Hans, you wrote:
The
bottom line is to be prepared to deal with a multiplicity of categorization schemes,
or at least recognize that others are possible, even if for economic and self
interest/perspective reasons one might only support one particular
categorization or just a few alternate categorization schemes.
I agree. My approach in the 7,209,923 had
an example embodiment where IDEF0 charts were used to model objects,
properties, actions, specifications, regulations, and all the usual minutiae of
a domain complex enough to have domains within it. So I used the IDEF0
example, with its well known ICOMs, as a graphical or textual representation of
the semantics to be defined by specific IDEF0 models to be constructed, or
loaded from libraries, by modeling users.
One advantage to that approach is that so
many engineers and MBAs are trained on how to use and interpret IDEF0 models.
Another is that they have well known transformations into Petri nets for
toolware, projections into schedules and progress charts, and all the usual
minutiae of project management.
A third advantage is that context diagrams
can be used as signatures to an index of object bindings, all to be interpreted
by the terminal objects and activities, which are actions that can be directly
interpreted.
I added a fourth advantage in that a
plurality of decompositions can be mapped into one context diagram. That way,
a complete And/Or graph is appropriate, and in one implementation
I used a Not (“~”) operator to signal
negation and when a Node became negated, its solvability markings were changed
to “unsolvable”, and propagated through the encompassing solution subtree.
The result was an FOL system that had both
solved (i.e. True) proof trees and solved (i.e. True) refutation trees. Given
that the usual environments we deal with are inconsistent, this approach is not
the same as negation as failure (NAF). Instead it is negation as logical evidence
against, weighed against logical evidence for, the assertion or refutation as
bound ultimately to its ground symbols, the terminal nodes.
Given that structure mapped directly into
the metadata, and then associated with symbols via the IDEF0 models, any kind
of categorization scheme appropriate to the top level domain’s decomposition
into components, fits nicely into an And/Or search with true negation that can
function in the typically inconsistent database.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
From:
ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Hans Polzer
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012
6:41 PM
To: '[ontolog-forum]
'
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis,semantics and the
research program of ontologies
Rich,
Thanks for the
feedback and questions. Taking your first one on top level categories, there
are always alternate decomposition/categorization shemas possible. It comes
down to the purpose of the categorization, which, unfortunately, is often left
as implicit. In my case of categorizing reality types, the purpose was to
inform system sponsors and developers as to the nature of the information
sources necessary to represent a model of the context and scope in the system
they are building. You can’t determine which people belong to what organization
by using physical sensors (unless the organizations and people in question
agree to wear or implant some form of remotely sensed ID that includes that
information). You need to access some database/information service that keeps
track of people’s locations and organizational affiliation (for the
people/organizations in question – a scope issue). This may seem obvious, but
there are lots of systems that attempt to do this by inferencing from
physically observable behavior (with, let us say, “mixed results”). Determining
whether a piece of property is “for sale”, requires contacting the owner(s) of
the property – although checking out a multiple listings service may be adequate
in some contexts. Either of these is a social reality information source.
The bottom line is
to be prepared to deal with a multiplicity of categorization schemes, or at
least recognize that others are possible, even if for economic and self
interest/perspective reasons one might only support one particular
categorization or just a few alternate categorization schemes.
Regarding your
questions about two participants with divergent perspectives on the same
context, I take the approach that each participant has a context (or more than
one), and two or more participants may share a context, upon which each have
their own perspective – obviously influenced by the individual contexts they
have prior to encountering the shared context (a context-shifting event or
change in condition/state). I’ll send you separately an email exchange I had
with someone else about this topic many years ago by way of background. Good
examples of context-shifting events are natural disasters, introduction of new
technologies/products/services (like the WWW and URI’s), new competitors, a
change in environment (e.g., climate change), and the like.
A more personal
example might be getting stopped by the police on the way home from work, or
experiencing a heart attack. The policeman and the emergency medical
technicians will have significantly different perspectives on the context they
are newly sharing with you, compared to your perspective on each of these new
contexts. Things that were important to you before will suddenly seem
unimportant, and things you considered unimportant prior to the context
shifting event will take on an importance you probably wish you had taken more
seriously before the event. Conversely, the police could care less where you
are headed and why, or whether someone is waiting on you to arrive. The EMTs’,
on the other hand, would be interested if you had a next-of-kin or other emergency
contact, whether you were an organ donor, your blood type, and medical history
info relevant to treating a heart attack. Typically we have enough agreement on
the shared context to muddle through, with a few mistakes/casualties to keep
things interesting on a statistical basis.
