2012/3/16 Marcelino Sente <zaratruta@xxxxxxxxx>
Let consider this assertion (refered as A1):
“It should be emphasized that we are talking about a perceived world and not a metaphysical world without a knower” (Rosch 1978, p.29)
How this assertion impacts on the research program of ontologies?
Some initiatives regarding conceptual modeling, systems interoperability, and conceptual analysis have been using of theories coming from the domain of formal ontology. I say "formal ontology", in the sense of Husserl, as analogous to formal logic. Whilst formal logic deals with formal logical structures (e.g.,truth, validity, consistency) independently of their veracity, formal ontology deals with formal ontological structures (e.g., theory of parthood, types and instantiation, identity, dependence, unity), i.e., with formal aspects of entities irrespective of their particular nature. Some (so called) foundational ontologies (as UFO - unified foundational ontology) embody several conceptions coming from the "formal ontology". So...What A1 say about the use of conceptions imported from "formal ontology" to the territory of semantic web, communication among computer and humans and systems interoperability?
How can we view and compare the contributions related to the realist semantics and cognitive semantics, regarding our objetives expressed above (semantic web, communication among computer and humans and systems interoperability)? Does make sense think in terms of cognitive semantics in the reserach program of ontologies?
E. Rosch (1978) Principles of Categorization. in: E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization. pp. 27-48, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey.