PatH,
(see comments below) (01)
On 4/12/2013 4:54 AM, Pat Hayes wrote:
> Pavithra, greetings.
>
> On reading through these emails again, I think I may understand what is
>bothering you.
>
> I think you have a picture of the semantic/ontology game which divides the
>world into layers. The base layer is the actual external world, the world of
>objects. Houses, for example, are in this basic layer. Then language comprises
>the next layer, which describes the first layer, and words live in this
>second, language, layer. And perhaps meta-linguistic knowledge, such as
>disussions of grammatical relationships between words, lives in a third layer
>lying even higher. But in any case, the layering is strict, and is necessary
>to avoid paradoxes and perhaps infinite loops in programming, so you object to
>ideas which seem to violate this clean layered division, by for example using
>categories (like Doug's and my "thing") which bridge across two or more layers.
>
> If I have this is more or less right, then I would suggest that you might
>want to consider abandoning this layering idea. It does not really correspond
>with anything real, and it is not necessary. It reflects a very early approach
>to avoiding the semantic paradoxes, but this approach was abandoned by
>mathematicians nearly a century ago in favor of more modern approaches to set
>theory (which are now considered standard, most notably Zermelo-Fraenkel set
>theory, dating from 1922) which do not force this rigid hierarchy of levels
>upon the universe. (Indeed, more recent work has shown that it is quite
>possible to have set theories which violate the 'layers' idea even more
>sharply, for example by requiring that all sets have infinitely descending
>chains of subsets, so there is no "bottom" to the universe. I mention this not
>to recommend such odd theories, but only to illustrate that the idea that a
>strict hierachy of levels is somehow necessary, or required in order to keep
>things consistent, is quite wrong.) The IKL logic developed by myself and
>others a few years ago is strictly first-order, but it contains its own
>meta-language: it is able to describe its own propositions and reason about
>them, and even quantify over them, with complete syntactic freedom, without
>needing any kind of 'layering' discipline to maintain internal consistency.
>The propositions are fully-fledged genuine elements of the semantic universe,
>just like everythng else the logic is describing. (See
>http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/ikl/guide/guide.html ) The RDF semantics uses
>a simpler version of the same basic device to ensure consistency while
>allowing such things as classes that contain themselves (rdfs:Class is an
>element of itself, for example.)
JB: The layering approach traces back to a paper by Edsger W. Dijkstra
entitled "THE Machine" which suggests that operating systems should be
constructed in layers:
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~zaher/classes/CS656/p341-dijkstra.pdf (02)
Further, Dijkstra points out that in a well-behaved system a layer
passes data to an adjacent layer but does not dip into another's layer's
data. Today, this approach is modified a bit, again for operating
systems. Hierarchical structure is still used, but forward and reverse
tunnels are established to steal data away from a layer using a higher
(temporal) priority. (03)
One can argue that semantic and linguistic processing are types of
operating systems, but I think of them more as applications running
under an operating system. Still, a system that uses an ontology may use
a number of different architectural approaches, and layering might be
useful for some. I don't think we should ban them altogether. I imagine
a sophisticated system would use a combination of layering, data passing
and link types to allow a wide variety of data access. (04)
-John Bottoms
> So, layering is not in fact necessary. I would argue that it is also not
>desirable. The world is *not* layered in this way, in fact. Language is as
>much part of the real world as architecture is, and words are just as real as
>houses. (Contrary to your assertion, below: words *are* objects.) Language is
>itself described in language just like anything else is: the word "word"
>describes words just as the word "house" describes houses. And we do in fact
>violate any kind of layering discipline whenever we talk about reference,
>because to even describe the idea of reference, we have to say what the
>referring word is, and what that word refers to, and so mention both 'layers'
>in one sentence. And when we talk about the business of defining reference
>itself, as I have just been doing in the previous sentence, we are actually
>using at least three layers, because this discourse itself is about the
>*relationship* between language and the world that it describes, which would
>be located in a higher "level". If you try to keep this kind of discussion
>separated into rigorously distinct layers of objects, descriptions and
>meta-descriptions, you will inevitably fail, or become hopelessly confused.
