Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology d

[Thomas Johnston <tmj44p@xxxxxxx>]

Rich,

I think you're right. Sometimes the way to make progress in science is to play hunches, to jump in somewhere and swim around. And so I should have taken "emotional neurochemicals" in the sense of "neurochemicals that, in the human brain, are involved in emotion", and as nothing more than that. 

However, at that stage of research, it's probably a little too early to talk about insect ontology, isn't it?

(Although I believe that serotonin, dopamine and norepinephrine are involved in cognitive processes as well. Dopamine, especially, is implicated in neurological diseases like Parkinson's, which involve cognitive impairment.)

I have no direct references for Kandel's work. He did write an interesting article in ScAm several decades ago, and I see his work mentioned frequently. 

One reason I cited The Brain: a Very Short Introduction, is that in spite of reading quite a few explanations of Kandel's findings, I never understood what was going on until I read The Brain (see esp. pp.90-101). 

In it, O'Shea explains neurochemical stimuli at synapses send second and third messenger chemicals back to the cell nucleus where they trigger the release of RNA strands that build specific proteins that alter neuroanatomy, prompting physical changes which strengthen the chemical discharge at the original synapses, and forming additional synaptic connections with the target neurons. Thus explaining how short-term memory (a state of excited neurons) can be translated into long-term memory (structural changes in the brain).

BTW, don't take this brief description (correct as it is) to indicate any serious knowledge of neurophysiology on my part. I don't have any.

BTW2, fruit flies probably aren't prey for Venus fly traps. Those plants snap shut on their prey only when three of their hairs are tripped over, within a short period of time, by an insect wandering around inside the plant. I think fruit flies would be too small to do that. Also, insect-eating plants exist in swampy areas, which probably don't support fruits of any sort, because the soil is so nutrient-poor (leading to the evolution of plants that eat insects to get the nutrients they need).

Regards,

Tom

On Wednesday, May 20, 2015 12:02 PM, Rich Cooper <metasemantics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Dear Thomas,

 

You wrote:

TJ: 1. How would the Cal Tech scientists know what the basic "emotional neurochemicals" are? That would depend on knowing what fruit fly behavior resulted from what emotions.

 

From their publications I've read, they are using the same biochemicals known to have function in the human brain - Dopamine, Epinephrine, Norepinephrine, and the others known to be associated with human emotional expressions. 

 

As you might note, that still is basing observations of emotional behavior on the psychological filter of the observer.  I don't see a way around that fact at this point, but as deeper knowledge is gained from experiments (those we can't do on people who might object), the researchers might expand their list of biochemicals through the usual discovery process, like the one I described in my '923 about unstructured text interpretation. 

 

TJ: Also, my word-play on Venus fly traps was intended to make a serious point. On what grounds would the Cal Tech scientists interpret fruit fly behavior, but not interpret Venus fly trap behavior, as mediated by "emotional chemicals"? 

 

On funding grounds; they are only studying fruit flies for now.  Venus fly traps will have to await a new project with funding for them.  But if the fruit fly has relationships with Venus fly traps, it might show up when the fruit fly is exposed to them but not eaten. 

 

TJ: If it's the assumption that neurons are required for emotions, then what about the famous neurons in the snail Aplysia, the study of which led to Eric Kandel's receiving the Nobel prize?

 

I didn't see that explicit assumption in their work (neurons required for emotion), but it seems that both neurons and neurochemicals would be involved in any physiological action that so strongly affects the body as emotions do. 

 

What is an Aplysia?  Do you have references to the Eric Kandel work?  That sounds like a good reference.  I found the following paragraph on wiki at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aplysia_gill_and_siphon_withdrawal_reflex

 

Wiki: Nonassociative learning is a change of the behavior of an animal due to an experience from specific kinds of stimuli. In contrast to associative learning the behavioral change is not caused by the animals learning that a particular temporal association occurs between the stimuli. There are three different forms of nonassociative learning examined in Aplysia: habituation, dishabituation and sensitization. Eric Kandel and colleagues were the first to demonstrate that Aplysia californica is capable of displaying both habituation and dishabituation.^[1]

Habituation in Aplysia californica is when a stimulus is repeatedly presented to an animal and there is a progressive decrease in response to that particular stimulus.^[1]

Dishabituation in Aplysia californica is when the animal is presented to another novel stimulus and a partial or complete restoration of a habituated response occurs.^[1]

Sensitization in Aplysia californica is the increase of a response due to the presentation of a novel, often noxious, stimulus.