Regarding handling
inconsistent perceptions, people do this fairly well if there isn’t an a priori
hostile disposition by entering into a discovery dialog and possible
“negotiations” if the perceptions represent a conflict of interests. For
systems, the result is usually some “interoperability failure”, followed by
some root cause analysis if the failure is operationally significant (too big
to ignore or fix by “rebooting”). That is usually followed by some modification
to one system or another, or both, or via introduction of some mediator or
adaptor component/system. Essentially, the information elements necessary for
the shared context to be successful are adjusted in each system’s perspective
on the shared context to bring them into alignment, or the adjustment is
exported to a third party. Other differences in perspective will remain,
however, usually because they are important/essential to each system’s
successful performance in its context/scope.
Hans
Hans
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Rich Cooper
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012
4:14 PM
To: '[ontolog-forum]
'
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis, semantics and the
research program of ontologies
Dear Hans,
Thanks for your thoughtful comments.
My comments are interspersed below,
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
Thanks
for the feedback and restatement of my key points, Rich. I don’t know if
there are more than 3 categories of reality, but I suspect there may be,
and there are likely to be useful subcategories in many operational contexts.
I’d be interested in any thoughts on possible other categories of reality where
the grounding/frames of reference are something other than physical
sensors/laws, human institutions, and human feelings about a context, entity,
or event/trend.
It seems
to me that the number of possible categories is virtually limitless. I
had thought you meant to limit the list by constraining top level categories,
under which can be any number of others. I am probably not the right
person to develop a total list of top level categories, since I find most of
the lists we (including I) trade in posts on this list. It would be nice
to find a short list that is all encompassing at the top level, but that hasn’t
really happened in a satisfactory way on this list yet. It may not be
possible due to the divergence of our (the list members’) viewpoints.
One
question would be whether “alternate realities” are a modality of the other
three categories, or a separate category in its own right. If we create a
pseudo physical reality in a network environment such as Second Life, we could
do so using the laws of physics as we understand them in the physical reality
we know today, or we could create a simulation of a “universe” in which the
laws of physics are different, or use different constants. Yes, this could be
viewed as part of yet another “conceptual reality”, but it may be useful in
some contexts to treat this as a different physical reality, especially if we
want other applications and models that interact with and represent the
physical reality we know to operate in this alternate physical reality by
accepting simulated sensor inputs as if they came from the physical reality we
know. In case this seems to be a “stretch”, consider that we already conduct
“rehearsal” operations in a location that isn’t the final location, but is set
up to “look like” the final target location. And many movies already do this
through CGI and other techniques. Note the seeming violation of the laws of
gravity in the movie Avatar.
Yes,
much of the cgi technology seems to show obvious craftsmanship instead of covering
up the seams of production methods. I would prefer more realistic movie
examples, of which there are many, but as you state, they are simulations
(simulacra?) not reality as filmed.
I
should also note that a context can be very narrow/constrained in scope, or it
can be very broad (epic?) as seen by the different participants. And there can
be many, many operative scope dimensions in each type of reality. So the
important thing for me is more the operative scope dimensions than the number
of reality categories they can be “binned” into.
That is
an interesting thought. If you capture the viewpoints of every
participant, and then find common conceptualizations (what few I would expect
to find), then enumerate ALL the dimensions conceptualized by ALL participants,
that would cover all available evidence. However, it is still an open
list because new participants can arrive and take part at any time in many
situations.
That way
of elaborating the definition of concepts seems like a very promising one,
nevertheless. But the idea of “context” is still puzzling; each
participant views a subjective context made up of the objects, properties,
relationships and actions which that participant views. How would you
handle two participants with divergent viewpoints? Does that mean that
there is AT LEAST one context per participant, or can all the contexts be
lumped together? What would you do about inconsistent conceptualizations
among participants?
The
only reason I use the categories is to help system developers/sponsors to
understand what the nature of the information sources need to be to represent
their desired/target contexts and the scope of those contexts on the network
(or what the inherent limitations of those representations might be because they
require surrogates or inferencing from significantly incomplete information).
Hans
Yes, in most AI systems in practice,
incomplete information is the rule rather than the exception,
-Rich
Dear Hans,
You wrote:
I
would describe context as having scope, with some of the scope dimensions
representing physical reality attributes important to that context and other
scope dimensions representing conceptual reality attributes, including social
reality attributes important to that context. Of course, different participants
will have different perspectives on a shared context, and for each such
perspective the operative scope dimensions and associated scope values will be
somewhat or radically different.
