On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 12:55 PM, doug foxvog <doug@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Wed, March 21, 2012 21:07, William Frank wrote:
> As we have also discussed separately, I think you make a nice and useful
> distincition here, but I do believe that these uses of the words
> "physical"
> and "conceptual" are different from the way the words were used in the
> founding subject for this thread, or in the article in question, or in the
> history and philosopy of science. There, " a piece of land" is ***also**
> something that only can be percieved to exist by having conceptual glasses
> that let you see some directly observable pheonomia (sensations of colors
> and touch and sound), and turn these into a concrete "thing".
I agreed up until the word "concrete".
You are right, I agree only up to that word, too. By using that meaningless-in-this context word "concrete", I hoisted myself by my own petard.
I was trying to say, "let's get the amateur metaphysics out of ontology as a branch of computer science: at least read the cliff notes on Kant, Wittgenstein, or read Popper, Mario Bunge, Lakoff, etc. before you start out on your own". But then I dropped in some of my own thoughtless wording right there. And, at the same time, Amanda Vizedom summarized a practical, common sense set of assertions that I thought let us move on, and several others said similarly sensible things.
I love what these geniuses say about metaphysics and epistomology in the last century or so, and they helped me see that I personally wanted to stay away from unanswerable questions. I can't seem to help expressing my own weak understanding of this to others. But, I would rather not belabor matters outside my own areas of expertise on a public forum. So, after I read what everyone else said, I thought I was off the hook.
But I can't help but want to talk about such matters, with anyone who wants to. I just don't see it as something I am successful at adding to the word's clarity of knowledge about, especially using email as the medium. As you just showed, this is an area in which one must be *very* careful in choices of words, while most people, especially me, neither write nor read emails carefully enough, and there is always the temptation to to veer the thread off in the direction of one's own pet subjects. Then, a reader finds a red herring in a miswording or misunderstanding to follow instead of the point of the thread, and the first sometimes says: "I GUESS YOU MUST HAVE NOT BOTHERED TO READ MY MAIL!!!". Doesn't ever look like fun to me.
So, I will respond to the rest of your message privately, and we can continue thus, if you wish.
Thanks,
Wm
ANYTHING can only be PERCEIVED to exist by having conceptual glasses
that let one OBSERVE some PHYSICAL PHENOMENA and then model it as a MENTAL
"thing".
This is a definition of perception.
Is a "piece of land" physical? Since it has mass and a physical location,
one could conclude it is.
Is a "piece of land" a MENTAL concept? In so far as its borders are not
defined by physical criteria (e.g. a cliff edge or concrete curb) it is.
Any given spot on a "piece of land" on earth is on googleplexes of
connected pieces of land as changing the border by a micron at any
location would define a different "piece of land".
What constitutes an OBJECT in the real world in many cases is a conceptual
definition. When is a brick that starts flaking no longer the "same"
brick?
Some things in the natural world tend to act as individual objects, but
they can gain and loose pieces, and change shape and location.
Fundamental particles (electrons, quarks, ...) apparently can not gain or
loose parts and can be considered to be real-world OBJECTS irrespective of
conceptualization, but almost any other "physical object" that is modeled
is in some sense a conceptual object, since its boundaries (temporal
and/or physical) are temporally defined.
> So, *everything* we see in any world we are in is part of a conceptual
If we see it and identify it, identification makes (our representation of) it
part of our conceptual framework.
> framework, whether that be one you categorize nicely as physical,
> "conceptual" (in your special meaning) or "social". That is, mass and
> land are "physical"* concepts*,
> ownership and value are "conceptual" *concepts*,
> and valuation is a "social": *concept*.
Ownership, value, and valuation are all social concepts.
> All are concepts meaning 2, and
> also, all are based, in different ways, on exteranl reality that must be
> **assumed** or taken to be "objective", as well as on how we classify the
> things in that reality.
The "external reality" of a social concept is a feature of an intangible
social reality.
> Even though, as you say, all the good words are
> already taken, I think that "conceptual reality", as separate from
> "physical reality" is a misleading _expression_.
Why do you consider the distinction to be misleading? "Physical reality"
applies to things that can [at least "conceptually" 8)# ] be measured by
physical devices. "Conceptual reality" deals with interpretation.
Or course, what can be physically measured depends upon context. In
various contexts, things beyond a certain (temporal or linear) scale would
be out of context and not part of that context's physical reality. And,
of course, context is a conceptual, not physical concept -- although it may
be given a physical definition.
> In fact, I find the physics of string theory to be alot more "conceptual"
> and less based in "reality" than
> following my freinds preferences on facebook.
The first is an issue of context, not physicality. Preferences are by
definition conceptual. Being part of a "conceptual reality" does not
make something less "real" -- just differentially real.
> Further, if I
> think I see a peice of land, other people may show me that I am probably
> mistaken, if none of them see it. So, social reality bleeds into the
> physical.
i wouldn't consider this "social reality".
