On Jun 9, 2009, at 5:59 AM, Yuk Hui wrote:
> ... Halliday's approach to meaning instead of ontology is
> interesting, which is similar to what I am working on, though I
> didn't know his work until now. And this sounds to me more like a
> phenomenological approach, then we may see difference meanings,
> ranging from the Fregean Sinn und Bedeutung to Husserlian congnitive
> meaning pertaining to a horizontal ideality. And this is no more
> easier than analysing natural language indeed...but it proposes
> another logic which is not based on the objecitivity of things, but
> the objectivity of meanings. (01)
I'm not sure from that brief description what that distinction is
supposed to be, but there is certainly a clear sense in which meanings
-- typically understood as truth conditions -- in standard logic are
"objective". Indeed, I can't really think of a sense in which they
are not. So whatever is "other" about the other logic you mention,
it's got to be something other than that. (02)
Chris Menzel (03)
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