Steven,
Your remarks to John Sowa seem to merit a few comments from me.
SEZ:
> Using a discussion of a term, such a
> "consciousness" (again, however it is meant) in
> order to simply hide an inadequacy of the thesis
> does a disservice to the other good work done.
> Phil appears to be saying (to me) "I do not know
> what this term means but let's call it something
> that you may be familiar with" and in doing so
> "I'll discuss what others have said" but "I will
> not offer any explanation or speak to what it
> might do."
The thesis does not discuss artificial consciousness "in order to hide an inadequacy". In addition to discussing what others have said, it offers a description of what 'artificial consciousness' would enable a Tala agent to do, and an explanation of how the TalaMind architecture could support artificial consciousness.
Yet it is clear my discussion does not agree with your perspective on consciousness, and you consider the discussion inadequate.
It does not appear to me there is necessarily any inherent conflict between the TalaMind approach, and the approach you may be advocating, though I know little of your research approach. Section 4.1.2.4 notes the TalaMind approach does not preclude use of 'continuous computation', transcending Turing machines. I gather this is what you may advocate, from the information at
http://www.iase.info/ I'm willing to continue discussing the topic with you, either online or offline, and interested in learning more about your research approach.
SEZ:
> Being charitable and revealing something of my
> own interest, I assume "consciousness" is in the
> thesis because there is some expectation that
> "feeling" is involved somehow in the claim for
> "human level intelligence"
The reasons why consciousness is discussed in the thesis are explained in section 2.1.2.8, pp.27-28.
I appreciate your intent to be charitable, and appreciate that you think you are being charitable, from your perspective. I am also corresponding in good faith.
Phil