Dear Chris Menzel
You quoted me:
RS: In our MEASUR
methods we use only the words of the users. All
invented vaguely
word-like strings one finds in OWL, for example,
are not permitted.
CM: For some purposes, that might
be quite appropriate. However,
something like the "vaguely
word-like strings one finds in OWL" are
indispensable if you are
interested in (a) sharing your ontologies in
a standardized fashion on the Web
or (b) being able to take advantage
of powerful computer-based tools
to manage and reason upon ontologies
generally. Are you not
interested in these things?
RS: Indeed I am but the human
users take precedence, in my opinion.
RS: 'Listening in'
to the ontolog discussions I sense a widespread
belief that logic
and formal methods will solve the problems of
ontology development.
CM: I doubt there is a single
person who participates in this forum who
thinks that. What many here
do believe is that logic and formal
methods are *necessary* to the
solution of the problems of ontology
development. No one believes
they are sufficient in and of themselves.
RS: I take your word for that but
the tone of some discussions made me suspicious. I am accustomed to using
‘ontology’ in the metaphysical sense where formal methods are of secondary
importance.
RS: I am all for
formal precision once we are sure we have fully grasped
what we need to be
formal and precise about.
CM: Well, sure, if all that means
is that we have to clearly circumscribe
the intended domain of an
ontology. But a major point of introducing
formal methods, once we are clear
about the domain, is to make
concepts out of ordinary discourse
that are initially vague and
ambiguous clear and precise.
RS: That suggests that we can
clear up the meanings we find in ‘ordinary discourse’ (which naturally is
defective?) using formal methods. I find that, although formal methods help
during the intermediate stages of analysis, they cannot finally remove all
defects and ultimately one must rely upon the relevant people for their
judgements.
I thought that the
age of logicism had closed by mid-20th century.
CM: Logicism, a creation of the
German mathematician Gottlob Frege in the
late 1800s, was an attempt to
"ground" all of mathematics on logical
principles alone. Bertrand
Russell torpedoed Frege's attempt around
the turn of the 19th century by
showing that it was possible to deduce
his famous paradox in Frege's
system. Russell's own attempt to
resurrect logicism in Principia
Mathematica (1910-1913, with co-author
A. N. Whitehead) also largely
ended in failure, a fact widely
acknowledged by the mid-1920s.
"Logicism" is also sometimes used to
refer to the logic-based approach
to AI and knowledge engineering,
which didn't even exist until the
mid-20th century. And this movement
is of course still very robust.
RS: True! But the tone of much
ontolog discussion suggests that the attitudes of the logicists are still
influential.
The generic-specific
hierarchies that play such an important role in OWL 'ontologies' play only
a minor role in our schemas because they are forms of cognitive norms without
ontological importance. We use them to make some schemas rather more succinct.
CM: Why the ironic quotes around
'ontologies'?
RS: Because of a deep personal
prejudice against using ‘ontology’ in the ontolog sense I would feel dishonest
to omit them. Putting ‘ontology’ before ontology is putting the cart before
the horse.
CM: Do you have any arguments
(beyond the mere observation that they simply have no role to play in your own
approach) to suggest that OWL ontologies, even those that are only type
hierarchies, don't deserve the label?
RS: I’m sure they deserve the
label if understood in its established ontolog sense. But I would like to see
a clear, explicit statement of the ontological assumptions on which OWL is
based. Can you provide one?
I have placed two
papers on a very amateurish website: www.rstamper.co.uk
CM: This URL is broken.
RS: And I am mortified and full
of apologies. When I have the chance I shall attend to the problem.
Ronald Stamper