 

A deeper response than that would be useful if you think it bears on the issue.  But the problem of essential attribution of emotions is something I can't see any way around at this point.  Can you?

 

TJ: When Aplysia withdraws from a stimulus, are the neurochemicals involved "emotional neurochemicals"? If the Cal Tech scientists said they are, wouldn't they be guilty of your charge of anthropomorphizing? And if that is true, aren't they already guilty of that charge by doing research on the "emotional neurochemicals" of Drosophilia?

 

Yes, the Cal Techies would certainly be anthropomorphizing, and yes, they are already guilty of such behavior on this project.  But can you suggest an alternative that is within reasonable research budgets for opening up neurological research into emotions, short of trying to track all the millions of active chemicals in the brain?  Given the very limited state of knowledge in this area, and the vast amount of missing knowledge in front of us, it seems a reasonable next step.  But yes, the knowledge gained will be extremely inexact and filtered by the researchers' biases.  We have to live with that for now. 

 

Thanks for the O'Shea reference.  I found a PDF here in case anyone else is interested:

http://zung.zetamu.net/Library/Education/Education_Neuroscience/OShea_Brain_2006.pdf

 

Sincerely,

Rich Cooper,

Rich Cooper,

 

Chief Technology Officer,

MetaSemantics Corporation

MetaSemantics AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

( 9 4 9 ) 5 2 5-5 7 1 2

http://www.EnglishLogicKernel.com

 

From: Thomas Johnston [mailto:tmj44p@xxxxxxx]
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 8:24 AM
To: Rich Cooper; '[ontolog-forum] '
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology discovery possible?

 

Hi Rich,

 

Your questions and comments are very much to the point. My response, in brief, is this:

 

1. How would the Cal Tech scientists know what the basic "emotional neurochemicals" are? That would depend on knowing what fruit fly behavior resulted from what emotions. And, as you said:

 

<<<<< 

That depends on the observer's interpretation.  Why would flying indicate anything emotional?  You are anthropomorphizing flying with human-interpreting events. 

>>>>>  

 

Indeed. Why would any fruit fly behavior indicate the presence of "emotional neurochemicals"? That's my point. It isn't me, but the Cal Tech scientists, who appear to be "anthropomorphizing flying with human-interpreting events".

 

Also, my word-play on Venus fly traps was intended to make a serious point. On what grounds would the Cal Tech scientists interpret fruit fly behavior, but not interpret Venus fly trap behavior, as mediated by "emotional chemicals"? 

 

If it's the assumption that neurons are required for emotions, then what about the famous neurons in the snail Aplysia, the study of which led to Eric Kandel's receiving the Nobel prize? When Aplysia withdraws from a stimulus, are the neurochemicals involved "emotional neurochemicals"? If the Cal Tech scientists said they are, wouldn't they be guilty of your charge of anthropomorphizing? And if that is true, aren't they already guilty of that charge by doing research on the "emotional neurochemicals" of Drosophilia?

 

For a very good short introduction to these neurological issues, I highly recommend:

 

Michael O'Shea. The Brain: a Very Short Introduction (2005). 

 

2. "Draining the concept of concept of meaning" simply means being willing to attribute concept possession on the basis of very little evidence. What meaning the concept of concept has, that could be drained away, is evidenced in the immense body of literature in philosophy of mind. One might best begin looking up topics like "concepts", "theories of meaning" and "mental representation", not to mention "externalism" and "internalism", and the connectionist vs. representationalist debate between, among others, Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor.

 

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy are open sources, and both are peer-reviewed. But in getting started, the IEP is usually best, with the SEP for a deeper dive.

 

Regards,

 

Tom

 

 

On Wednesday, May 20, 2015 10:44 AM, Rich Cooper <metasemantics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

 

Hello Thomas,

 

Thanks for your comments:

 

TJ: I don't know how we could derive ontological categories from observations of fruit files, even from observations correlated with identifiable patterns of stimuli in identifiable regions of the fly's brain (something, anyway, which I doubt can be reliably done). 