>Not because the ideas are hard to grasp, but because the layer metaphor is
>simply inadequate to the task of handling this kind of discussion.
>
> So, to sum up: strictly separated layers of description and meta-description
>are not in fact required, are artificial, and do not correspond to reality.
>This layering idea is neither correct nor useful. Abandoning it does not lead
>to paradoxes or to infinite loops: it just requires us to be a little careful
>when we make definitions, to check they are internally consistent. But this is
>a good idea, in any case.
>
> Hope this helps.
>
> Best wishes
>
> Pat
>
>
>
> On Apr 11, 2013, at 3:02 PM, Pavithra wrote:
>
>> Doug,
>>
>> I understand that "Thing" is used in an universal type and everything is a
>thing, until further defined.
>>
>> The word "house" is an English word that represent an object house, The
>word itself is not an object, it is a 5 character string ( which you call a
>thing) , that represents a building with rooms and doors and roof etc ( which
>is actually the thing.)
>>
>> Every word represents something in real world, based on the language. But
>it is part of a language. Just like number 2 represent 2 things ( we don't
>know what those two things are, unless specifically mentioned), it is
>quantitative and part of mathematics.
>>
>> There are actual things, or acts or events and there are language specific
>words that represents them. I understand that it is a matter of semantics,
>and it has been defined and formalized that way. If we have to change it, we
>have to define a new class - language, and subclass - word , types as - noun,
>verb etc. But all the double usage ( as in string vs string ) of the same
>words with multiple context usage etc cause semantic problems. So I
>understand that we can not jump the guns make changes unless such issues
>have resolutions.
>>
>> Pavithra
>>
>> From: doug foxvog <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: Pavithra <pavithra_kenjige@xxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: "doug@xxxxxxxxxx" <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>; [ontolog-forum]
><ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Thursday, April 11, 2013 4:38 PM
>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Dennett on the Darwinism of Memes
>>
>> On Wed, April 10, 2013 18:04, Pavithra wrote:
>>> Dr. Pat & Doug,
>>> I remember these discussion and decisions about defining "Words are
>>> things, just as numbers, patterns and other non-physical
>>> things are. Spoken or written word tokens are *physical* things ", in
>>> these forums in the past.
>>> But in general discussions in this forum or other contexts, it is not very
>>> intuitive.
>> As a native English speaker, i found it intuitive. But for the purposes of
>> this forum, you can consider "thing" to be jargon with the defined meaning
>> of the class of whatever can be referred to.
>>
>>> I wish we used the term "word" itself rather then thing.
>> Most things are not words. Was your writing of the email i am responding
>> to a word? Was each bite you took in your last meal a word? Is your
>> house a word?
>>
>> -- doug
>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Pavithra Kenjige
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ________________________________
>>> From: doug foxvog <doug@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> To: Pavithra <pavithra_kenjige@xxxxxxxxx>; [ontolog-forum]
>>> <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Cc: Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2013 3:57 PM
>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Dennett on the Darwinism of Memes
>>>
>>> On Wed, April 10, 2013 14:07, Pavithra wrote:
>>>> Dr. Hayes
>>>> Based on wikipedia definition of meme,
>>> Wikipedia should never be considered as a reference. Use the document
>>> that is the source of whatever Wikipedia claims. For definitions, go to
>>> a
>>> good dictionary.
>>>
>>>> Â it can be modeled as a concept. Â It is a social concept.
>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meme
>>> Wikipedia references the Meriam Webster Dictionary's definition, "an
>>> idea,
>>> behavior or style that spreads from person to person within a culture."
>>> http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme
>>>
>>> Of course, the idea is far more than that. Dawkins proposed a theory
>>> of how they operate and others have modified and expanded the
>>> theory (creating the field of memetics). A cultural ontology could have
>>> the basic concept at a broad level and have multiple theories of how
>>> the property of memes in theory knowledge bases (or ontologies).
>>>
>>>> You can call all "words" as "things".
>>> Needless to say, the word, "thing", has scores of definitions. The
>>> normal formal ontology use of the term is the one that informs the words
>>> "anything", "something", "everything", and "nothing". If one says that
>>> "nothing" has a certain property P, but you define words as not being
>>> "things", then a word having the property P would not falsify the claim
>>> that nothing has property P.