Yes, I can agree with that
description. I’m sure you would agree that in fact ANY returned N-tuples
from ANY query would be comprised of N values retrieved or calculated from a
collection of (not necessarily N) columns that are each possibly physical,
possibly conceptual, and possibly social in origin. Any combination of
those three characterizations would fit the description, even if there are zero
columns of any one, two or three of the above. But if every N-tuple
returned has only one or the other of the three kinds of columns, does that leave
out other characterizations beyond the three (physical, conceptual,
social). Do you consider that list of three kinds exhaustive, or simply
typical? Are there more than three kinds?
I see that you also agree that the
perceiver P2 of a context has a subjective view of the said N-tuple, and the
original recorder P1 of the columns’ values also had a subjective view when she
recorded one of the columns.
Perhaps the chosen columns were entered by
different perceivers, perhaps even hundreds of data providers. So by the
time person P2 formulates an interpretation of said query response, the
information has flowed through at least those two cycles of interpretation,
including at least P1.
But quite possibly, hundreds of perceivers
played a role in assigning values to the columns. For example, medical
knowledge of diagnoses and treatments recorded in databases could easily have
contributions from hundreds of healthcare providers. The likelihood of
such a database being consistent seems vanishingly small from an ontological
viewpoint.
Thanks for your comments,
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
Rich,
I would describe
context as having scope, with some of the scope dimensions representing
physical reality attributes important to that context and other scope
dimensions representing conceptual reality attributes, including social reality
attributes important to that context. Of course, different participants will
have different perspectives on a shared context, and for each such perspective
the operative scope dimensions and associated scope values will be somewhat or
radically different.
My original example
of a “piece of land” is illustrative, since I didn’t specify any scope extent –
although I did allude to that fact that there are many physical reality scope
dimensions associated with both the concept of a piece of land, and the
physical reality of any given (i.e., specific) piece of land. My aside “leaving
aside the issue of thickness into the earth and the air above the land” was
intended to convey that, but was clearly inadequate to that task, as the
subsequent emails evidenced. Clearly, the shared context of such a “piece of
land” among, say, a homeowner, a geologist, or a nearby airport operator would
have significantly different scope dimensions and dimension values/value ranges
for each such participant in the shared context. Different participants may
also have different frames of reference (e.g., language, location descriptors,
descriptors for soil/ground/vegetation/etc) for representing scope dimensions and
dimension values, even if they agree on what the important scope attributes of
the shared context are, such as the location, shape, size/extent, and temporal
interval of the piece of land in question.
Hans
Hans
Dear Doug,
You wrote:
Or course, what can be
physically measured depends upon context. In various contexts, things
beyond a certain (temporal or linear) scale would be out of context and not
part of that context's physical reality. And, of course, context is a
conceptual, not physical concept -- although it may be given a physical
definition.
One way to view context is as a collection of
properties and relations about a situation. In that view, context is
possibly physical, and possibly conceptual, but not necessarily either.
For example, if I am recording objects and their
properties in a database, then a query which returns a situation description
may have either conceptual structure (if they are MY concepts that were
recorded) or physical structure (if the returned values are solely physical
SENSOR measurements).
In actual practice, a context can mix both physical
and subjective (“conceptual” if you prefer) estimates of reality, and usually
does in most practical database applications.
So, IMHO, situations are every bit as slippery and
subjective as concepts. Situations are just more articulated since they
usually comprise both concepts and sensor readings.
-Rich
Sincerely,
Rich Cooper
EnglishLogicKernel.com
Rich AT EnglishLogicKernel DOT com
9 4 9 \ 5 2 5 - 5 7 1 2
-----Original Message-----
From: ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of doug foxvog
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2012 9:56 AM
To: [ontolog-forum]
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis,
semantics and the research program of ontologies
On Wed, March 21, 2012 21:07, William Frank wrote:
> As we have also discussed separately, I think you
make a nice and useful
> distincition here, but I do believe that these
uses of the words
> "physical"
> and "conceptual" are different from the
way the words were used in the
> founding subject for this thread, or in the
article in question, or in the
> history and philosopy of science. There,
" a piece of land" is ***also**
> something that only can be percieved to exist by
having conceptual glasses
> that let you see some directly observable
pheonomia (sensations of colors
> and touch and sound), and turn these into a
concrete "thing".