 

If a fruit fly flies off in one direction, is it flying towards a desired object (a mate, food) or away from a feared object (a bird, any other large moving object)? If it is flying towards a mate, that's how we would describe what it's doing. But in what sense does the fly itself have the concept of a mate?

 

That depends on the observer's interpretation.  Why would flying indicate anything emotional?  You are anthropomorphizing flying with human-interpreting events.  The real value of the Cal Tech work is in having access to the fly's central emotional neurons, which are hypothesized to be in a tiny area of the brain.  So the "meaning" of a stimulus is only organized in the fly brain, not in the observer brain.  The "meaning" of any stimulus depends on the fly, not on the observer.  The observer's attribution of meaning is simply wrong.  Get the basic emotional neurochemicals first, then hypothesize an emotional reason that fits with the fly's actions after the stimulus is presented.   

 

TJ: If we drain the concept of concept of enough meaning, than any pattern of behavior could be said to manifest the use of a concept in making a judgment (the judgment to carry out that behavior). And the concept we attribute, in those attenuated cases, will be very much a product of our own interpretative prejudices. The fruit fly ontology we come up with will be more or less an Alice in Wonderland ontology.

 

And if we drain the concept of concept of enough meaning to attribute concepts (ontological categories) to fruit flies, then I think it's not a very big step beyond that to attribute desire and hunger to Venus fly traps!

 

How does one "drain the concept of meaning"?  I don't understand your statement.  Could you please elaborate on how that is possible given that the "meaning" is in the fruit fly, not in the observer.  The observer's attributed "meaning" would be completely unrecognizable to the fruit fly. 

 

Sincerely,

Rich Cooper,

Rich Cooper,

 

Chief Technology Officer,

MetaSemantics Corporation

MetaSemantics AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com

( 9 4 9 ) 5 2 5-5 7 1 2

http://www.EnglishLogicKernel.com

 

From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Thomas Johnston
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2015 7:06 AM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Fruit fly emotions mimic human emotions - ontology discovery possible?

 

I don't know how we could derive ontological categories from observations of fruit files, even from observations correlated with identifiable patterns of stimuli in identifiable regions of the fly's brain (something, anyway, which I doubt can be reliably done). 

 

If a fruit fly flies off in one direction, is it flying towards a desired object (a mate, food) or away from a feared object (a bird, any other large moving object)? If it is flying towards a mate, that's how we would describe what it's doing. But in what sense does the fly itself have the concept of a mate?

 

If we drain the concept of concept of enough meaning, than any pattern of behavior could be said to manifest the use of a concept in making a judgement (the judgement to carry out that behavior). And the concept we attribute, in those attenuated cases, will be very much a product of our own interpretative prejudices. The fruit fly ontology we come up with will be more or less an Alice in Wonderland ontology.

 

And if we drain the concept of concept of enough meaning to attribute concepts (ontological categories) to fruit flies, then I think it's not a very big step beyond that to attribute desire and hunger to Venus fly traps!

 

 

 

 

On Tuesday, May 19, 2015 12:02 PM, John F Sowa <sowa@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

 

On 5/18/2015 7:44 PM, Rich Cooper wrote:
> I am interested in the emotions, their interrelationships,
> and math models of how they work in a library of situations.

There have been many, many such models over the centuries.
For a model developed by the psychologist David Matsumoto and
applied to "human intelligence", see
http://www.humintell.com/macroexpressions-microexpressions-and-subtle-expressions/

That page has 7 sample faces that express his "universal facial
expressions of emotion":  Happy, Surprise, Contempt, Sadness, Anger,
Disgust, and Fear.  It also cites some publications that describe
applications of that classification.

> I am looking for an algorithm that could, with sizeable numbers
> of fruit flies, and sizeable numbers of situations experimentally
> simulated to the flies, elicit the ontology of the fruit fly's
> response CLASS TYPEs through observing the behavior of the fruit flies.

I got that message from your previous note.

JFS
> Don't expect a "unified theory" based on a simple combination
> of features or components.

RC
> But do use a simple framework of combinations of the common
> components to explore the emotion space.

Philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists
have devoted many person-millennia to exploring the "emotion space"
with a huge number of simple and complex frameworks.

If anybody comes up with a really good combination, I would express
something between Happy and Surprise.  But I'm not holding my breath.

John

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