>>>
>>> In formal ontologies, the concept "thing" (e.g., Cyc's #$Thing) is the
>>> universal set -- anything that the ontology can refer to (including
>>> #$Thing)
>>> is an instance of it.
>>>
>>>> Â And all things as words at your discretion.
>>> Not at all. Flower petals, animal species, and thing itself are not
>>> words,
>>> although they may have various words or strings of words to denote them.
>>>
>>>> Â But defies the English language, & meaning of the
>>>> word "thing" and how it is described in wikipedia.
>>> Wikipedia's disambiguation page gives the first meaning of the word
>>> "thing"Â as "Object (philosophy)", which page states that "Charles S.
>>> Peirce
>>> defines the broad notion of an object as anything that we can think or
>>> talk
>>> about.
>>>
>>> We can think or talk about words, so they would be PhilosopicalObjects.
>>> So would memes (or anything else you mention!).
>>>
>>>> Wikipedia has documented meaning of the word "word" and
>>>> "thing" as follows.
>>>>
>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThingÂ
>>>> Â http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Word
>>>> Using definitions of those two words, I can not derive that all words
>>>> are
>>>> things in a logical manner.
>>> ?? Huh? Are there words that one can not talk about?
>>>
>>>> However I can say that nouns are things.
>>> The referents of verbs, adverbs, and adjectives are also things, in that
>>> they can be talked about. One can also talk about prepositions, but
>>> if they don't have referents, then their referents are not things.
>>>
>>>> But am not the authority on wikepedia or English language. So it is at
>>>> your discretion, ( In other words, you are the adviser).
>>> I advise that word is a type of thing, which means that any instance of
>>> word is an instance of thing. Wikipedia is also a thing.
>>> Â
>>>> However, In traditional modeling, for example relational and Object
>>>> Oriented world such assumptions leads to many to many relationships and
>>>> causes infinite loops in programming.
>>> Programming languages allow for infinite loops. Just because the
>>> concept
>>> of thing is an instance of thing, your reasoning engine does not have to
>>> follow the turtles all the way down. One should program to avoid
>>> infinite
>>> loops.
>>>
>>>> Who is "us" ?? Us is Ontolog group and OWL, UML modelers..
>>> Many in the Ontolog group find OWL very restrictive.
>>>
>>>> About Darwinism, As you said, DNA and genetic engineering did not exist
>>> I presume you mean human knowledge of DNA.
>>>
>>>> at the time of definition. Â Felidae
>>>> & Canidae or Cats and Dogs can not breed an offspring and it is
>>>> fatal if they do so, since they belong to different species
>>> I assume that the word "fatal" referred to being fatal to a continued
>>> line of descent. There are many cases in which animals of different
>>> species of the same genus can breed to produce sterile offspring.
>>>
>>>> Â Who knows what happens in the future or happened millions of
>>>> years ago. I speculate about such things. I have no proof one way or
>>>> the other at hand.
>>> As species are diverging, members of different subspecies are less
>>> likely to produce fertile (or any) offspring. It is certainly possible
>>> to have 3 subspecies (S1, S2, and S3) diverging from a parent species
>>> S, such that a member of S1 may sometimes produce a fertile offspring
>>> with a member of S2, and a member of S2 may sometimes produce a
>>> fertile offspring with a member of S3, but no member of S1 may produce
>>> a fertile offspring with a member of S3.
>>>
>>> Sure, no one has proof. But we have good scientific theories that we
>>> can state and model.
>>>
>>>> Â (A Korsak looks like cross breed between a cat & a
>>>> Â dog, I may call it a cat ).
>>> The English term is corsac fox (or corsac); its scientific name is
>>> Vulpes corsac. It is a kind of fox (Vulpes), which is a canine. You
>>> may call it what you want, but it is not a feline.
