The paper present a contrast between two main views
within the research program in ontologies:
- Realist view: the ontology is build upon universals
in reality rather than concepts. A good ontology is one which corresponds to
reality as it exists beyond our concepts.
- Conceptualist view: the ontology is a explicit
speciﬁcation of a conceptualization. A good ontology is one which captures our
I think the difference between the two
communities (Realists, Conceptualists) is due to the perceived potential usefulness that is required, the when and the
where, of the said ontology. Those who seek to implement must be realists at
the time and on cost and within schedule of whatever stressor has said realist
at the moment.
So the Realist, where also an implementer
Realist, reflects a practical consistent way to view by realist motivated people
when said people start thinking about implementing some project.
The Conceptualist must not have such consumer
level interfacing; a conceptualist is probably funded by any underspecified deliverable
within cost and schedule. The conceptualist also has pressures and
environments that drive said conceptualist just as hard, but highly likely in
some other direction of motivation, without ruling out the occasional implementer.
To me at least, that metaphor of the
subjective realist with the objective conceptualist, both have parts in each our
makeup(s). By that I mean you and I and we and me all have both Realist and
Conceptualist in some proportion. It seems an environmentally likely event.
Both skills are certainly needed,
specifically at the genetic pod level, where individuals more or less
cooperate. Aggregation of biological cells into films, organs, creatures and
crowds are evolutionary steps forward to social animals. Presumably we are
How has that worked out for us so far?
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Marcelino Sente
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis,semantics and the
research program of ontologies
In this paper, the author discuss some aspects raised by this topic and
present a "cognitivist ontology".
The paper present a contrast between two main views within the research
program in ontologies:
- Realist view: the ontology is build upon universals in reality rather
than concepts. A good ontology is one which corresponds to reality as it exists
beyond our concepts.
- Conceptualist view: the ontology is a explicit speciﬁcation of a
conceptualization. A good ontology is one which captures our shared
I would like to know the position of the members of this forum about this
2012/3/16 Marcelino Sente <zaratruta@xxxxxxxxx>
consider this assertion (refered as A1):
“It should be emphasized that we are talking about a perceived world and
not a metaphysical world without a knower” (Rosch 1978, p.29)
assertion impacts on the research program of ontologies?
initiatives regarding conceptual modeling, systems interoperability, and
conceptual analysis have been using of theories coming from the domain of
formal ontology. I say "formal ontology", in the sense of Husserl, as
analogous to formal logic. Whilst formal logic deals with formal logical structures
(e.g.,truth, validity, consistency) independently of their veracity, formal
ontology deals with formal ontological structures (e.g., theory of parthood,
types and instantiation, identity, dependence, unity), i.e., with formal
aspects of entities irrespective of their particular nature. Some (so called)
foundational ontologies (as UFO - unified foundational ontology) embody several
conceptions coming from the "formal ontology". So...What A1 say about
the use of conceptions imported from "formal ontology" to the
territory of semantic web, communication among computer and humans and systems
we view and compare the contributions related to the realist semantics and
cognitive semantics, regarding our objetives expressed above (semantic web,
communication among computer and humans and systems interoperability)? Does
make sense think in terms of cognitive semantics in the reserach program of
E. Rosch (1978) Principles of Categorization.
in: E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization. pp.
27-48, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New