I found an article that should be
interesting to ontologists who are looking at the ways in which the various
senses provide feedback loops that activate (or deactivate) other senses.
That article is at:
http://www.the-scientist.com//?articles.view/articleNo/38942/title/Feeling-Is-Believing/
Although this article deals with
proprioceptive feedback, we should expect the same sorts of feedback in both
language and logic:
“There
are examples where stimulating one sense changes what you experience in another
sense,” says experimental psychologist Charles Spence, director of the
Crossmodal Research Laboratory at the University of Oxford,
who was not involved in the research. “This is a stronger example of
that—doing something in one sense conjures up something out of nowhere in
another sense.”
Do word meanings (“senses” in
a sense) provide the same kind of feedback?
Do assertions bias our viewpoints so as to
enhance confirmation bias so that we experience only beliefs that are
consistent with the said assertions?
If anyone has other relevant articles on
similar situations in language and logic, please post them.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
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