>>>
>>>> Â I will read or re-read the books that you suggested.Â
>>>>
>>>> Pavithra
>>>> ________________________________
>>>> Â From: Pat Hayes <phayes@xxxxxxx>
>>>> To: Pavithra <pavithra_kenjige@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Cc: [ontolog-forum] <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2013 11:35 AM
>>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Dennett on the Darwinism of Memes
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Apr 10, 2013, at 8:15 AM, Pavithra wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> John Bottoms:
>>>>> From a modeling perspective:
>>>>> ÂÂ
>>>>> ·     Languages are first level abstraction of real
>>>>> world
>>>>> ·     Languages are expression of the world, allows
>>>>> us to
>>>>> express and communicate past, present, future, real and imaginary,
>>>>> proven and unproven aspects of the world.
>>>> But they are also in the actual world, and can be studied empirically
>>>> like
>>>> any other phenomenon.
>>>>
>>>>> *Â Â Words are parts of a language.
>>>>> *Â Â Nouns are used to express "things" in English
>>> As are verbs and adjectives.
>>>
>>>>> language. Things - as in entities.  ( Not all words are things.
>>>>> For
>>>>> example, verbs are words, but not things)
>>>> All words are things. Not all words *describe* things, maybe.
>>> OK. Words such as prepositions don't describe things.
>>>
>>>>> *Â Â Nouns are a subset of words.
>>>>> *Â Â Memes are ideas / concepts, real or imaginary, proven or
>>>>> unproven.Â
>>>>> Question is : do we need to model meme??
>>>> Who is "we" and what is being "modeled"?
>>>>> My opinion : Concepts can be named with a name and modeled.
>>> OWL users have taken the English word "concept" and made it a jargon
>>> word. I find such use confusing and suggest avoiding such computer
>>> language-specific use when not referring to OWL. The Compact Oxford
>>> Dictionary's first definition of 'concept' is "an abstract idea" -- which
>>> seems a good definition to me. The word comes from Latin 'conceptum' --
>>> "something conceived".
>>>
>>>>>  At present we do not use the verbiage "meme" for it. Probably we
>>>>> can use the name meme in the future.
>>> The word 'meme' is part of a theory that many do not accept.
>>> There is no need to commit to that theory. I suggest using the
>>> word only when referring to the theory to which it is attached.
>>>
>>>> My advice would be to only use the term if you have a pretty exact idea
>>>> of
>>>> what it is you are talking about, and document that understanding as
>>>> carefully as you possibly can.
>>>
>>>>> About Darwinism, Americans use the word Darwinism from a scientific
>>>>> evolution point of view vs theological, god made us, changed us (
>>>>> mutation) etc.
>>>> American scientists use the term the same way other scientists do.
>>>>
>>>>> Maxwell, & Dr. Steven.
>>>>> Thanks for summarizing my gibberish writing.  ( It was not
>>>>> scientific
>>>>> feed back, it was more of a general discussion)
>>>>> There is natural evolution due to mutation and then there is human
>>>>> intervention for change.
>>>> Until recently, the only intervention available was artificial
>>>> *selection*, which follows the natural process but amplifies the
>>>> effects.
>>>>
>>>>>  Grafting & genetic engineering are human intervention. My point
>>>>> was
>>>>> Darwinism did not include human intervention, or cross breeding among
>>>>> subspecies.ÂÂ
>>>> Darwin certainly considered cross-breeding and also human intervention
>>>> in
>>>> breeding (eg of dogs and farm animals, which he studied at great length:
>>>> I
>>>> recommend reading his "Origin of Species", it is a very readable work.)
>>>> He
>>>> did not, of course, consider genetic engineering, as genetics had not
>>>> even
>>>> been formulated when he was writing. I suspect he would have been
>>>> delighted and fascinated to have known about genetics and DNA, but he
>>>> did
>>>> not have this pleasure.
>>>>
>>>>> You mentioned that his theory includes cross breeding among
>>>>> subspecies??ÂÂ
>>>> If animals can breed and produce fertile offspring, they are (by
>>>> definition) the same species.
>>>>
>>>>> However the following is not totally proven in all cases and is open
>>>>> for
>>>>> speculation and there are ethical issues about genetic engineering. ( I
>>>>> don;t want to go there)
>>>>>    • crossing between different species is genetically
>>>>> fatal ..