-- doug foxvog
> (As it does in physics itself, where being laughed at is a
> motivator of what physicists see, 'I would bet.)
>
> On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 8:20 PM, Hans Polzer < hpolzer@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> Just to elaborate a bit, a piece of land is a physical reality (leaving
>> aside the issue of thickness into the earth and the air above the land).
>> The concept that land can be owned is a conceptual reality (nothing
>> physical changes when land is owned by some entity). That land can have
>> value is also a conceptual reality. What the value might be of a
>> specific
>> piece of land is a social reality (as recent history in the US
>> demonstrates). The fact that a specific entity owns a specific piece of
>> land is mostly a conceptual reality, but has elements of social reality
>> (i.e., what happens when the revolution comes? Will the ownership of the
>> land still be recognized by others? The value will almost certainly be
>> currency
>> used to represent the value of the land). ****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Hans****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> *From:* ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
>> ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Hans Polzer
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 21, 2012 7:51 PM
>>
>> *To:* '[ontolog-forum] '
>> *Subject:* Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis, semantics and the research
>> program of ontologies****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> William,****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Since we are dragging physicists into this discussion, I would observe
>> that the issue is a lot like the “wave – particle†duality of
>> light and
>> quantum mechanics. Humans share a conceptual reality (if diverse and
>> from
>> different perspectives), as well as an understanding of physical
>> reality.
>> Otherwise, we wouldn’t be having this discussion. As we have discussed
>> separately, there is also a social reality – what is real and
>> acceptable in
>> different social circles, such as on the TV show “Survivor†– in
>> which the
>> survivor is rarely (never?) the one best able to deal with physical –
>> or
>> conceptual – reality. It’s called reality TV for a reason.****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> Hans****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> *From:* ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *William
>> Frank
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 21, 2012 6:37 PM
>> *To:* [ontolog-forum]
>> *Subject:* Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis, semantics and the research
>> program of ontologies****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> 'To me, the problem is in this supposed "dichotomy". Implicit in
>> saying:
>>
>> "The ontology is build upon universals in reality* rather than*
>> concepts"
>>
>> I think that this is ***not*** a dichotomy. I think that every
>> perspective
>> on reality is structured according to human concepts, But that the
>> reality
>> is ***still there***, and is what it is, not something we just "make
>> up".
>> Or that cultures "just make up." (If that were true,then there would be
>> no
>> reason to prefer insulin to incantations for curing diabetes. We could
>> solve the world healthcare crisis over night.) Only, we can't observe
>> it
>> without putting our own mark on it. How much and what kiind of a mark,
>> is
>> what varies. Just as in the "nature versus nurture" non- "arguments".
>>
>> I think that this what of the theoretical linguists cited in the paper
>> are
>> saying (Lakoff, Jackendoff). I think that this is what physicists
>> understand very well.
>>
>>
>>
>> For example, the paper cited says:
>>
>> "Is ontology about the 'real world' (as seen, say by a physicist), *or
>> rather*, should it take cognition into account"
>>
>> There's that "rather" again. Whoa!!! who has a more complex,
>> human-created ontology than physicists??? The Ether?? Wait a minute.
>> (well
>> that's ok because it was 'wrong'?) What about Dark Matter????
>> Strings??????? Force, mass, and distance were plenty bad enough. Their
>> ontology provide the explanatory framework for what they more directly
>> observe (but even those are intemediated by instruments whose
>> measurements
>> depend on theories). But, of course, every time there is a new
>> theory,
>> that explains things better, and is simpler, most physicists believe
>> that
>> the ontology on which this new theory is based is *closer* to what is
>> 'really real.' Yet, they know they will never be done, and can always
>> be
>> proved wrong even in their most basic assumptions.
>>
>> I believe that this has been well demonstrated to be **very subtle* in
>> the
>> last century, and we should be building on that knowledge. Not some
>> simple
>> either -or at all. That cultures as a whole strive to explain more than
>> they can, sometimes woefully inadequately. But international
>> scientific
>> culture has learned to be increasingly modest about what it claims to
>> "know", and to increasingly understand the importance of the role of the
>> observer in the equation, from Heisenberg's Uncertainly principle and
>> Godel's incompleteness proofs to the kinds of demonstration that Rich
>> was
>> sending around. Yet, this does not mean that reality is *just*
>> whatever
>> you say it is. You can't see *anything* without your conceptual
>> glasses
>> on, but you couldn't see anything, either, unless there was something to
>> look at.
>>
>> If we have a robot that can see obstacles, it needs to have a theory
>> that
>> organizes its visual field into "things". Are the things 'really
>> there',
>> or are they a construct of the robot's processing? This is the kind of
>> question that I think has been shown to be without much meaning, or at
>> least without much use asking.
>>
>> So, given this, from a practical point of view, I agree completely with
>> what Mathew West says below. Which we emphasize will depend on our
>> interests, just as environmental medicine will look at nurture while
>> genetics is looking at nature. Personally, I think ontologies need to
>> be
>> reconciled with viewpoints, but believing in viewpoints as I do, I can
>> also
>> well imagine that there could be a use for a more "realist" kind of
>> ontology.
