that's how we would describe what it's
doing. But in what sense does the fly itself have the concept of a mate?
That depends on the observer's interpretation. Why would flying
indicate anything emotional? You are anthropomorphizing flying with human-interpreting
events. The real value of the Cal Tech work is in having access to the fly's central
emotional neurons, which are hypothesized to be in a tiny area of the brain. So
the "meaning" of a stimulus is only organized in the fly brain, not
in the observer brain. The "meaning" of any stimulus depends on the
fly, not on the observer. The observer's attribution of meaning is simply
wrong. Get the basic emotional neurochemicals first, then hypothesize an
emotional reason that fits with the fly's actions after the stimulus is
presented.
TJ: If
we drain the concept of concept of enough meaning, than any pattern of behavior
could be said to manifest the use of a concept in making a judgment (the judgment
to carry out that behavior). And the concept we attribute, in those attenuated
cases, will be very much a product of our own interpretative prejudices. The
fruit fly ontology we come up with will be more or less an Alice in Wonderland
ontology.
And if
we drain the concept of concept of enough meaning to attribute concepts
(ontological categories) to fruit flies, then I think it's not a very big step
beyond that to attribute desire and hunger to Venus fly traps!
How does one "drain the concept of meaning"? I don't
understand your statement. Could you please elaborate on how that is possible
given that the "meaning" is in the fruit fly, not in the observer.
The observer's attributed "meaning" would be completely unrecognizable
to the fruit fly.
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper,
Rich Cooper,
Chief Technology Officer,
MetaSemantics Corporation
MetaSemantics AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
( 9 4 9 ) 5 2 5-5 7 1 2
http://www.EnglishLogicKernel.com
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Thomas
Johnston
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 7:06 AM To: [ontolog-forum] Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology discovery possible? I don't know how we could
derive ontological categories from observations of fruit files, even from
observations correlated with identifiable patterns of stimuli in identifiable
regions of the fly's brain (something, anyway, which I doubt can be reliably
done).
If a fruit fly flies off in
one direction, is it flying towards a desired object (a mate, food) or away
from a feared object (a bird, any other large moving object)? If it is flying
towards a mate, that's how we would describe what it's doing. But in what sense
does the fly itself have the concept of a mate?
If we drain the concept of
concept of enough meaning, than any pattern of behavior could be said to
manifest the use of a concept in making a judgement (the judgement to carry out
that behavior). And the concept we attribute, in those attenuated cases, will
be very much a product of our own interpretative prejudices. The fruit fly
ontology we come up with will be more or less an Alice in Wonderland ontology.
And if we drain the concept
of concept of enough meaning to attribute concepts (ontological categories) to
fruit flies, then I think it's not a very big step beyond that to attribute
desire and hunger to Venus fly traps!
On Tuesday, May 19, 2015 12:02
PM, John F Sowa <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 5/18/2015 7:44 PM, Rich
Cooper wrote:
> I am interested in the emotions, their interrelationships, > and math models of how they work in a library of situations. There have been many, many such models over the centuries. For a model developed by the psychologist David Matsumoto and applied to "human intelligence", see http://www.humintell.com/macroexpressions-microexpressions-and-subtle-expressions/ That page has 7 sample faces that express his "universal facial expressions of emotion": Happy, Surprise, Contempt, Sadness, Anger, Disgust, and Fear. It also cites some publications that describe applications of that classification. > I am looking for an algorithm that could, with sizeable numbers > of fruit flies, and sizeable numbers of situations experimentally > simulated to the flies, elicit the ontology of the fruit fly's > response CLASS TYPEs through observing the behavior of the fruit flies. I got that message from your previous note. JFS > Don't expect a "unified theory" based on a simple combination > of features or components. RC > But do use a simple framework of combinations of the common > components to explore the emotion space. Philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists have devoted many person-millennia to exploring the "emotion space" with a huge number of simple and complex frameworks. If anybody comes up with a really good combination, I would express something between Happy and Surprise. But I'm not holding my breath. John _________________________________________________________________ Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/ Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/ Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J _________________________________________________________________ Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/ Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/ Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/ Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J (01) |
Previous by Date: | Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology discovery possible?, Thomas Johnston |
---|---|
Next by Date: | Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology discovery possible?, Rich Cooper |
Previous by Thread: | Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology discovery possible?, Rich Cooper |
Next by Thread: | Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology discovery possible?, Rich Cooper |
Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |