First, to all, I yet again left my confidentiality signature on the bottom of my previous message to which Hans responds here. I retract the confidentiality, and apologize.
And Hans, yes, I think I understand your approach better, now too. it is the associations and interactions with the other entities in that "reality" that distinquish them in your model of reality types.
Wm
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 10:08 PM, Hans Polzer <hpolzer@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
William,
All good points. I was trying to be terse, since my own personal social reality is that I have difficulty writing short emails (so I am told). And yes, the different types of reality I mentioned do “bleed” together at their respective extremes. My point was simply to articulate that the nature of the “external reality” is different in each case. I can interact with that “piece of land” whether or not there are other people around, and the land can interact with other parts of physical reality, even if I’m not around (like a meteorite strike, or a tree falling down, for example). But ownership is only grounded in other (i.e., external to me) people sharing that concept. And value of the land depends on a specific external social context. I think we generally need to be more explicit about the nature and scope of the external frames of reference we use to describe our admittedly somewhat subjective realities.
And as string theory demonstrates, the social reality of physicists is typically quite constrained in scope. Indeed, many wear the badge of “being laughed at” with pride. J
Hans
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of William Frank
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 9:07 PM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis, semantics and the research program of ontologies
As we have also discussed separately, I think you make a nice and useful distincition here, but I do believe that these uses of the words "physical" and "conceptual" are different from the way the words were used in the founding subject for this thread, or in the article in question, or in the history and philosopy of science. There, " a piece of land" is ***also** something that only can be percieved to exist by having conceptual glasses that let you see some directly observable pheonomia (sensations of colors and touch and sound), and turn these into a concrete "thing".
So, *everything* we see in any world we are in is part of a conceptual framework, whether that be one you categorize nicely as physical, "conceptual" (in your special meaning) or "social". That is, mass and land are "physical" concepts, ownership and value are "conceptual" concepts, and valuation is a "social": concept. All are concepts meaning 2, and also, all are based, in different ways, on exteranl reality that must be **assumed** or taken to be "objective", as well as on how we classify the things in that reality. Even though, as you say, all the good words are already taken, I think that "conceptual reality", as separate from "physical reality" is a misleading _expression_. I n fact, I find the physics of string theory to be alot more "conceptual" and less based in "reality" than following my freinds preferences on facebook. Further, if I think I see a peice of land, other people may show me that I am probably mistaken, if none of them see it. So, social reality bleeds into the physical. (As it does in physics itself, where being laughed at is a motivator of what physicists see, 'I would bet.)
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 8:20 PM, Hans Polzer <hpolzer@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: Just to elaborate a bit, a piece of land is a physical reality (leaving aside the issue of thickness into the earth and the air above the land). The concept that land can be owned is a conceptual reality (nothing physical changes when land is owned by some entity). That land can have value is also a conceptual reality. What the value might be of a specific piece of land is a social reality (as recent history in the US demonstrates). The fact that a specific entity owns a specific piece of land is mostly a conceptual reality, but has elements of social reality (i.e., what happens when the revolution comes? Will the ownership of the land still be recognized by others? The value will almost certainly be significantly different after the revolution – as might be the currency used to represent the value of the land).
Hans
William,
Since we are dragging physicists into this discussion, I would observe that the issue is a lot like the “wave – particle” duality of light and quantum mechanics. Humans share a conceptual reality (if diverse and from different perspectives), as well as an understanding of physical reality. Otherwise, we wouldn’t be having this discussion. As we have discussed separately, there is also a social reality – what is real and acceptable in different social circles, such as on the TV show “Survivor” – in which the survivor is rarely (never?) the one best able to deal with physical – or conceptual – reality. It’s called reality TV for a reason.
Hans
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of William Frank
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 6:37 PM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis, semantics and the research program of ontologies
'To me, the problem is in this supposed "dichotomy". Implicit in saying:
"The ontology is build upon universals in reality rather than concepts"
I think that this is ***not*** a dichotomy. I think that every perspective on reality is structured according to human concepts, But that the reality is ***still there***, and is what it is, not something we just "make up". Or that cultures "just make up." (If that were true,then there would be no reason to prefer insulin to incantations for curing diabetes. We could solve the world healthcare crisis over night.) Only, we can't observe it without putting our own mark on it. How much and what kiind of a mark, is what varies. Just as in the "nature versus nurture" non- "arguments".
I think that this what of the theoretical linguists cited in the paper are saying (Lakoff, Jackendoff). I think that this is what physicists understand very well.
