Re: [ontolog-forum] Dennett on the Darwinism of Memes

[jmcclure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

A very well-known meme in the political sphere is that "tax cuts generate growth" - hardly a popular idea but one you better toe if you're a Republican congressman! The purpose of a meme is specifically to cause/explain one's (voting) behaviour promoting certain agendas. In this case, the agenda is to maximize the retained earnings of rich people.

A meme is neither a "true nor factual" idea. It is purely a tool for behaviour modification, somewhat akin to a "claim" in a "belief system". Genetic analogies may come to mind to explain why some memes survive, becoming mythic in proportion, while others do not.

"If it feels good, then DO IT."

The other day I was crotchety & crusty and I regret a public outburst was the result. Sorry for that (Pat).

- john

 

On 12.04.2013 05:55, John F Sowa wrote:

> Ronald, Ali, Doug, Pavithra, and Pat,
>
> In all the discussions and publications about memes, you can do a global
> change of 'meme' to 'idea that has become popular' without changing the
> meaning of anything in the discussion itself.
>
> What the word 'meme' contributes is a keyword or search term that
> links the documents in which it is used.  That is very helpful for
> finding related discussions.  But, by itself, it doesn't explain
> the underlying principles.
>
> My complaint about the word 'meme' is that the analogy with genes is
> more distracting than enlightening.  In the popular and academic talk,
> nobody has found any unifying principle that is more precise or cogent
> than the term 'idea that has become popular'.
>
> RS
> > Memes operate through specialised clusters of social norms... I hope that discussing memes will draw attention to the essential role of norms in the functioning of every human information system, which distinguishes them from IT systems.
> Those are good points.  The same could be said about "popular ideas".
> What is essential to the term 'meme' is idea.  The notion of popularity
> is accidental.  That suggests the central focus of the discussions
> about memes should be on the mechanisms that promote popularity.
>
> AH
> > [John Gray et al.] would argue that memes are propagated and selected not by some generic fitness factor, but by sustained, concerted efforts by individuals and groups, and gains in memes are more ephemeral than we may suspect...
> Yes.  An advertising campaign for ideas.
>
> AH
> > This further reminds me of the work done by the Koch brothers in creating a massive meme generating machine (aka echo chamber),
> Yes.  The Koch bros and their use their so-called "Think Tanks" created
> a giant hype machine.  The K bros are not stupid.  They graduated from
> my old alma mater, MIT, and they contribute to some worthy causes such
> as the Nova science programs on PBS.  But I noticed that Nova has never
> had a program on global warming -- that's a "meme" they don't like.
>
> Speaking of the K bros and MIT reminds me of an old cartoon, which
> showed a complicated diagram of a hype machine.  On the left was
> an input funnel for "raw hype".  Coming out on the right side were
> nicely packaged lumps of "pure hype".
>
> DF
> > A word is a thing, yes. A word is not a string.
> Instead of arguing about whether a meme is a thing, I suggest that we
> just use 'idea' as the hypernym or supertype of 'meme'.  The question
> I raised is whether there is anything more to meme than "popular idea".
>
> PK
> > There are actual things, or acts or events and there are language specific words that represents them...
> Yes. That is the distinction of language vs metalanguage.
>
> But as I replied to Doug, I suggest that we agree that memes are ideas.
> That shifts attention to the question whether there is anything more
> to meme than just "idea that has become popular".
>
> PH
> > I would argue [layered metalanguage] is not desirable. The world is *not* layered in this way, in fact. Language is as much part of the real world as architecture is, and words are just as real as houses.
> I agree.  But signs didn't become relevant until there were
> sentient beings that could respond to signs.  And even with the
> higher mammals, metalanguage didn't enter the world until humans
> developed the sign systems we call language.  So the distinction
> of signs, referents of signs, and interpreters of signs is relevant.
>
> PH
> > I would suggest that you might want to consider abandoning this layering idea.
> Tarski recommended the layered approach for metalanguage as a simple way
> to avoid paradox.  But that is a separate issue.
>
> IKL (or any notation that supports metalanguage) requires something
> like the 'that' operator.  The question of whether you stratify the
> metalevels is an independent choice.
>
> In fact, even with a semantics like IKL, which allows you to mix levels,
> there may be useful reasons for distinguishing them for particular
> applications.
>
> John
>  
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