>>
>> But, to argue about this, that is, insist on which perspective on how we
>> organize or perceptions as manifestations of things in themselves is
>> 'right' -- that the conceptual frameworks are themselves really out
>> there
>> or are created by people's minds, seems no more necessary than I can see
>> it
>> to be useful.
>>
>> Finally, I think that this is what Kant said in the Critique of Pure
>> Reason, and that just about everybody who has spent much mind space
>> since
>> has agreed,at least outside of philosophy of mathematics. I that we
>> don't
>> need to rehash metaphysics without the benefit of the world's greatest
>> geniuses, who we can have in the room with us.
>>
>> http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/kant/section1.html
>>
>> I think that as temperamentally and in detail at odds as they were, both
>> Karl Popper and Ludwig Wittgenstein are both Kantians.
>>
>> So, I wholehearted support "research" into how to put Computer Science
>> ontology work onto a firmer foundation, but I think that the research
>> would
>> take the form of learning more of what has already been done, and
>> applying
>> it to computer science and engineering.
>>
>>
>> Wm
>>
>> ******
>> wrote:****
>>
>> Dear Marcelino,****
>>
>> I think you will find people here who favour one or other of these
>> approaches. Which they favour will often be determined by the kinds of
>> problems they are interested in.****
>>
>> Me. I’m a realist interested in the application of ontology to
>> engineering.
>> ****
>>
>> Regards****
>>
>> Matthew West ****
>>
>> Information Junction****
>>
>> Tel: +44 1489 880185****
>>
>> Mobile: +44 750 3385279****
>>
>> Skype: dr.matthew.west****
>>
>> matthew.west@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx****
>>
>> http://www.informationjunction.co.uk/****
>>
>> http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/****
>>
>> This email originates from Information Junction Ltd. Registered in
>> England
>> and Wales No. 6632177.****
>>
>> Registered office: 2 Brookside, Meadow Way, Letchworth Garden City,
>> Hertfordshire, SG6 3JE.****
>>
>> *From:* ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
>> ontolog-forum-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Marcelino Sente
>> *Sent:* 21 March 2012 18:16
>> *To:* ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> *Subject:* Re: [ontolog-forum] metaphysis, semantics and the research
>> program of ontologies****
>>
>> In this paper, the author discuss some aspects raised by this topic and
>> present a "cognitivist ontology".****
>>
>>
>> http://www.mind-consciousness-language.com/CarstensenTowardsCognitivistOntologies.pdf
>> ****
>>
>> The paper present a contrast between two main views within the research
>> program in ontologies:****
>>
>> - Realist view: the ontology is build upon universals in reality rather
>> than concepts. A good ontology is one which corresponds to reality as it
>> exists beyond our concepts.****
>>
>> - Conceptualist view: the ontology is a explicit speciï¬ cation of a
>> conceptualization. A good ontology is one which captures our shared
>> conceptualization.****
>>
>>
>> I would like to know the position of the members of this forum about
>> this
>> aspects.****
>>
>> Thanks****
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> 2012/3/16 Marcelino Sente <zaratruta@xxxxxxxxx>****
>>
>> Let consider this assertion (refered as A1):
>> “It should be emphasized that we are talking about a perceived world
>> and
>> not a metaphysical world without a knower†(Rosch 1978, p.29) ****
>>
>> How this assertion impacts on the research program of ontologies?****
>>
>> Some initiatives regarding conceptual modeling, systems
>> interoperability,
>> and conceptual analysis have been using of theories coming from the
>> domain
>> of formal ontology. I say "formal ontology", in the sense of Husserl, as
>> analogous to formal logic. Whilst formal logic deals with formal logical
>> structures (e.g.,truth, validity, consistency) independently of their
>> veracity, formal ontology deals with formal ontological structures
>> (e.g.,
>> theory of parthood, types and instantiation, identity, dependence,
>> unity),
>> i.e., with formal aspects of entities irrespective of their particular
>> nature. Some (so called) foundational ontologies (as UFO - unified
>> foundational ontology) embody several conceptions coming from the
>> "formal
>> ontology". So...What A1 say about the use of conceptions imported from
>> "formal ontology" to the territory of semantic web, communication among
>> computer and humans and systems interoperability? ****
>>
>> How can we view and compare the contributions related to the realist
>> semantics and cognitive semantics, regarding our objetives expressed
>> above
>> (semantic web, communication among computer and humans and systems
>> interoperability)? Does make sense think in terms of cognitive semantics
>> in
>> the reserach program of ontologies?****
>>
>> Reference:
>> E. Rosch (1978) Principles of Categorization. in: E. Rosch and B. Lloyd
>> (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization. pp. 27-48, Lawrence Erlbaum
>> Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey.****
>> To join: http://ontolog.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J****
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> William Frank
>>
>> 413/376-8167****
--
William Frank
413/376-8167
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