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Pavithra
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: John Bottoms <john@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>> To: ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2013 6:20 AM
>>>>> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Dennett on the Darwinism of Memes
>>>>>
>>>>> Pavithra,
>>>>>
>>>>> I may not have remembered his wording correctly in the use of "word".
>>>>> Also, it is a difficulty of linguistics that "thing" often gets used
>>>>> when a better selection would be "entity". However, the audience
>>>>> understood the intent of the question. Words come and go and likewise
>>>>> memes come and go. They share some characteristics and there is a
>>>>> shoot-from-the-hip impulse to put them in a lexicon or dictionary.
>>>>>
>>>>> Another view might be that memes are types of propositions that need to
>>>>> be evaluated. They could be classified into "indeterminate" until they
>>>>> are evaluated. Dennett does recognize that memes are "good" or "bad",
>>>>> and I suppose we should accept that they can be resurrected. One theory
>>>>> I have is that the term "meme" applies to atomic entities that have
>>>>> particular attributes or properties that can be generalized or
>>>>> rationalized. If that is true then we should be able to build
>>>>> classifiers for memes. A question for exploration is whether that
>>>>> property can be understood in a way that makes sense or is useful.
>>>>>
>>>>> Your view of giraffe evolution is referred to as Lamarckian inheritance
>>>>> and it survives today only as a weakened theory.
>>>>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamarckism)
>>>>>
>>>>> -John Bottoms
>>>>>  Concord, MA USA
>>>>> On 4/9/2013 8:39 PM, Pavithra wrote:
>>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Words are not things. "Words" representation things if they are
>>>>>> nouns. memes are ideas that spreads from person to person??
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Darwinism and theory of evolution explains how living organisms evolve
>>>>>> over few generations according to the needs/usage etc. According
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> him Giraffe has long neck, because they keep stretching their neck to
>>>>>> eat branches and eventually it caused a genetic mutation to aid
>>>>>> survival -- a process known as "natural selection." These beneficial
>>>>>> mutations are passed on to the next generation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Darwin does not take cross pollination ( for lack of better
>>>>>> word)ÂÂ
>>>>>> of plants and animals and between different species that happens in
>>>>>> one
>>>>>> generation and produce offspring of blended types into
>>>>>> consideration.  A Lion and Tiger may have a Liger for a
>>>>>> child.  You
>>>>>> can actually cut a branch of one fruit tree and put it another
>>>>>> fruit
>>>>>> tree branch stub and tie it up and it may bear the fruit of the first
>>>>>> tree kind.. There is all sorts of intervention that happens to
>>>>>> change
>>>>>> the way species of plants and animal world to evolve intoÂÂ
>>>>>> something
>>>>>> new and different not only by genetic mutation due to thousands of
>>>>>> years
>>>>>> of usage or need for survival but due to cross pollination. Â
>>>>>> I know
>>>>>> this is a thesis for genetic decoding not fiction.ÂÂ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I still have to read the book listed below..
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pavithra ÂÂ
>>>>>> ÂÂ
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: John Bottoms <john@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>> To: [ontolog-forum] <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2013 5:28 PM
>>>>>> Subject: [ontolog-forum] Dennett on the Darwinism of Memes
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Daniel Dennett's next book will be out in a few weeks and I had the
>>>>>> opportunity to hear him talk about how memes obey the tenets of
>>>>>> Darwinism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The title of his book is, "Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for
>>>>>> Thinking".
>>>>>> (not available yet,
>>>>>> http://www.amazon.com/Intuition-Pumps-Other-Tools-Thinking/dp/0393082067)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> His argument starts by asking if words are things. Then he argues that
>>>>>> if words are things then we should consider memes as things also. He
>>>>>> goes on to illustrate that memes follow the basic three principles of
>>>>>> Darwinism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> His arguments are compelling and I wonder where they belong in the
>>>>>> grand
>>>>>> ontologies of entities. Are memes a new construct, or do memes simply
>>>>>> replicate a known construct?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -John Bottoms
>>>>>>   FirstStar Systems
>>>>>>   Concord, MA USA
>>
>>
>>
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