I agreed up until the word "concrete".
ANYTHING can only be PERCEIVED to exist by having
conceptual glasses
that let one OBSERVE some PHYSICAL PHENOMENA and then
model it as a MENTAL
"thing".
This is a definition of perception.
Is a "piece of land" physical? Since
it has mass and a physical location,
one could conclude it is.
Is a "piece of land" a MENTAL concept?
In so far as its borders are not
defined by physical criteria (e.g. a cliff edge or
concrete curb) it is.
Any given spot on a "piece of land" on earth
is on googleplexes of
connected pieces of land as changing the border by a
micron at any
location would define a different "piece of
land".
What constitutes an OBJECT in the real world in many
cases is a conceptual
definition. When is a brick that starts flaking
no longer the "same"
brick?
Some things in the natural world tend to act as
individual objects, but
they can gain and loose pieces, and change shape and
location.
Fundamental particles (electrons, quarks, ...)
apparently can not gain or
loose parts and can be considered to be real-world
OBJECTS irrespective of
conceptualization, but almost any other "physical
object" that is modeled
is in some sense a conceptual object, since its
boundaries (temporal
and/or physical) are temporally defined.
> So, *everything* we see in any world we are in is
part of a conceptual
If we see it and identify it, identification makes
(our representation of) it
part of our conceptual framework.
> framework, whether that be one you categorize
nicely as physical,
> "conceptual" (in your special meaning)
or "social". That is, mass and
> land are "physical"* concepts*,
> ownership and value are "conceptual" *concepts*,
> and valuation is a "social": *concept*.
Ownership, value, and valuation are all social
concepts.
> All are concepts meaning 2, and
> also, all are based, in different ways, on
exteranl reality that must be
> **assumed** or taken to be "objective",
as well as on how we classify the
> things in that reality.
The "external reality" of a social concept
is a feature of an intangible
social reality.
> Even though, as you say, all the good
words are
> already taken, I think that "conceptual
reality", as separate from
> "physical reality" is a
misleading _expression_.
Why do you consider the distinction to be
misleading? "Physical reality"
applies to things that can [at least
"conceptually" 8)# ] be measured by
physical devices. "Conceptual reality"
deals with interpretation.
Or course, what can be physically measured depends
upon context. In
various contexts, things beyond a certain (temporal or
linear) scale would
be out of context and not part of that context's
physical reality. And,
of course, context is a conceptual, not physical
concept -- although it may
be given a physical definition.
> In fact, I find the physics of string
theory to be alot more "conceptual"
> and less based in "reality" than
> following my freinds preferences on facebook.
The first is an issue of context, not
physicality. Preferences are by
definition conceptual. Being part of a
"conceptual reality" does not
make something less "real" -- just
differentially real.
> Further, if I
> think I see a peice of land, other people may
show me that I am probably
> mistaken, if none of them see it. So,
social reality bleeds into the
> physical.
i wouldn't consider this "social reality".
-- doug foxvog
> (As it does in physics itself, where being
laughed at is a
> motivator of what physicists see, 'I would bet.)
>
> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 8:20 PM, Hans Polzer <hpolzer@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> Just to elaborate a bit, a piece of land is a
physical reality (leaving
>> aside the issue of thickness into the earth
and the air above the land).
>> The concept that land can be owned is a
conceptual reality (nothing
>> physical changes when land is owned by some
entity). That land can have
>> value is also a conceptual reality. What the
value might be of a
>> specific
>> piece of land is a social reality (as recent
history in the US
>> demonstrates). The fact that a specific
entity owns a specific piece of
>> land is mostly a conceptual reality, but has
elements of social reality
>> (i.e., what happens when the revolution
comes? Will the ownership of the
>> land still be recognized by others? The value
will almost certainly be
>> significantly different after the revolution
– as might be the
>> currency
>> used to represent the value of the land).
****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Hans****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> *From:* ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:
>> ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
*On Behalf Of *Hans Polzer
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 21, 2012 7:51 PM
>>
>> *To:* '[ontolog-forum]
'
>> *Subject:* Re: [ontolog-forum]
metaphysis, semantics and the research
>> program of ontologies****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> William,****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Since we are dragging physicists into this
discussion, I would observe
>> that the issue is a lot like the “wave –
particle†duality of
>> light and
>> quantum mechanics. Humans share a conceptual
reality (if diverse and
>> from
>> different perspectives), as well as an
understanding of physical
>> reality.
