Re: [ontolog-forum] Child architecture

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith <steven@xxxxxxx>]

Dear Phil,

I am happy to discuss the matter further but prefer to do so publicly in a fashion that is constructive to the forum. None of your references answer my primary objection, however, that is: what is it that a discussion of "consciousness" adds to the thesis?

While I too, am enamored of, and enjoy, working with computing machinery, my own career being dedicated in large part to its (large-scale) engineering, especially in concept analysis and parallel computing systems, I caution against the selling of computation as a general remedy in science. For example, I currently argue that computation as we currently understand it is excluded from biophysics based upon an analysis of the power requirements.

I suggest you familiarize yourself with my main arguments that can be found in a recent Stanford lecture, available on YouTube, and in written form at https://www.createspace.com/Preview/1137409

http://youtu.be/zF5Bp_YsZ3M

Regards,

Steven

On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 12:53 PM, Philip Jackson <philipcjacksonjr@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Steven,
 
Your remarks to John Sowa seem to merit a few comments from me.
 
SEZ:
> Using a discussion of a term, such a
> "consciousness" (again, however it is meant) in
> order to simply hide an inadequacy of the thesis
> does a disservice to the other good work done.
> Phil appears to be saying (to me) "I do not know
> what this term means but let's call it something
> that you may be familiar with" and in doing so
> "I'll discuss what others have said" but "I will
> not offer any explanation or speak to what it
> might do."
 
The thesis does not discuss artificial consciousness "in order to hide an inadequacy". In addition to discussing what others have said, it offers a description of what 'artificial consciousness' would enable a Tala agent to do, and an explanation of how the TalaMind architecture could support artificial consciousness.
 
Yet it is clear my discussion does not agree with your perspective on consciousness, and you consider the discussion inadequate.

 

It does not appear to me there is necessarily any inherent conflict between the TalaMind approach, and the approach you may be advocating, though I know little of your research approach. Section  4.1.2.4 notes the TalaMind approach does not preclude use of 'continuous computation', transcending Turing machines. I gather this is what you may advocate, from the information at http://www.iase.info/
 

I'm willing to continue discussing the topic with you, either online or offline, and interested in learning more about your research approach.

 

SEZ:
> Being charitable and revealing something of my
> own interest, I assume "consciousness" is in the
> thesis because there is some expectation that
> "feeling" is involved somehow in the claim for
> "human level intelligence"
  
The reasons why consciousness is discussed in the thesis are explained in section 2.1.2.8, pp.27-28.

 

I appreciate your intent to be charitable, and appreciate that you think you are being charitable, from your perspective. I am also corresponding in good faith.
 
Phil

 

http://www.philjackson.prohosting.com/PCJacksonPhDThesisInformation.html

 

_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/
Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/
Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/
To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J
 

_________________________________________________________________
Message Archives: http://ontolog.cim3.net/forum/ontolog-forum/  
Config Subscr: http://ontolog.cim3.net/mailman/listinfo/ontolog-forum/  
Unsubscribe: mailto:ontolog-forum-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shared Files: http://ontolog.cim3.net/file/
Community Wiki: http://ontolog.cim3.net/wiki/ 
To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J    (01)