JS: (01)
> Indeed. Counterfactual statements are a method of
> talking about possible ways that our real world could be. That does
> involve some logical questions, but they can be resolved without assuming
> an ontology of possible worlds. (02)
A theory of counterfactuals = a theory of possibility. (03)
> That leads to my preferred way of talking:
> replace every occurrence of the term 'possible world' with 'how the world
> would be if ...'. (04)
Ok, let's leave the term "world" out of the glossary. The question becomes: (05)
How do you define the meaning of "possible"? (06)
You and everybody else uses the term, so I don't think it's a good
choice to just say "it's pragmatic to not to problemize over it".
Isn't it the same with possibility as it is with all the rest of
metaphysics: one commits to some theory implicitly or explicitly, but
it is better to explicate one's commitments because these exist in any
case. (07)
Every systematic philosophy must give some account of the nature of
possibility. The main constraint I wish to place on such an account is
that it be compatible with Naturalism. The term 'Naturalism' is often
used rather vaguely, but I shall understand by it the doctrine nothing
at all exists except the single world of space and time. So my
objective is to give an acount of possibility which is in no way
other-worldly. D.M. Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility,
p3. (08)
-Avril (09)
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