>> Otherwise, we wouldn’t be having this
discussion. As we have discussed
>> separately, there is also a social reality
– what is real and
>> acceptable in
>> different social circles, such as on the TV
show “Survivor†– in
>> which the
>> survivor is rarely (never?) the one best able
to deal with physical –
>> or
>> conceptual – reality. It’s called reality
TV for a reason.****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Hans****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> *From:* ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
*On Behalf Of *William
>> Frank
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 21, 2012 6:37 PM
>> *To:* [ontolog-forum]
>> *Subject:* Re: [ontolog-forum]
metaphysis, semantics and the research
>> program of ontologies****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> 'To me, the problem is in this supposed
"dichotomy". Implicit in
>> saying:
>>
>> "The ontology is build upon universals
in reality* rather than*
>> concepts"
>>
>> I think that this is ***not*** a dichotomy. I
think that every
>> perspective
>> on reality is structured according to human
concepts, But that the
>> reality
>> is ***still there***, and is what it is, not
something we just "make
>> up".
>> Or that cultures "just make
up." (If that were true,then there would be
>> no
>> reason to prefer insulin to incantations for
curing diabetes. We could
>> solve the world healthcare crisis over
night.) Only, we can't observe
>> it
>> without putting our own mark on
it. How much and what kiind of a mark,
>> is
>> what varies. Just as in the
"nature versus nurture" non- "arguments".
>>
>> I think that this what of the theoretical
linguists cited in the paper
>> are
>> saying (Lakoff, Jackendoff). I
think that this is what physicists
>> understand very well.
>>
>>
>>
>> For example, the paper cited says:
>>
>> "Is ontology about the 'real world' (as
seen, say by a physicist), *or
>> rather*, should it take cognition into
account"
>>
>> There's that "rather" again.
Whoa!!! who has a more complex,
>> human-created ontology than
physicists??? The Ether?? Wait a minute.
>> (well
>> that's ok because it was 'wrong'?) What
about Dark Matter????
>> Strings??????? Force, mass, and
distance were plenty bad enough. Their
>> ontology provide the explanatory framework
for what they more directly
>> observe (but even those are intemediated by
instruments whose
>> measurements
>> depend on theories).
But, of course, every time there is a new
>> theory,
>> that explains things better, and is simpler,
most physicists believe
>> that
>> the ontology on which this new theory is
based is *closer* to what is
>> 'really real.' Yet, they know
they will never be done, and can always
>> be
>> proved wrong even in their most basic
assumptions.
>>
>> I believe that this has been well
demonstrated to be **very subtle* in
>> the
>> last century, and we should be building on
that knowledge. Not some
>> simple
>> either -or at all. That cultures as a whole
strive to explain more than
>> they can, sometimes woefully
inadequately. But international
>> scientific
>> culture has learned to be increasingly modest
about what it claims to
>> "know", and to increasingly
understand the importance of the role of the
>> observer in the equation, from Heisenberg's
Uncertainly principle and
>> Godel's incompleteness proofs to the kinds of
demonstration that Rich
>> was
>> sending around. Yet, this
does not mean that reality is *just*
>> whatever
>> you say it is. You can't see *anything*
without your conceptual
>> glasses
>> on, but you couldn't see anything, either,
unless there was something to
>> look at.
>>
>> If we have a robot that can see obstacles, it
needs to have a theory
>> that
>> organizes its visual field into "things".
Are the things 'really
>> there',
>> or are they a construct of the robot's
processing? This is the kind of
>> question that I think has been shown to be
without much meaning, or at
>> least without much use asking.
>>
>> So, given this, from a practical point of
view, I agree completely with
>> what Mathew West says below.
Which we emphasize will depend on our
>> interests, just as environmental medicine
will look at nurture while
>> genetics is looking at nature.
Personally, I think ontologies need to
>> be
>> reconciled with viewpoints, but believing in
viewpoints as I do, I can
>> also
>> well imagine that there could be a use for a
more "realist" kind of
>> ontology.
>>
>> But, to argue about this, that is, insist on
which perspective on how we
>> organize or perceptions as manifestations of
things in themselves is
>> 'right' -- that the conceptual frameworks are
themselves really out
>> there
>> or are created by people's minds, seems no
more necessary than I can see
>> it
>> to be useful.
>>
>> Finally, I think that this is what Kant said
in the Critique of Pure
>> Reason, and that just about everybody who has
spent much mind space
>> since
>> has agreed,at least outside of philosophy of
mathematics. I that we
>> don't
>> need to rehash metaphysics without the
benefit of the world's greatest
>> geniuses, who we can have in the room with
us.