For example, the paper cited says:
"Is ontology about the 'real world' (as seen, say by a physicist), or rather, should it take cognition into account"
There's that "rather" again. Whoa!!! who has a more complex, human-created ontology than physicists??? The Ether?? Wait a minute. (well that's ok because it was 'wrong'?) What about Dark Matter???? Strings??????? Force, mass, and distance were plenty bad enough. Their ontology provide the explanatory framework for what they more directly observe (but even those are intemediated by instruments whose measurements depend on theories). But, of course, every time there is a new theory, that explains things better, and is simpler, most physicists believe that the ontology on which this new theory is based is closer to what is 'really real.' Yet, they know they will never be done, and can always be proved wrong even in their most basic assumptions.
I believe that this has been well demonstrated to be **very subtle* in the last century, and we should be building on that knowledge. Not some simple either -or at all. That cultures as a whole strive to explain more than they can, sometimes woefully inadequately. But international scientific culture has learned to be increasingly modest about what it claims to "know", and to increasingly understand the importance of the role of the observer in the equation, from Heisenberg's Uncertainly principle and Godel's incompleteness proofs to the kinds of demonstration that Rich was sending around. Yet, this does not mean that reality is *just* whatever you say it is. You can't see *anything* without your conceptual glasses on, but you couldn't see anything, either, unless there was something to look at.
If we have a robot that can see obstacles, it needs to have a theory that organizes its visual field into "things". Are the things 'really there', or are they a construct of the robot's processing? This is the kind of question that I think has been shown to be without much meaning, or at least without much use asking.
So, given this, from a practical point of view, I agree completely with what Mathew West says below. Which we emphasize will depend on our interests, just as environmental medicine will look at nurture while genetics is looking at nature. Personally, I think ontologies need to be reconciled with viewpoints, but believing in viewpoints as I do, I can also well imagine that there could be a use for a more "realist" kind of ontology.
But, to argue about this, that is, insist on which perspective on how we organize or perceptions as manifestations of things in themselves is 'right' -- that the conceptual frameworks are themselves really out there or are created by people's minds, seems no more necessary than I can see it to be useful.
Finally, I think that this is what Kant said in the Critique of Pure Reason, and that just about everybody who has spent much mind space since has agreed,at least outside of philosophy of mathematics. I that we don't need to rehash metaphysics without the benefit of the world's greatest geniuses, who we can have in the room with us.
http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/kant/section1.html
I think that as temperamentally and in detail at odds as they were, both Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein are both Kantians.
So, I wholehearted support "research" into how to put Computer Science ontology work onto a firmer foundation, but I think that the research would take the form of learning more of what has already been done, and applying it to computer science and engineering.
Wm
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Matthew West <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Dear Marcelino, I think you will find people here who favour one or other of these approaches. Which they favour will often be determined by the kinds of problems they are interested in.
Me. I’m a realist interested in the application of ontology to engineering.
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In this paper, the author discuss some aspects raised by this topic and present a "cognitivist ontology". The paper present a contrast between two main views within the research program in ontologies: - Realist view: the ontology is build upon universals in reality rather than concepts. A good ontology is one which corresponds to reality as it exists beyond our concepts.
- Conceptualist view: the ontology is a explicit specification of a conceptualization. A good ontology is one which captures our shared conceptualization.
I would like to know the position of the members of this forum about this aspects.
2012/3/16 Marcelino Sente <zaratruta@xxxxxxxxx>
Let consider this assertion (refered as A1):
“It should be emphasized that we are talking about a perceived world and not a metaphysical world without a knower” (Rosch 1978, p.29)
How this assertion impacts on the research program of ontologies? Some initiatives regarding conceptual modeling, systems interoperability, and conceptual analysis have been using of theories coming from the domain of formal ontology. I say "formal ontology", in the sense of Husserl, as analogous to formal logic. Whilst formal logic deals with formal logical structures (e.g.,truth, validity, consistency) independently of their veracity, formal ontology deals with formal ontological structures (e.g., theory of parthood, types and instantiation, identity, dependence, unity), i.e., with formal aspects of entities irrespective of their particular nature. Some (so called) foundational ontologies (as UFO - unified foundational ontology) embody several conceptions coming from the "formal ontology". So...What A1 say about the use of conceptions imported from "formal ontology" to the territory of semantic web, communication among computer and humans and systems interoperability?
How can we view and compare the contributions related to the realist semantics and cognitive semantics, regarding our objetives expressed above (semantic web, communication among computer and humans and systems interoperability)? Does make sense think in terms of cognitive semantics in the reserach program of ontologies?
Reference:
E. Rosch (1978) Principles of Categorization. in: E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization. pp. 27-48, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey.
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