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Re: [ontolog-forum] "Amy Winehouse is the apotheosis and nadir of post-m

To: "[ontolog-forum]" <ontolog-forum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
From: Yuk Hui <huiyuk@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 17:33:48 +0100
Message-id: <8d6d70840906090933x615a8f3ej111f4a161a30b22@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Thank you for asking Chris. I was referring to a critique by Husserl on his contemporary logicians, and mainly Frege I guess. The critique starts by claiming that the universality promised by logic, already assumes a kind of objectivity which excludes a subjective understanding. (the ambiguity of the "subjective" can be traced to Frege's critique of Husserl's psychologism in his review of Husserl's book The Philosophy of Arithmatics) If we look at Frege's idea of sinn and bedeutung, it is widely translated as meaning and reference, which only specify the relation between meaning and the object which it belongs to. Husserl tries to understand meaning not as a presupposed relation to the object, but as a subjective explication of the object, hence meaning in terms language should not be valified by the objectivity of the object, but the constant creation and modification of meaning in the subject's own understanding.

On Tue, Jun 9, 2009 at 4:36 PM, Christopher Menzel <cmenzel@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Jun 9, 2009, at 5:59 AM, Yuk Hui wrote:
> ... Halliday's approach to meaning instead of ontology is
> interesting, which is similar to what I am working on, though I
> didn't know his work until now. And this sounds to me more like a
> phenomenological approach, then we may see difference meanings,
> ranging from the Fregean Sinn und Bedeutung to Husserlian congnitive
> meaning pertaining to a horizontal ideality. And this is no more
> easier than analysing natural language indeed...but it proposes
> another logic which is not based on the objecitivity of things, but
> the objectivity of meanings.

I'm not sure from that brief description what that distinction is
supposed to be, but there is certainly a clear sense in which meanings
-- typically understood as truth conditions -- in standard logic are
"objective".  Indeed,  I can't really think of a sense in which they
are not.  So whatever is "other" about the other logic you mention,
it's got to be something other than that.

Chris Menzel

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