>>
>> http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/kant/section1.html
>>
>> I think that as temperamentally and in detail
at odds as they were, both
>> Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein are both
Kantians.
>>
>> So, I wholehearted support
"research" into how to put Computer Science
>> ontology work onto a firmer foundation, but I
think that the research
>> would
>> take the form of learning more of what has
already been done, and
>> applying
>> it to computer science and engineering.
>>
>>
>> Wm
>>
>> **
>> ******
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Matthew West
>> <dr.matthew.west@xxxxxxxxx>
>> wrote:****
>>
>> Dear Marcelino,****
>>
>> I think you will find people here who favour
one or other of these
>> approaches. Which they favour will often be
determined by the kinds of
>> problems they are interested in.****
>>
>> Me. I’m a realist interested in the
application of ontology to
>> engineering.
>> ****
>>
>> Regards****
>>
>> Matthew West ****
>>
>> Information Junction****
>>
>> Tel: +44 1489 880185****
>>
>> Mobile:
+44 750 3385279****
>>
>> Skype: dr.matthew.west****
>>
>> matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx****
>>
>> http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/****
>>
>> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/****
>>
>> This email originates from Information
Junction Ltd. Registered in
>> England
>> and Wales No. 6632177.****
>>
>> Registered office: 2 Brookside,
Meadow Way,
Letchworth Garden City,
>> Hertfordshire, SG6 3JE.****
>>
>> *From:* ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:
>> ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
*On Behalf Of *Marcelino Sente
>> *Sent:* 21 March 2012 18:16
>> *To:* ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> *Subject:* Re: [ontolog-forum]
metaphysis, semantics and the research
>> program of ontologies****
>>
>> In this paper, the author discuss some
aspects raised by this topic and
>> present a "cognitivist
ontology".****
>>
>>
>> http://www.mind-consciousness-language.com/CarstensenTowardsCognitivistOntologies.pdf
>> ****
>>
>> The paper present a contrast between two main
views within the research
>> program in ontologies:****
>>
>> - Realist view: the ontology is build upon
universals in reality rather
>> than concepts. A good ontology is one which
corresponds to reality as it
>> exists beyond our concepts.****
>>
>> - Conceptualist view: the ontology is a
explicit speciï¬cation of a
>> conceptualization. A good ontology is one
which captures our shared
>> conceptualization.****
>>
>>
>> I would like to know the position of the
members of this forum about
>> this
>> aspects.****
>>
>> Thanks****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> 2012/3/16 Marcelino Sente <zaratruta@xxxxxxxxx>****
>>
>> Let consider this assertion (refered as A1):
>> “It should be emphasized that we are
talking about a perceived world
>> and
>> not a metaphysical world without a knowerâ€
(Rosch 1978, p.29) ****
>>
>> How this assertion impacts on the research
program of ontologies?****
>>
>> Some initiatives regarding conceptual
modeling, systems
>> interoperability,
>> and conceptual analysis have been using of
theories coming from the
>> domain
>> of formal ontology. I say "formal
ontology", in the sense of Husserl, as
>> analogous to formal logic. Whilst formal
logic deals with formal logical
>> structures (e.g.,truth, validity,
consistency) independently of their
>> veracity, formal ontology deals with formal
ontological structures
>> (e.g.,
>> theory of parthood, types and instantiation,
identity, dependence,
>> unity),
>> i.e., with formal aspects of entities
irrespective of their particular
>> nature. Some (so called) foundational
ontologies (as UFO - unified
>> foundational ontology) embody several
conceptions coming from the
>> "formal
>> ontology". So...What A1 say about the
use of conceptions imported from
>> "formal ontology" to the territory
of semantic web, communication among
>> computer and humans and systems
interoperability? ****
>>
>> How can we view and compare the contributions
related to the realist
>> semantics and cognitive semantics, regarding
our objetives expressed
>> above
>> (semantic web, communication among computer
and humans and systems
>> interoperability)? Does make sense think in
terms of cognitive semantics
>> in
>> the reserach program of ontologies?****
>>
>> Reference:
>> E. Rosch (1978) Principles of Categorization.
in: E. Rosch and B. Lloyd
>> (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization. pp.
27-48, Lawrence
Erlbaum
>> Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey.****
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> William Frank
>>
>> 413/376-8167****
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
> --
> William Frank
>
> 413/376-8167
>
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