I don't know if this is helpful, but I always try and keep in mind
that meaning is not truth and truth is not meaning.
Ontology notations allow one to make a meaningful model of some
domain. How you apply those (i.e. whether the meaningful concepts
you define relate to some set of real things or not) is a separate
matter.
So the considerations of what kind of world you are modeling, and
what you choose to model it with, are two separate matters.
Mike
On 22/03/2012 03:51, William Frank wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 6:22 PM, Amanda
Vizedom <amanda.vizedom@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Marcelino,
I'll try to respond without going into too much detail for a
reasonable post. I believe that this is a false dichotomy.
yes, it seems that all of
the initial responses said this same thing, in one way or
another, if I can gloss them
depends on your interests,
(mathew west)
a false dichotomy because
"reality" is something that one only gets *closer* to, by
using special-purposed partial models, or contexts, that can
be interelated. (amanda viedom)
there is no "either - or"
because it is not a meaningful question when framed that
way, it *has** to be a both-and, to make sense (william
frank)
there are different
interrelated perspectives on reality, using different kinds
of constructs and relationships, no one of these being the
"correct" one - hans polzer
Was interested to hear about
Contextual Realism, (Richard Schlagel). I love the below,
which seems to fit all these views, and seems to me like a
kind of modest common sense, that includes viewpoints and
the views you see from the viewpoint (my favorite things),
while at the same time saying that just because our views
are partial and different does not mean there is no
objectivity possible. There is a real elephant, even if we
can experience and create models for only one part at a
time. We can then work to tie our views together.
(people have a predisposition to agree, so I hear).
* There is a real world.
* It is incredibly, fantastically complicated.
* One aspect of that complication is that the world looks very
different depending on where in it you are standing and what
you are
doing.
* One's chance and ability to get things more *right* about
the world
is much improved if one takes into account, or at least
acknowledges,
the fact of this complex variation in perception of, cognition
about,
and interaction with the world.
* It may be the case that a unifying model of reality, that
takes into
account all of these contextual variations in perception,
cognition,
and interaction while also incorporating the aspects of
reality
partially captured in local models, is, in principle possible.
* It seems likely that any such unified model is itself
incredibly
complex. Certainly, anything approaching it is a long way from
what we
can manage now, even collectively.
* Knowledge advances in particular sciences (e.g., physics v.,
chemistry) through use of local, partial models. Even were it
possible
to force all chemists to work in the terms and models of
physics,
there seems to be no advantage to doing so, and much
disadvantage.
* Similarly, knowledge can and does advance in many areas, at
many
levels of granularity, through us of local, partial models.
Even if it
were possible to force abandonment of those local, partial
models,
there seems little advantage to doing so, and there is much
disadvantage.
* Contextual Realism recommends acknowledging the locality and
partiality of the views of reality available and usable from
within
different contexts (including different model-motivating
activities)
* Contextual Realism also recommends that pursuit of
understanding
that crosses such contexts, whether for the purpose of
bringing
together knowledge from multiple contexts or for some other
purpose,
is best supported not by attempting to erase the local models
and the
complexities of reality and our interaction with it from which
they
result, but by attempting to *capture* the variations and
dependencies
as much as we can, where we encounter them. Doing so also has
the
pragmatic benefit of enabling humans from outside the context
of some
given model to begin to understand the assumptions, use,
scope, and
limitations of that model, and thus to use or not use, and to
interpret it, accurately.
Thus, it can be understood that an applied, computational
ontology --
the kind of artifact with which we are concerned -- is a model
of an
underlying reality. And as a model, It is itself a
conceptualization.
It is also created for some motivating purpose, that is, to
enable
understanding of , interaction with, reasoning about some
aspects of
that reality. And as a model, it is inherently incomplete -
created
in part via incomplete interaction with reality and
contextualized
perception and cognition.
It *might* be possible, in principle, to create a grand
unified
ontological model that incorporates all of these partial
models. But
(a) it is not certain that this is so, and (b) such a model
would not
be usable to for any purpose for which we currently can use
models.
Such a thing, if possible, would surely be too unwieldy to use
for
local, specialized reasoning, by humans or machines.
On the other hand, creating ontological models that reflect
acknowledgement of, and to some degree explicitly capture,
their
contextual location not only serves the purposes that motivate
modeling in the first place, but also provides for the
possibility of
using information about context to enable making connections
between
local, contextual models. Who knows? The accumulation of
information
about such conditions of variation *might* lead us slowly
towards more
complete, less partial, understanding. It *does* give us
models that
support reasoning and discovery within fields, in part by
respecting
that localized, partial conceptualizations often reflect
optimization
of models by experts and through experience. And, to the
extent
context/provenance factors are captured, good local,
contextual models
also enable sharing knowledge across contexts, by supporting
the
incorporation of knowledge *about* context into
interpretation.
So, I say: it's a false dilemma. Ontologies can be models of
reality
*and* conceptualizations, if both realism and
conceptualization are
understood non-naively and with an acceptance of the
extraordinary
complexity of reality and an appreciation of the ways in which
real
contexts, including knowledge-seeking purposes, can motivate,
drive,
and shape conceptualizations.
Best,
Amanda
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 14:15, Marcelino Sente < zaratruta@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> In this paper, the author discuss some aspects raised
by this topic and present a "cognitivist ontology".
>
> http://www.mind-consciousness-language.com/CarstensenTowardsCognitivistOntologies.pdf
>
> The paper present a contrast between two main views
within the research program in ontologies:
> - Realist view: the ontology is build upon universals
in reality rather than concepts. A good ontology is one
which corresponds to reality as it exists beyond our
concepts.
> - Conceptualist view: the ontology is a explicit
specification of a conceptualization. A good ontology is
one which captures our shared conceptualization.
>
> I would like to know the position of the members of
this forum about this aspects.
>
> Thanks
>
>
>
> 2012/3/16 Marcelino Sente < zaratruta@xxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> Let consider this assertion (refered as A1):
>> “It should be emphasized that we are talking
about a perceived world and not a metaphysical world
without a knower” (Rosch 1978, p.29)
>>
>> How this assertion impacts on the research
program of ontologies?
>>
>> Some initiatives regarding conceptual modeling,
systems interoperability, and conceptual analysis have
been using of theories coming from the domain of formal
ontology. I say "formal ontology", in the sense of
Husserl, as analogous to formal logic. Whilst formal logic
deals with formal logical structures (e.g.,truth,
validity, consistency) independently of their veracity,
formal ontology deals with formal ontological structures
(e.g., theory of parthood, types and instantiation,
identity, dependence, unity), i.e., with formal aspects of
entities irrespective of their particular nature. Some (so
called) foundational ontologies (as UFO - unified
foundational ontology) embody several conceptions coming
from the "formal ontology". So...What A1 say about the use
of conceptions imported from "formal ontology" to the
territory of semantic web, communication among computer
and humans and systems interoperability?
>>
>> How can we view and compare the contributions
related to the realist semantics and cognitive semantics,
regarding our objetives expressed above (semantic web,
communication among computer and humans and systems
interoperability)? Does make sense think in terms of
cognitive semantics in the reserach program of ontologies?
>>
>> Reference:
>> E. Rosch (1978) Principles of Categorization. in:
E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and
Categorization. pp. 27-48, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Hillsdale, New Jersey.
>
>
>
>
> _
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